The USAAF lost 214 soldiers in Romania, according to the Romanian Gendarmerie, but several B-24 aircraft had crew members who were so badly burned that it was impossible to identify them
Operation Tidal Wave was one of the boldest and most controversial air raids of World War II.
The Ploesti oilfields in Romania served as both a major strategic air power target and Germany’s single most important fuel supply in 1943. However, the Tidal Wave raid, which used B-24s flown from Libya to destroy the refineries, ended up being one of the most expensive US Army Air Force (USAAF) operations to date, with roughly a third of the force being shot down. Although clearly valiant, the mission’s outcomes—for which five Medals of Honor were given—were in doubt. Initial evaluations claimed that 40% of Ploesti’s refinery capacity had been lost, however, subsequent research found that the damage was swiftly fixed and output levels increased.
According to Steven J. Zaloga in his book Ploesti 1943, Gen. Alfred Gerstenberg (who led the Luftwaffe in Romania from February 15, 1942, to August 27, 1944), in his initial report to Berlin, acknowledged the damage to the refineries but noted that it would not significantly affect the supply of fuel to Germany and its allies. The attack also resulted in devastating losses for the USAAF. Senior Romanian and German leadership met in Bucharest on August 3, 1943, to examine the takeaways from the Ploesti raid.
The meeting included Marshal Ion Antonescu, General de escadra Gheorghe Jienescu (Romanian Air Minister), General de divizie Gheorghe D. Marinescu (Romanian Air Defenses), German Ambassador Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Gen Gerstenberg, Oberst Woldenga (German fighter forces), Gen Kuderna (commander of 5.Flak Division), and others.
Even though the raid had significantly damaged the refineries, Gerstenberg pointed out that they were still in operation and that production might resume normally in a few weeks. Despite numerous recommendations for enhancing air defense, Ploesti’s Flak defense was determined to be the single most crucial cause of the raid’s demise. The conference felt that the Flak was too spread and that only about a third of the German and Romanian antiaircraft weaponry in Romania was concentrated in Ploesti and the Prahova valley.
Consequently, a program was started to focus the Flak defenses on the most critical places, including Bucharest, Ploesti, the Cernavoda bridge, the port of Constanta, and the manufacturing cities of Reqita and Brasov. As a result of the assumption that subsequent raids would come from high altitudes following the failure of the low-altitude raid, there was also universal agreement on the necessity for more antiaircraft guns, notably heavy batteries of 105mm. It would also be necessary to deploy more radar stations and increase the fighter force.
The FARR (Fortele Aeriene RegalenRomane, Royal Romanian Air Force) launched 54 flights with 13 kill claims while having 31 available aircraft and crews on August 1. In the proximity of Ploesti, the Luftwaffe operated 26 aircraft with crews, carried out 69 missions, and recorded 15 kills. The other five kills claimed by Jagdgeschwader are not included in this. 27 from the Greek base at Kalamaki/Tanagara attacked the retreating Tidal Wave force over the Ionian Sea.
Romanian assessments seriously downgraded the number of bombers lost to fighters. Many of the bombers that fighters claimed to have shot down had already been mortally injured by flak, and the fighters had only shown up to provide the finishing blow. After the Tidal Wave, one of the key technical assessments was that the fighter aircraft needed to be updated with a 20mm cannon because the machine-gun-equipped fighters could not damage a heavy bomber effectively enough.
An enormous overstatement was made by the Tidal Wave bomber crews when they claimed to have shot down 52 hostile aircraft. In the final battles over the Ionian Sea, the Luftwaffe lost two BF 109G-2 aircraft destroyed and four damaged from I./JG.4, and two Bf 109Gs destroyed and one damaged from JG.27. Night-fighter losses were one Bf 110E-4 destroyed and four damaged from NJG.6. Two JAR 80 fighters were lost by the FARR, three were damaged, and one Romanian Bf 110C was also destroyed. During the encounters, at least two Romanian Bf 109G-2s were also damaged.
According to Romanian reports, between 34 and 36 bombers were shot down over the country, 26 of which crashed outside of the city of Ploesti and nine of which crashed nearby. Due to numerous bombers disintegrating and burning after colliding with the refineries, the number of bombers varied. Officials from Romania sent the US a list of 25 mostly intact aircraft that could be recognized by serial number in 1944. According to estimations, fighters (12), balloon wires, and flak (20) were to blame for the bomber losses (4).
According to the first US assessment, fighters were mostly to blame for five to six of the losses above Ploesti, balloon cables for one, and one or two planes may have been destroyed by bomb explosions or other ground fires. The light 20mm and 37mm guns were blamed for the majority of the Flaknkills by both the Germans and the Romanians. Low-altitude engagements were not well suited for the 88mm guns. The USAAF suffered 214 deaths in Romania, according to the Romanian Gendarmerie, however other aircraft had crew members who were so badly burned that it was impossible to identify them.
The number of casualties on the ground varies between reports. Most recent sources state that there were over 300 fatalities and injuries. The B-24 crash into the women’s penitentiary, which resulted in 61 deaths and 60 injuries, was the single most expensive incident. Three 88mm guns and five 20mm guns were lost in terms of equipment. When their wires were damaged, seven barrage balloons were released, and five more were set on fire and destroyed.
Ploesti 1943 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force