On November 25, 1944, the kamikaze campaign had just been going for a month. The US Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was the primary target of the Japanese, who mainly avoided it for the majority of the first few days of the campaign
On November 25, 1944, the kamikaze campaign had just been going for a month. The US Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was the primary target of the Japanese, who mainly missed it for the majority of the first several days of the campaign. There had been a few strikes, but most of the carriers hit by kamikazes between October 26 and November 25 had been escort carriers, as explained by Mark Lardas in the book The Kamikaze Campaign 1944-45. Assault on fast carriers has only resulted in one hit, the Essex-class Yorktown on November 5. Yet on November 25, Japan spun the wheel of destiny and won big.
TF38 was making a third visit to a patch of ocean off Luzon’s eastern coast to attack naval targets around Luzon. The fast carriers were coming back to that region every week to conduct airstrikes, as the Japanese had observed. On the days the American carriers were supposed to arrive, they continued air searches over the area and discovered them.
This time, the US Navy was the one that was taken off guard. The US was understaffed, with fewer planes available for CAP and fighter sweeps centered on the airfields surrounding Luzon since only two of TF38’s three carrier groups were deployed.
In the early afternoon of November 25, the Japanese launched a series of kamikaze raids. Also, rather than the airfields close to Manila where the US fighters were looking for them, the kamikazes originated from southern Luzon. Three waves of kamikaze aircraft hit both US carrier groups between 12:30 and 13:00. By the time the attacks ended, four carriers had been struck: the Essex-class fleet carriers Essex, Intrepid, and Hancock, and the light carrier Cabot.
In comparison to other carriers in the larger fleet, the Cabot was more vulnerable. Based on the hulls of light cruisers, light carriers have less defensive margin than fleet carriers. They had one-third of the 40mm armament carried by the Essex-class ships and half the displacement of the fleet carriers, as well as a far weaker antiaircraft battery but lacked five-inch guns. Hence it was difficult for a light carrier to shoot down an approaching kamikaze.
This was demonstrated on November 25 when a kamikaze attacked the carrier shortly before 1300 hours. When the kamikaze approached, the Cabot opened fire with all of its 40mm Bofors in an effort to stop it, but it was unable to do so because there was not enough steel in the air to do so. Despite receiving a number of hits, the aircraft was not stopped by any of them. It advanced persistently under the influence of momentum and collided with the Cabot on the port side of the forward flight deck. It destroyed the port catwalk, and a portion of the forward gun gallery, and left a 6-foot hole in the flight deck.
A second kamikaze dived at the Cabot a short while later. This time, the kamikaze was forced to miss and splashed into the nearby water by the carrier’s anti-aircraft fire.
The Kamikaze Campaign 1944–45 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by: Adam Tooby via Osprey
