MiG Killers

“This is the first time to my knowledge that an airplane scored a kill while carrying four 2,000-lb bombs, then continued to hit its target,” Lieutenant Commander Mark Fox, VFA-81 F/A-18 Hornet Pilot

On Jan. 17, 1991, Lieutenant Commander Mark Fox and Lieutenant Nick Mongillo launched with five other VFA-81 F/A-18 Hornets as part of a CVW-17 strike. Lieutenant Commander Fox was an airborne spare and was not scheduled to cross the beach. However, three of the scheduled strikers aborted for various reasons, and Lieutenant Commander Fox joined the three remaining aircraft as they headed inland.

CVW-17 on USS Saratoga (CV-60) flew the strike together with aircraft from CVW-3 on USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). It was the first daylight strike of the Gulf War. The previous night had seen an intense first-strike effort by hundreds of allied aircraft against Iraqi facilities, especially around Baghdad and the major airfields in western Iraq codenamed H-2 and H-3.

Although the enemy defenses had everyone’s attention—there had been heavy concentrations of AAA and SAMs, and few Iraqi interceptors had taken off—the planners had scheduled an ongoing series of around-the-clock strikes. Planes had been lost during the first strikes, all to flak and SAMs. The MiGs and Mirages had been in the air, but none had been flown aggressively. The threat was there, however, and not to be taken lightly.

The four Sunliner F/A-18Cs each carried four Mk 84 2,000-lb bombs, a hefty load for a single-seat aircraft. They approached their target, an H-3 airfield in western Iraq, in a ‘wall’, line abreast. The other two Hornet pilots were Commander Bill McKee, VFA-81’s Executive Officer, and Lieutenant Commander ‘Chuck’ Osborne.

High overhead, the ever-present AWACS and an E-2C from Saratoga’s VAW-125 monitored the strike. Although they were under visual ID (VID) Rules of Engagement, the Hornet pilots knew the E-2 could make a difference. The Hawkeye used various geographic reference points for its calls.

As he ran in on his target, Lieutenant Commander Fox was confident of himself, his aircraft, and the rest of his flight, as he explains in the book Gulf Air War Debrief.

“I didn’t leave thinking I wasn’t going to come back later. During the few hours before we entered Iraqi airspace, I thought about a lot of practical things. I made sure everything was set up, switches were in the right position, and I kept the other three planes in sight. There wasn’t time to think about anything but the mission.”

As they ran in from the south, the radio was alive with calls from other portions of the strike group. Kennedy’s package had run into a few MiG-29s that had tailed the strikers as they exited the target area after delivering their ordnance. The ‘Fulcrums’ stalked the CVW-3 planes as two F-15Cs from the USAF’s 33rd TFW, based at Eglin AFB, Florida, dropped from their CAP station. The F-14 escort watched as the F-15s streaked past and fired missiles at the MiGs. Two MiG-29s failed to return to their base.

When Lieutenant Commander Fox and his flight were about 30 miles from their target, their systems set up for the bomb delivery they would soon make, the E-2 called a bandit alert as MiGs seemed to head for the VFA-81 Hornets soon after the Kennedy group had left the area. The Hornets flew on.

Then, Lieutenant John Joyce, the E-2’s Air Control Officer (ACO)—one of the three Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) in the back of an E-2—made another call, this time with a real sense of urgency.

“Hornets, bandits on your nose, 15 miles!”

That was it. Lieutenant Commander Fox and Lieutenant Mongillo each thumbed the knurled knob on the control stick that selected the missiles and changed their systems to air-to-air mode. Their hands tightened on the stick-mounted trigger that fired their missiles.

As the flight flew on, Fox in F/A-18C AA 401 (BuNo 163508) and Mongillo in AA 410 (BuNo 163502) looked for the oncoming MiGs. Fox got a lock-on at 10 miles—two MiG-21s in a left echelon, a standard Soviet formation. Commander McKee and Lieutenant Commander Osborne had also locked up the lead MiG.

“It all happened very quickly. I switched back to air-to-air and got a lock on one of them. I had the MiG on the right, while the second Hornet in our formation, Lieutenant Mongillo, took the MiG on the left. The other two Hornets had also acquired radar locks.

“The MiGs approached us, nose on, supersonic at Mach 1.2. Our relative rate of closure Was more than 1,200 kt. They weren’t maneuvering.

“I shot a Sidewinder first. It was a smokeless missile and I thought, at first, that I had wasted it because I couldn’t see it tracking toward the MiG. I fired a Sparrow. The Sidewinder hit, though, followed by the Sparrow. The first missile actually did the job, and the Sparrow flew into the fireball. The whole event, from the E-2’s call to missile impact, took less than 40 seconds.”

Lieutenant Mongillo fired a single Sparrownwhich took out the second MiG-21.

“The Iraqi pilot knew what he was getting into when he climbed into that jet and took off after us.”

Following their two kills, the two new shooters rejoined their flight and continued with their bomb delivery. Throughout their engagement with the MiGs, they had kept their bombs, all 8,000 lb of them. As the four F/A-18s came off-target and headed south, they could see the two columns of black smoke rising up from the desert where the two MiGs had crashed—in the same relative formation as when they were shot down.

Talking about the strike-fighter concept that the F/A-18 represents, Fox has a definite opinion. “This is the first time to my knowledge that an airplane scored a kill while carrying four 2,000-lb bombs, then continued on to hit its target. If the MiGs had gotten behind us, we would have had no choice but to honor their threat. You can’t do that with 8,000 lb of bombs. We would have had to jettison ordnance to face them and would have served their purpose in stopping our strike. They failed; we succeeded.” These two kills were the only confirmed air-to-air Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft.

Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force

‘I looked at him more closely and saw that he had two missile pylons under each wing. Now I knew that it was not an F-15 or F-14. That was the moment I knew that my target was a “Foxbat”. Then I started shooting’ Rick ‘Kluso’ Tollini, F-15 pilot

The F-15C Eagle is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to permit the U.S. Air Force (USAF) to gain and maintain air supremacy over the battlefield.

F-15C and D models were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 in support of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) where they proved their superior combat capability. The F-15C fighters in fact accounted for 34 of the 37 USAF air-to-air victories.

As told by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat, on Jan. 19, 1991 (the third day of ODS) at Tabuk AB, Rick ‘Kluso’ Tollini (F-15 pilot from the 58th Tactical Fighter Squadron, TFS) was ready to lead a mission in support of F-15Es searching for elusive mobile “Scud” launchers. His four-ship Offensive Counter Air (OCA) flight, call-sign CITGO, comprised Larry ‘Cherry’ Pitts, John Kelk, and Mark Williams in tow.

Larry Pitts remembers: `By Day 3, we had realized that the IrAF was not going to pose as great a threat as we thought it would. We flew two missions that day, the first of which was canceled due to weather, but it still required us to stay on the tanker for six hours because there was intelligence that Saddam Hussein was going to try and leave the country, and senior commanders wanted us to shoot that flight down. Having hung on to the tanker for six hours, we went back thinking that we were going to have the day off.

‘As soon as we landed, the Ops Officer told us to get gas and take off again, so we refueled, got airborne, and then rendezvoused with a tanker south of the border. AWACS called two groups of enemy fighters 60 miles north of us just as we were coming off the tanker.’

The flight pushed north at 25,000 ft to engage the first group, which was dead ahead and 15,000 ft below.

Tollini recalled that AWACS had erroneously identified both groups as MiG-29s. However, he continued to monitor the first group as it headed off to the northeast, then checked his flight to the north to go head-on with the second group as it came south:

‘Once we locked the second group up they also maneuvered—this time to the west—and I remember that as they turned through west to the north, I thought we were going to have to chase them. Fairly quickly, they did a 270-degree turn to the south, coming straight at us from 30 miles out in a three or five-mile lead-trail formation, clown around 3000 ft MSL (Mean Sea Level – about 2000 ft Above Ground Level). My intention was to shoot a couple of AIM-7s and kill these guys BVR, so I locked the lead, and “J B” Kelk locked the trailer.’

With their concentration now focused exclusively on the south-bound MiGs in front of them Pitts recalled that the target jets executed a defensive maneuver:

‘”Kluso” got a good lock, and was ready to shoot at targeting range, when the MiGs went to the beam [perpendicular to Tollini and Pitts] and took it down low. We lost them, “Kluso” never got his missile off and we totally lost SA for a little bit. As we kept pushing north, we realized that one guy had come back in “hot”. He was coming left-to-right across our formation, five miles in front of us, at 300 ft and doing 700 knots. He had also lost his SA, and didn’t know that we were there.’

Being on the extreme left side of the F-15s’ wall formation, Mark Williams was the first to see the MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’ as it crossed from left to right in front of the 58th TFS pilots. However, it was Pitts who was in the best position to engage:

‘I called “Engaged!” and locked him up with my radar in a high-to-low weapons conversion, where I actually pulled 12G [F-15’s maximum allowable is 9G] and seriously over-stressed the jet! He was going so fast, however, that as soon as I locked him up he “gimballed” [flew off the radar’s coverage] me, and I began to think that I would never find him again because he was going like stink.

‘This was the second mission of the day; the weather was bad and he was now on top of a low overcast, and as I did the conversion, I saw him again and re-locked him with Auto Acq. As soon as I did that, he went into a defensive turn and broke into me, going from an easterly heading through south and then back to the west. By the time he turned from west to north, I was in weapons parameters and at a fighting speed of about 420-450 knots, but he was way above the Mach, flying this huge defensive turn.

‘I easily got inside his turn and again called “Engaged!” because I had not heard “Kluso” clear mee to fire. “Kluso” responded with “Press!”, which made me flight lead for a short time and indicated that he was now supporting me.

‘I was now 9000 feet behind the guy, and close to a tail aspect, so I selected an AIM-9. I got a good tone (the missile saw the target) and uncaged the weapon, after which I still had a good tone [the missile was tracking the target without the aid of the radar], so I launched. He immediately decoyed the AIM-9 with flares.’

The MiG’s timely release of countermeasures had spoofed the missile into shifting track from its hot exhausts to the even hotter burning magnesium flare.

‘As soon as he hit north, he stopped turning and tried to run, still at 300ft and now doing 500 knots. I selected an AIM-7, felt the clunk as it released, and then looked to the right and saw that he was almost flying information with me! The rocket motor then lit and it accelerated off right at him, and past his canopy without fusing.’

Now at 6000 ft, and with a pure tail aspect, Pitts re-selected the AIM-9, got a good tone, and uncaged:

‘Just as I was about to fire, he put out more flares, dragging the missile’s seeker head off before I could take the shot. I re-caged the weapon back to the radar, got a good tone, and shot, but he again decoyed it with flares. He was fighting pretty hard, and I was thinking, “Man, I am going to have to gun this guy”. I selected another AIM-7 and shot it, and this time the missile went right up my adversary’s tailpipe and exploded. “Kluso” must have been thinking “‘Cherry’ needs some help here” at the same time, because he shot an AIM-9 which went straight into the fireball. The pilot bailed out and his ejection seat passed right over my canopy — I thought it was going to hit me — and I started hearing his emergency locator on GUARD [radio frequency].’

Pitts made his ‘Splash’ call and pulled up into a left-hand, climbing turn. As he did so, he saw the other ‘Foxbat’ and called, ‘Two, second MiG-25, my nose, five miles’. Tollini responded with, `Engaged!’, but struggled to immediately identify the jet as a MiG-25, F-15, or F-14.

Tollini recalled the engagement from his own perspective:

‘I had “Willie” Williams searching high and “Cherry” Pitts searching low after the second group of MiGs beamed us and we lost them on the radar. Fortunately, “Cherry” was able to grab the trailer as he finished his beam to the east and then turned due south again, and I actually got the lead jet back on radar momentarily before both of them flew off of our scopes. “Cherry’s” guy started his right-hand turn underneath us, and my guy did a high-speed turn through the south, and I saw him leave the flight.’

Tollini transitioned from lead to wingman when Pitts called ‘Engaged’ on the first ‘Foxbat’. He followed Pitts through the maneuver that placed him behind the MiG-25:

‘The MiG was in a right-hand turn and we were at very close range when “Cherry” camped behind him. I joined the fight in a left-hand turn from the southeast and cut across the circle as the MiG continued its turn from the west towards the northeast. It was then that “Cherry” scarred shooting off all of his missiles. He was not having any luck, so I radioed, “Two, come off’, about which he later said to me, “‘Kluso’, I don’t remember you saying that”. My first shot got there a split-second later than his, and although I did not personally see the guy punch out, “Cherry” said that my missile got there seconds after the seat came out of the aircraft.’

With the troublesome Foxbat dealt with, Tollini began his own engagement:

`As “Cherry” peeled off to the west, I flew right behind his MiG and watched it enter the undercast and impact the ground. We had already dropped our wing tanks, and we were all going really fast, so I pulled into a high-G right-hand turn through east to south. As I did that, I had an Auto Acq mode slewed out to the south — I think more by accident than planning — and as I came around the corner to the south, the radar grabbed the other guy as he came back into the fight.’

The `Foxbat’ re-entered the fight from a northerly heading, and although both Pitts and Tollini missed it at the time, AWACS had made a timely call to advise ‘CITGO’ flight of the impending merge. Tollini continued:

‘The instant I snagged him, “Cherry” saw him visually and called him to me. Then it became an issue of ID again. When we merged the first time we had good ID, but having been spat out of the fight I didn’t know who he was when he came back in again. I didn’t know where “J B” and “Willie” had gone [they had actually departed the area to provide cover in case the original MiG-29 group attempted to pincer the flight], and I knew that there was a Navy package out there. This left me sitting barely a mile behind my target, looking at its tail, but unsure of what it Was.

‘What I could see was the jet’s two huge burner plumes, so I asked on the radio if anyone was in the burner. Having received various responses, I called everyone to get out of the burner — working on the basis that if my target was indeed one of us its pilot would comply. Well, he didn’t, so I looked at him more closely and saw that he had two missile pylons under each wing. Now I knew that it was not an F-15 or F-14. That was the moment I knew that my target was a “Foxbat”. Then I started shooting.’

The spare mental capacity that allowed Tollini to indulge in such dynamic thinking is a great indicator of how effective the USAF’s F-15 pilot training has been over the years. At a time when temporal distortion, `channelized’ attention, fear, and cognitive saturation can blunt the senses of any fighter pilot, Tollini’s efforts to ID the target were characterized as ‘outstanding’ by Pitts.

With the MiG positively identified, Tollini closed for the kill:

`I was in full burner, camped back there in pure pursuit. The pilot of this aircraft was not like the first MiG in that he was not putting out any chaff or flares. Maybe he could not see me because I was camped in his “deep six”, or maybe he’d run out of flares — I don’t know. But he stayed in this high-G turn. My first AIM-7 was at low aspect, maybe 20 to 30 degrees off of the tail, and I hit the pickle button and waited, but I didn’t see the missile flying out in front of me. We don’t know for sure, but we think the rocket motor failed to light [the AIM-7 was less than reliable throughout the war]. `I thumbed forward on the throttle-mounted weapons select switch to select an AIM-9, at which point what looked like a single flare popped out of the aircraft — it was not very bright, and it could have even been the pilot punching out, but I think I would have seen more flames if he had indeed ejected.

`In any case, I was not that confident that the AIM-9 would get there, having seen what happened to “Cherry’s” missiles, so as soon as I shot it I thumbed back to AIM-7 again. The AIM-9 flew close to his burner cans — through the plume —but then sailed wide and missed. I then shot the second AIM-7.’

In the temporal distortion that many pilots experienced at the time of their kills, Tollini watched the missile guide in a lag-pursuit mode for what seemed to him like minutes. It flew up from beneath the ‘Foxbat’ and then punctured its belly, exploding milliseconds later:

‘The explosion was huge, like the Death Star from the Star Wars film! The “Foxbat” totally disintegrated, and I was amazed because that had not happened to “Cherry’s” MiG.’

Even though Pitts had flown the visual engagement extremely well, and had employed his weapons properly, the first `Foxbat’ still required a total of five missiles to down it. To illustrate the point, every one of Pitts’ shots would have been classed as kills in a peacetime exercise. He credits the `Foxbat’ pilot with having put up a good fight — one of the few Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) pilots to do so throughout the war.

Tollini’s main concern had been to end the fight as quickly as possible, and that remained the priority. AWACS was warning that the original group of IrAF fighters initially intercepted by the F-15s was now headed south again, and his flight had already been sucked into one merged engagement in what had been a fairly ‘ugly’ intercept. Fortunately, Pitts and Tollini exited the area without any additional complications. The original group called out by AWACS failed to threaten either `CITGO’ flight or the strikers, although Kelk and Williams were still up high covering if they had.

