A top-level decision was made in June 1963 to combine the VPAF and the Air Defence Forces. On October 22, 1963, a new organization known as the Air Defence Forces Vietnamese People’s Air Force (Phong Khong – Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet Nam) was established under the leadership of Col. Gen. Phung The Tai. He was assisted by Col. Gen. Dang Tinh.
The ADF-VPAF unified the air force, radar, and air defense units under a single command. The air defense forces were made up of 11 regiments, three of which were devoted to radar units, and 18 companies were in charge of the radar gear. The 919th transport wing and the training wing were both parts of the VPAF at the time (the 910th). It had 83 aircraft on duty, including 44 transports, 12 helicopters, and 27 trainers, and it managed 10 sites that were active and a handful that were still under construction.
The North Vietnamese had a very narrow window of time as the conflict began to develop their air force and air defenses from scratch. They lacked many fighters and were vastly outnumbered by swift jets from the US Air Force and Navy. Also, fighter pilot training was of a much lower level than that of their adversaries.
The problems for the ADF-VPAF were further complicated by the shape of the country, which made defense against fast-flying attackers almost impossible. North Vietnam is 800 km long from north to south but only 70 km wide in the south and 400 km wide in the north. US planes coming in from different directions would frequently give a small heads-up, and the attackers would typically be over their objectives minutes after crossing into the coast. When the fighters were scrambled, it was already too late; the intruders had already left.
The fact that the country is over 60% covered in jungle caused further difficulties for the units trying to move radar equipment. Also, the radar itself has flaws. Coverage up to a height of 500 m to 1000 m worked for up to 40 km, but continuous operation over 500 m was only achievable over flat areas, including the Red River valley and the coastline. In contrast, the radar was only functional over 4000 m in other parts of the country.
Observers had a role to play in spotting low-flying intruders, and look-out posts had been set up. They were able to report on arriving American pilots using radio, but the system was far from perfect because there were only a small number of observation posts and many US aircraft were never found. The Vietnamese air defenses’ early-warning radar capability and poor communication with fighter units were the weakest points in 1966. During this time, the radar equipment and units directly in charge of protecting significant industrial and urban centers were under the responsibility of the ADF-VPAF high command. Nonetheless, they had absolutely no power whatsoever over members of regional defense committees and military districts.
The fact that the air defense system only ran occasionally made things worse for the fighter groups. Without appropriate guidance from the ground, pilots frequently had to use only their eyes to locate their targets. Yet, this did have some advantages because bigger enemy aircraft formations say, eight to ten aircraft could be seen in daylight from up to 15 kilometers away. The North Vietnamese were able to approach the fighter bombers covertly since there was no radar to tell the American pilots that they had been observed.
As they were not allowed to reach areas patrolled by AAA units or SAM sites unless they were returning home at an altitude of 500–600 m, the Vietnamese were only able to fight their enemies in a small portion of the airspace available to them. Within the same defense region, coordinated action between fighters and SAM units was actually uncommon. The command center would grant a pilot permission to operate at a different height in specific circumstances, such as during a chase, when he was completing an attack, leaving a dogfight, or getting ready to land.
There was a significant possibility of “friendly-fire” occurrences. Defense units fired on their own airmen ten times in 1966 alone, downing two MiG-21s and severely injuring the others.
As the conflict continued on, a steady supply of weapons from China, the Soviet Union, and other communist nations was available. There were surface-to-air missiles (SA-2, SA-3, SA-7, SON-4/9, “Fan Song,” and “Low Blow”), fighters (MiG-17/F/PF, MiG-19, MiG-21F13/PF/PFM/MF), radar units (P-12 “Spoon Rest,” P-15 “Flat Face,” P-35 “Bar Lock,” and PRV-11 “Side Net,”), and conventional anti-aircraft artillery weapons (37, 57, 85 and 100 mm). The air defenses also became more effective at night and during the day thanks to a continual training program for pilots and ground troops.
The book “MiG 17 and MiG 19 Units of the Vietnam War” by István Toperczer and Iain Wyllie is available to purchase here.