Both Israeli Mirage pilots were scared away by Tupolev Tu-16 defensive fire from the tail-mounted barbette after their Shafrir Mk.1 air-to-air missile attack attempt failed
The Iraqi High Command in Baghdad gave Squadron Leader Farouk at-Tail, commander of the No. 10 Squadron, Iraqi Air Force (IrAF), the order to launch an air strike on Ramat David AB in northern Israel early on June 6, 1967 (the second day of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War). Tail made the fast decision to send four crews and four Tupolev Tu-16 bombers into this operation as single ships, with a quarter-hour between each aircraft. Each bomber was equipped with six FAB-500 bombs (caliber 500kg).
Together with Flt Lt Majid Turki, Tail piloted the first Tu-16. They traveled to Mafraq AB (now known as Salti AB) in Jordan at a high altitude before making a steep descent to save fuel. He increased his speed to 900 km/h as soon as he entered Israeli airspace, then began a climb to look for his intended target. The crew then reported having found Ramat David AB and released its bombs without any disturbance, around 0500hrs local time.
Israeli accounts claim that the crew actually struck an unspecified military installation close to Ta’amach, which is 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) southeast of Afula; the attack destroyed many structures, resulted in the deaths of two Israeli soldiers, and injured five others. The other two Tu-16s had less luck; they were both forced to return to Ton Habaniyah early after having to abort their missions because of mechanical issues. Sqn Ldr Hussein Mohammad ‘Kaka’ Hussein piloted the Tupolev Number 4, with Flt Lt Alwan serving as co-pilot, Flt Lt Rashid, Flt Lt Kargoli, and Flt Lt Sabih serving as navigator-gunners 1 and 2, respectively.
Like Tail before him, Hussein silently began a similar rise and entered Israeli airspace. But for some reason, his group was unable to launch an attack on the intended target. In defiance of directives not to attack civilian targets, it dropped its warlord shortly after 6:00 a.m. over the center of Netanya, a coastal town in northern Israel, killing one person and injured 21 others. Hussein and Alwan then redirected their bomber back into Israeli airspace while flying over the Mediterranean Sea. At that point, two Israeli Defense Force/Air Force (IDF/AF) Mirage IIICJ aircraft attacked them.
What specifically transpired after then is a subject of some debate. The Shafrir Mk.1 air-to-air missiles fired by the Mirages in one version of the story missed their target, and the two pilots were subsequently scared off by Sabih’s defensive fire from the barbette mounted on the back of the aircraft. They claimed that Sabih and Kargoli had fired from their barbettes on the aircraft and installations they observed below. Hussein and Alwan then flew their bomber directly over Ramat David AB while being pursued by two Mirages.
An Israeli air-to-air missile should have struck the lone Tu-16 shortly after that. The bomber was still under control and trying to flee in an easterly direction, Hussein said over the radio. He should have avoided a military base in Megiddo, where his bomber is said to have been shot down by an IDF-operated 40mm Bofors L/70 anti-aircraft gun. The bomber destroyed two teams of 120mm mortars and three barracks when it fell into a military storage facility, killing not only its crew but also between 11 and 14 Israeli soldiers in addition to its own crew members.
These two were the only Tu-16 airstrikes against Israel that are known to have taken place.
The photograph below was taken in 1965 and shows one of the Tu-16s from No. 10 Squadron together with the majority of its pilots. With the material at hand, I am unable to confirm the involvement or the death of any “Hussein ad-Dahy” in the airstrike on Ramat David on June 6, 1967. However, it’s possible that the pilot of the lost Tupolev bomber went by that complete name.
Photo by U.S. Air Force