The debrief for this flight was lengthy and intense. The mission had hardly gone according to plan, and there was no shying away from the customarily candid mission debrief—a modus operandi of everyday peacetime training that, `Kluso’ argues, is one of the reasons why the USAF was so successful in its quest to kill MiGs.

Did Pitts’ and Tollini’s hypothesis about Russian or ex-Soviet Bloc pilots come true? We will never know for sure, but Tollini offers this: ‘Look at it this way. They were either the best or luckiest Iraqi pilots in the world, or they were not Iraqis at all. They should not have survived to the merge—our tactics, weapons, and training should have been to that—but these guys used tactics both before the merge and at the merge that really impressed me. I often wonder.’

Photo by U.S. Air Force, Dmitriy Pichugin and Leonid Faerberg (transport-photo.com) via Wikipedia 

F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

“Another aircraft hit the ground at my ‘two o’clock’ about three miles away from where the first Mirage had come down. The pilot of the number two Mirage had gone into a hard right turn to the west in an effort to get away from us, suffered spatial disorientation and then flown into the ground,” Capt Robert ‘Cheese’ Graeter, F-15C pilot

The F-15C Eagle is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to permit the U.S. Air Force (USAF) to gain and maintain air supremacy over the battlefield.

F-15C and D models were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 in support of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) where they proved their superior combat capability. The F-15C fighters in fact accounted for 34 of the 37 USAF air-to-air victories.

In the early hours of Jan. 17, 1991, the 58th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) launched two flights of four F-15Cs, operating with the call-signs ‘Citgo 61′ to ’64’ and ‘Pennzoil 61′ to ’64’.

As told by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat, with ‘Pennzoil’ flight approximately 100 miles ahead to the northeast of Baghdad, and committed to intercepting the two groups of ‘bogeys’ called out by AWACS, `Citgo’ flight pushed northwest towards Mudaysis AB — a small airfield used by forward-deployed Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) assets, and with an alert component of Mirage F1EQs.

Capt Robert ‘Cheese’ Graeter, the same pilot who had flown cover for U.S. Navy P-3s during the KAL 007 incident some eight prior – was leading the flight in F-15C 85-0105, call-sign ‘Citgo 61’.

`Citgo’ was tasked to run directly at Mudaysis, then to turn northwest towards H2 and H3 airfields. Once there, Graeter was to set up a Barrier CAP (BARCAP) of two 25-mile legs between H2/H3 and Mudaysis, with a pair of Eagles on each leg. This would allow them to commit against IrAF fighters ascending from either base:

“As we ran towards Mudaysis, I could see all of the F-15Es on Mode 4 (IFF). We could also see a CAP of MiG-29s 50 to 60 miles northwest of Mudaysis and about 85 miles from us, but they were all we could see. I was pretty confident that the MiG-29s I could see were the same ones that AWACS was talking about because I was not getting a Mode 4 response in front of them. We were closing the distance on them, but we were not really running an intercept on them just yet.”

As `Citgo’ closed the gap, Graeter began to pick up new contacts over the top of Mudaysis: “I got a contact at low altitude, which was my search area of responsibility. I had my radar seen to search from ground level upwards to about 18 miles in front of me. Maw [Lt Scott Maw, ‘Citgo 62’] had the opposite area and was looking from 50,000 ft downwards. At 25 miles, my first contact appeared to be at about 1500 ft AGL, (Above Ground Level), on a departure heading northwest. He started a left-hand turn to the southeast, so I broke the lock and observed additional jets taking off. I could now see three contacts, all in a few miles trail.”

Maw and Graeter melded their radar images and sorted their targets (both Mirage F 1EQs) in order to execute a coordinated plan of attack. At 17 miles, Graeter locked up the lead target and Maw concentrated on the trailing jet: `I still had no idea what type of threat they were, but AWACS was getting information from Rivet Joint and was calling “pop-up threats”, which meant that there were hostiles within 25 miles. I learned later from listening to the tapes that the AWACS controller was also referring to them as bandits, although I didn’t know that at the time. I was therefore working through my NCTR [Non-Cooperative Target Recognition] and IFF EID [Enhance Identification] “tree”, manually dialing in my Mode 3 7600 to see if anyone was “squawking” a comm failure, but getting no return.

