26 crew members and passengers aboard the two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters lost their lives in those few seconds, and the F-15 Eagle’s reputation was permanently damaged
On April 14, 1994, disaster struck when two F-15Cs piloted by Capt. Eric Wickson (lead) and Lt. Col. Randy W. May (wingman) shot down two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters carrying 26 crew members and passengers over northern Iraq. May was now the CO of the 53rd Fighter Squadron (FS) and already had the controversial Mi-24 kill to his name from three years prior. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) blamed a series of mistakes that started with the general in charge of the Operation Provide Comfort Task Force and went all the way down.
The day began at 0635 hours with the launch of two F-15Cs, designated “Tiger 01” and “02,” on a sweep of the airspace north of the no-fly zone, before changing to a DCA/CAP mission in the region, as stated by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat. The two UH-60s took off from Zakhu at 06:54 a.m. using the call sign “Eagle,” informing AWACS (call sign “Cougar”) of their departure location and their intended destination. At 0720 hours, Wickson, flying in “Tiger 01,” informed “Cougar” that he had entered northern Iraq. He then ordered his flight to conduct a sweep of the region in search of Iraqi aircraft.
The AWACS controller failed to relay the necessary information to the F-15 pilots, who were unaware that a friendly helicopter flight was operating in the very same airspace it was supposed to “delouse” because the ATO did not contain any specific information about the “Eagle” flight.
Two minutes later, Wickson reported a radar contact on a slow-moving, low-flying aircraft that was 40 miles to the southeast of his own location and 52 miles from the southern limit of the no-fly zone. “Cougar” reacted with a “clean there” call, indicating that the AWACS controller’s scope had no targets. While planning an intercept to investigate, the F-15 pilots used IFF to check the contacts for a friendly electronic response.
By 0725 hours (about three minutes after “Tiger 01” had discovered the radar contacts), the distance had shrunk to 20 miles. Wickson again shouted the contacts out to “Cougar,” who reacted this time with “hits there,” indicating that he too had seen the radar contact. The IFF returns were being sent to “Cougar” via the IFF transponders on the “Eagle” aircraft; the AWACS was not picking them up on direct radar returns.
A minute later, Wickson’s reported contacts were still present in the area where the UH-60’s IFF returns were not only clearly visible but also identified as being. Despite this, AWACS still failed to alert the “Tiger” flight to the availability of IFF data in the target area. Each six-second attempt to elicit a response from the target via Wickson’s own IFF interrogations in the commercial and military (Mode IV) modes failed. Wickson then locked the target up. ‘Tiger 01′ and ’02’ moved in closer to make a visual identification.
At 7:27 a.m., Wickson approached within seven miles and called “Tiger 01” to confirm that there was just one helicopter in the area. Standby VID’. In order to avoid any forward-firing weaponry that an enemy gunship could have, he passed “Eagle 01″ at a height of 500 feet and 1000 feet to the left at 450 knots (giving an overtake of 320 knots—”Eagle” was at 130 knots). He then pulled off high and to the right over the top of the helicopter. He noticed that the helicopter was carrying sponsons that were equipped with weapons, but he was unable to identify any other distinctive markings on the green-camouflaged helicopter.
He radioed, ‘”Tiger 01″. VID “Hind” — no, “Hip”‘, at 0728 hrs, before referring to an in-flight silhouette guide to clarify his VID. Wickson then called, ‘”Tiger 01”, disregard “Hip”. VID “Hind”‘. With that he reversed course from the southeast to the northwest, before acquiring a visual on the second helicopter, trailing ‘Eagle 01’ by two miles. His call ‘”Tiger 01”. VID “Hind”, tally two, lead-trail’, prompted ‘Cougar’ to respond, ‘Copy “Hinds”‘. Wickson now sought confirmation of his VID from May in ‘Tiger 02’. “‘Tiger 02”, confirm “Hinds”‘. He later reported receiving the response, ‘Standby’.
The final series of errors started at this time when May flew 2000 feet to the right of the helicopter that was trailing and broadcast “Tiger 02,” tally two, claiming to have both helicopters’ insight. Although May just intended to say that he had the insight into the two helicopters, Wickson misunderstood this signal and believed that May had concurred with his ‘Hind’ VID.
After informing AWACS that two “Hinds” had been engaged, Wickson flew to a location ten miles to the northwest of the helicopters in a planned maneuver that gave the F-15 pilots enough time to launch a successful attack.
As he rolled back towards the helicopters, Wickson called, ‘”Tiger” arm hot, “Tiger 01” is hot’, telling May that he was cleared to fire provided that ROE was met. He then transmitted on the AUX radio, `We’re coming up behind them. There are two in lead-trail. “Tiger 01” is going first. I will shoot the trailer and then you will shoot the leader’. Wickson and May switched to AUTO ACQ mode to acquire their quarry and then attempted a final IFF interrogation, before visually acquiring their respective targets in their HUDs.
‘”TIGER 01″, fox. “TIGER 01”, splash one “Hind”. “Tiger 02”, you’re engaged with the second one. He’s off my nose two miles, right past the fireball. “02” call in. “01’s” off left’. Wickson had despatched the trailing UH-60 with an AIM-120 fired from about four miles out. May followed with an AIM-9 fired about 9000 ft away from ‘Eagle 01’. ‘”Tiger 02″ in hot. “Tiger 02”, splash second “Hind”‘. May reportedly ended the engagement with the words, ‘Stick a fork in him — he’s done!’
The 26 crew and passengers aboard the two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters lost their lives in those few seconds, and the F-15 Eagle’s reputation was permanently damaged. Numerous circumstances contributed to the catastrophe, as explained by Steve Davies and Doug Dildy in their book F-15 Eagle Engaged. The lack of awareness on the part of the AWACS controller resulted in a court-martial. The lack of information in the ATO and Special Instructions (“spins”) cost the career of a very talented, dedicated, and conscientious brigadier general heading the OPC operation. However, the USAF failed to place the blame on the perpetrators of the event.
The F-15 pilots failed in a fundamental fighter pilot responsibility — to be able to correctly visually identify an enemy aircraft from one in their own nation’s military — and miscommunicated the ID. While the squadron commander was the wingman (as was frequently the case in these typically dull and boring missions, the flight lead responsibilities were alternated to give the younger pilots more flight leadership experience), he set the tone in the squadron, failed to convey his true (if later testimony is accepted) appreciation for the situation, and, if he was truly unsure whether the targets were friendly or Iraqi, failed to call off the attack. The Black Hawks were still 40 miles away from the No-Fly Zone line and weren’t going there anyhow at 130 knots. There was certainly enough time, but none was used.
Even worse, the USAF handled the aftermath of the incident appallingly. Initial court-martial charges against the two pilots were withdrawn by the commanding general, reportedly due to a lack of evidence. This prevented the world, and in particular, the grieving loved ones of those who perished aboard the helicopters, from learning the merits of each participant’s conduct. The two aviators received typical, encouraging assignments for their next deployments up until CSAF General Ron Fogleman intervened and resolved the issue. Many people believe that the way the Air Force handled the case’s aftermath was almost as much of a black mark for its reputation as the unfortunate incident itself.
The negative blotch on the otherwise impeccable record of the 53rd FS “Tigers” prevented them from ever fully recovering. Closing the unit was the only way the USAF could end the problem and the suffering. On March 10, 1999, this was completed, leaving USAFE with just one Eagle squadron for the ensuing conflict in its theater.
F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
F-15 Eagle Engaged is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by Sgt. Janel Schroeder and MSGT STEVEN TURNER / U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense
