Beaulier went after the second MiG, using a ‘lag pursuit’ tactic to give his F-4J Phantom II the correct distance for an AIM-9D shot…
After their MiG-21 shoot-down on March 28, 1970, Lt. Jerry Beaulier (left) and Lt. (jg.) Steve Barkley (sporting his famous mustache) of VF-142 are shown eagerly inspecting a celebratory bottle of champagne, perhaps taken from the carrier battle group commander.
Both men were Topgun grads from the very first class, and Barkley had served as a pilot in the USAF. When he thought back on his many years of working with Jerry, he said, “Being a bit older and possibly more focused on quality and survival, our missions tended to be quite well planned and “by our book.” Nobody ever saw a MiG at that stage of the war, much less get within Sparrow range of a bandit. Despite this, they meticulously planned their strategy for such a situation and conducted numerous BARCAP missions in the hopes of being able to attract a MiG to the surface of the sea.
According to Peter E. Davies’ account in U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969–1973, on March 28, 1970, Beaulier and Barkley were launched in F-4J “Dakota 201” (BuNo 155875) as the replacement spare for VF-142 CO Cdr Ruel E. Gardner in a CAP flight led by CVW-14 commander and F-8 MiG killer Cdr Paul Speer. They carried three external fuel tanks, two AIM-7Es, and three AIM-9Ds in preparation for a prolonged fighter sweep. The flight, which was vectored into MiG-21s by PO White aboard the destroyer USS Horne (DLG-30), the day’s “Red Crown” radar control ship, included a third F-4J with the crew of Lt. Cdr. Gary Hakanson and Lt. (jg.) Dave van Asdlen.
At the 25-mile range, they were cleared to fire AIM-7Es, but Hakanson’s radar was inoperative, and Barkley’s also died as they approached the target, ruling out Sparrow launches. ‘I was really disappointed — the perfect set-up for a head-on shot and no radar! I fought it for about five miles and then gave up’ recalled Barkley. It was later realized that the radar in Speer’s F-4 was also faulty, being limited to a one-mile range.
Beaulier closed after spotting the MiGs 10,000 feet above them. The MiGs dove in their direction as the F-4Js rose to intercept. Beaulier wheeled behind the leading MiG-21, but his F-4 quickly ran out of fuel since he was still towing three external tanks that created drag. The first MiG’s “Atoll” attempt at Speer’s Phantom II was unsuccessful, but Beaulier pursued the second MiG using a “lag pursuit” strategy to put him in position for an AIM-9D hit. The missile’s seeker head wasn’t properly set, yet it still managed to explode inside the MiG-21’s exhaust. We stopped and got a look as the unlucky aircraft fell into the cloud below us at the MiGs’ “four o’clock” position. We never witnessed an ejection, Barkley observed.
Pham Thanh Nam, an inexperienced 921st FR pilot, perished in the collision. As the Rules of Engagement (RoE) at the time prohibited assaults on MiGs unless they threatened a reconnaissance or BARCAP mission, the F-4 crew’s success could not be acknowledged publicly. Eventually, a report was made public that claimed Beaulier’s MiG-21 had been intercepted as it was attacking an RA-5C.
A MiG kill was a significant accomplishment for the F-4 pilots, especially during a period of relatively limited activity on the ground. Successful crews were also honored with specially crafted cakes, widespread media coverage, and congratulations visits with top war managers. Even though aircraft carriers were primarily platforms for attack aircraft, similar praise for successful assault aircrew and missions was uncommon.
Photo by U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.