The A-4 CAS missions flown during the siege of Khe Sanh
The 1968 Tet Offensive was part of a larger communist attack that mostly failed, despite being primarily a land battle with little to no naval air activity. Estimates of the Viet Gong’s losses during the two-week conflict range from 32,000 killed to 5800 captured. However, thousands of North Vietnamese were attacking the embattled camp at Khe Sanh, which was located farther to the northwest, around six miles from the Laotian border. The camp served as a crucial block to the enemy’s southbound supplies. The North Vietnamese realized that the camp, which Marines had reinforced in January 1967, had to be taken. Khe Sanh prepared himself for a major enemy attack.
As explained by Peter Mersky in his book US Navy and Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawk Units of the Vietnam War, the 77-day siege of Khe Sanh was a bloody testament to the Marine Corps. The men on the ground fought a relentless enemy, cold, damp weather, and supply problems. Ultimately, they prevailed, giving the North Vietnamese a bloody nose they did not forget. Part of the story is the umbrella of air power that included all the services, including several Navy A-4 squadrons.
Low ceilings and enemy defenses
Lt(jg) John Kuchinski of VA-94 aboard Bon Homme Richard flew several missions over the area, coping with the low ceilings and enemy defenses that made approaching the camp so hazardous.
`We went every day for about a month to Khe Sanh, with each pilot flying two sorties a day. We checked in with “Waterboy,” the controlling agency, who would ask our type and number of aircraft and what ordnance we had. Then he’d put us in a stack, much like an airliner holding pattern. As flights below you went in, you would drop in altitude and switched over to a FAC (forward air controller). We were now down to between 11,000 and 13,000 ft, and the FAC would give us the target, run-in line, and location of enemy troops. Then we would salvo all our ordnance on the target and depart. Most of the time you could see where the fire was coming from as you sat in the stack waiting your turn.
‘Most of the AAA came from the karst ridges to the north and north-west of the base at Khe Sanh. C-130s would make their approaches front east to west, and most of the flak was directed at them as they landed or dropped off pallets. But sometimes we would take fire as we coordinated our runs with a C-130 approach so as to draw fire away from them.
A souped-up version of the A-4E
`I carried a 0.357 Magnum as a personal side arm, and once, as I approached my roll-in point, I had to put negative Gs on the aircraft to avoid tracking flak bursts that were all around me. As I pushed the stick forward, the Magnum came out of its holster on my chest and flew around the cockpit on the lanyard. It hit my helmet and bounced off the canopy a few times. After I rolled in, dropped, and departed, I reeled in the pistol and put it back in the holster. Fortunately, I always kept it on an empty chamber for safety, or it might have gone off in the cockpit. Later, I swapped the 0.357 for a little 0.25-calibre automatic.’
In 1968, Lt. (jg) Stephen Gray was with VA-212 aboard “Ronnie Dick.” By this point, the “Rampant Raiders” and the VA-93 “Blur Blazers” had switched to the A-4F. John Kuchinski’s VA-94, the third A-4 squadron in CVW-5, flew an upgraded A-4E with a more powerful engine that produced 1200 lbs more thrust.
Each Skyhawk usually carried eight bombs—six 500-lb bombs and two 250-lb bombs — along with a 400-gallon fuel tank on the fuselage centerline. As the A-4F carried a dorsal avionics pack, its load of 20 mm ammunition had been restored to 200 rounds per gun.
‘Although the smallest and lightest jet on board’, Gray recalls, ‘the A-4F took the hardest cat shot. Our minimum flying speed off the cat at combat launch weights was 174 knots, which had to be delivered in just 300 ft of catapult stroke. Having the cat set to the proper launch weight was critical.’
Terrible weather
The weather was bad as usual. The strike force launched on March 7, then veered southwest and climbed through the clouds in the direction of the coast.