“In the meantime, I was having to ramp it downhill from 30,000 ft to the ‘mid-20s’ because my radar look-angle was getting a bit steep. I finally finished my EID matrix at about ten miles or so, but I was still asking AWACS for confirmation of the status of this guy [Graeter never heard the original AWACS call confirming that the target was a bandit]. I got no response, so I went ahead and shot him from a distance of ten miles.”

Graeter watched his AIM-7 come off of the right side of the jet, despite telling himself that he wouldn’t: “Our game plan was to shoot and look to see if the rocket motor had fired, and to check that the missile was looking good to intercept. So that’s what I did. I then got back into the cockpit and flew my F-pole maneuver, executing a 40-degree check turn to the left to give the missile and me some added space. By the time I looked back outside, I could no longer see the missile, and, as the computer told me that the weapon was about to time out, I started to pull my nose back towards the target. That’s when the missile went off.

“I distinctly remember the missile exploding in a conical shape as the charge went off. Everything coming off of it was red hot, so it was easy for me to see this cone of energy. Instantaneously, some four or so miles from me, at a height of 7000 ft, debris started coming from the other direction — southeast — as the target exploded with a really bright flash. Pieces of the jet continued to arc earthwards in flames from the southeast. I called, “Splash”, and Maw confirmed that he could see it.”

Maw was still locked onto the trailing Mirage F1EQ, which was 15 miles ahead of him. The remaining two F-15s in ‘Citgo’ flight, which had fallen back into a 20-mile trail, had already been despatched to the northwest by Graeter after he directed them to H2 and H3. They were to cut off any support that may have been launched in response to these initial engagements between the IrAF and the F-15Cs. Neither found anything of interest, so they executed a CAP over the original BARCAP coordinates instead. Capt Graeter recalled:

“I checked to the northwest, went to Auto Guns, and slewed the radar down, looking for the downed Mirage’s wingman. As I listened to Maw calling his bandit at 330 degrees for 13 miles, there was another explosion — the jet I had just shot had impacted the ground. Almost immediately afterward, another aircraft hit the ground at my ‘two o’clock’ about three miles away from where the first Mirage had come down. I could see the burning jet tumbling and cartwheeling across the desert floor. There was an overcast, so the light from the explosions bounced off of the cloud deck — it was pretty surreal.

“As best as we could tell, the pilot of the number two Mirage had gone into a hard right turn to the west in an effort to get away from us, suffered spatial disorientation, and then flown into the ground.”

By now the pilot of a third Mirage that had taken off from Mudaysis had a fairly good idea that he was outclassed and in a perilous situation. The Iraqi quickly headed back north towards his base putting Maw in a ten-mile tail-chase situation. Several factors, combined to prevent Graeter, who was closer than Maw by several miles, from going after the fleeing Mirage — Roland surface-to-air missile (SAM) indications were coming from the vicinity of Mudaysis and he was also detecting SAM activity in the H2/H3 airfield complex to the northwest. An excessive look-down radar angle was also required to detect the low-flying Mirage, and he did not want to light afterburners to give chase in case he attracted attention to himself.

For the first time, the odds were stacked in the Mirage pilot’s favor. Graeter told Davies that to this day, he would have been hard-pressed to have got him, “even with AMRAAM.”

‘Citgo’ flight learned from the wing’s intelligence officer upon landing at Tabuk (King Faisal AB) that their quarry had been Mirage F1EQs. Graeter was officially awarded credit for the second Mirage as a `maneuvering kill’ one week later. Suggestions that credit for this victory should have been attributed to an EF-111A, which allegedly out-maneuvered the Mirage after being pursued by it, were dismissed as ‘highly unlikely’ by the MiG killers interviewed by Davies. Graeter himself recalled that there were no EF-111As in the area that night, the only Coalition aircraft nearby being F-15Es.

Upon landing back at Tabuk, Graeter’s thoughts turned to the Iraqi pilot he had just killed: “There was no chance of surviving a hit by a big missile-like AA-10 (which the IrAF used) or AIM-7. You were not going to bail out, you were not going to make a radio call — you were going to turn into dust. That AIM-7 warhead absolutely shredded the Mirage. It’s designed to cut the cockpit into shreds when fired in a head-on engagement — the pilot never knew what hit him. When I got back, debriefed with the intel people and then headed to the food hall for breakfast. Chuck Magill, who had just got up in preparation for his day flight, told me later that he could tell from my face that this was not all fun and games.”

F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.