The airborne controller known as ‘Hillsborough’ in an orbiting Air Force C-130 sent the strike force toward Khe Sanh, where they entered a track pattern to await further assignment by the FAC monitoring the action on the ground. Gray and his friends watched as a C-123 cargo aeroplane taxied to take-off position at the end of the runway. It was going to evacuate wounded Marines to Da Nang. Gray recalled;
The attack force was directed toward Khe Sanh by the airborne controller, “Hillsborough,” in an orbiting Air Force C-130. There, they entered a track pattern to await additional assignment by the FAC keeping an eye on the ground action. At the end of the runway, Gray and his pals observed a C-123 cargo aircraft taxiing to takeoff position. Its purpose was to transport injured Marines to Da Nang. Gray recalled;
‘Suddenly, I saw a white flash where the wings of the C-123 crossed the fuselage, followed by a yellow blossom of gasoline fire engulfing the entire aeroplane. A mortar round had nailed the transport, and although it was impossible to distinguish people from that altitude, we were sure no one could have survived that explosion. FACs and aircraft below us desperately tried to locate the mortar, but the NVA regulars were experienced jungle fighters and experts at camouflage. Finally, we were assigned a FAC who marked trenches with a white phosphorous rocket.’
The A-4s descended to 9000 ft under the USAF FAC’s control and dropped their Mk 81 250-lb bombs the impact points were as close as 100 meters from the base perimeter. The FAC’s `attaboys’ did little to relieve the frustration at not being able to see the NVA as they bombed them. Swartz reassembled his division and returned to the carrier.
A-4 Skyhawks providing cover for C-130s delivering supplies to Khe Sanh
In the coming weeks, CVW-5’s A-4s provided cover for C-130s delivering supplies to Khe Sanh. They knew where the NVA troops were— on the high ground south and west of the base, where they could sweep open ground around the airstrip with rifle and mortar fire. Retrieving supplies from the C-130s was extremely dangerous. On March 10, the runway was closed, and the A-4s were again circling above the embattled camp. They were waiting to do a Combat Sky Spot drop, which was a radar-directed bomb dump over a specific area. Stephen Gray, who was flying A-4F BuNo 154174, recalled;
`We would fly at high altitude and simply drop our bombs on command from the radar operator controller. Suddenly, the “Hillsborough” controller called with a contact — a Marine PAC attached to a company on a hill top west of the base. They were corning under heavy fire from a large NVA force and needed CAS immediately.
`Normally, Marine CAS was the province of Marine units, but none were available. The FAC suggested dropping our bombs using a Snakeye delivery because we could make only one pass, and fuel was a concern. The delivery involved a shallow ten-degree dive and releasing the bombs 800 ft above the target.’
The pilots selected a switch on their bombing consoles that pulled off the bands holding the folding fins of the Snakeye bombs, allowing the fins to deploy after they had left the aircraft.
`It was an extremely accurate bomb delivery, but one we didn’t use very often in North Vietnam because of the intensity of the low-altitude AAA around most targets. But it was perfect for CAS.’
Bombing halt
Gray and his flight saw that the Marines had marked their position with red panels and red smoke—there was only one position—there were only 75 meters of clear ground between them and their attackers. The A-4s split into two sections, making a wide sweep south.
‘Flashing over the battle, I saw lead and his wingman drop their bombs. I felt my aeroplane jump as my release sequencer rippled the bombs off my wings. Although I couldn’t look back to see the results, the relief was evident in the Marine FAC’s voice as he gleefully described our bombs hitting the enemy concentration directly. Another FAC gave us a body count of at least 50, with more in the trees.’
When the siege of Khe Sanh was lifted in April, President Johnson called for one of his bombing halts, this time including the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. These incredible ill-advised tests of North Vietnam’s willingness to negotiate were a sad and frustrating indication of just how deep Washington’s misunderstanding of how to run the war was, and US airmen were paying for this ignorance with their lives. It was at this time that Johnson declared he would not seek another term as president.
US Navy and Marine Corps A-4 Skyhawk Units of the Vietnam War is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Government
