For the American pilots, the Fulcrum’s low-speed maneuverability and helmet-mounted sight system were its most striking performance characteristics
The MiG-29 was a severe threat to Western pilots since it was made in reaction to a new generation of American fighters, such as the F-15 and F-16.
East Germany was one of the nations that purchased the Fulcrum. After German unification, Luftwaffe (German Air Force) MiG-29s remained in service and were employed not only for national Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) service but also as enemy aircraft during NATO air drills, demonstrating the MiG-29’s incredible air-to-air capabilities.
The 510th Fighter Squadron (“Buzzards”) of the 31st Fighter Wing (FW) from Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, which flew against Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 73 (JG 73) MiG-29s in May 1995 during a German Fulcrum deployment to Decimomannu Air Base, was the first western fighter unit to have the opportunity to face the Fulcrum in mock air combats. According to David Sarvai’s in-depth article “Schlemming with the Fulcrum” for Code One Magazine, which was also posted on www.510fs.org, the location was on the southern edge of Sardinia.
Although the helmet-mounted sight system might prove to be a severe threat, McCoy argued that it was not an insurmountable one. “In a low-speed fight, fighting the Fulcrum is similar to fighting an F-18 Hornet, but the Fulcrum has a thrust advantage over the Hornet. An F-18 can really crank its nose around if you get into a slow-speed fight, but it has to lose altitude to regain the energy, which allows us to get on top of it. The MiG has about the same nose authority at slow speeds, but it can regain energy much faster. Plus, the MiG pilots have that 45-degree cone in front of them into which they can fire an Archer and eat you up.”
But as McCoy explained, even if the helmet-mounted sight system proved to be a formidable threat, it was not an insurmountable one. “Some of their capabilities were more wicked than we originally thought; we had to respect the helmet-mounted sight, which made our decisions to anchor more difficult. In other words, when I got close in, I had to consider that helmet-mounted sight. Every time I got near a Fulcrum’s nose, I was releasing flares to defeat an Archer coming off his rail.” An impression was also confirmed by Lt. Col. Gary West, another Viper pilot and back then Commander of the 510th. “Before coming here, some of our pilots may have thought of the MiG’s helmet-mounted sight as an end-all to a BFM fight. We have found that it is not as lethal as we had expected. We encountered some positions—particularly in an across-the-circle shot or a high-low shot and in a slow-speed fight—where a Fulcrum pilot can look up 45 degrees and take a shot while his nose is still off. That capability has changed some of the pilots’ ideas on how they should approach a MiG-29 in a neutral fight. Below 200 knots, the MiG-29 has incredible nose-pointing capability down to below 100 knots. The F-16, however, enjoys an advantage in the 200-knot-plus regime. At higher speeds, we can power above them to go vertical. And our turn rate is significantly better. By being patient and by keeping airspeed up around 325 knots, an F-16 can bring the MiG-29 to its nose. But the pilot must still be careful of the across-the-circle shot with that helmet-mounted display.”
McCoy and the other two USAF pilots had the chance to fly in German Fulcrums, and they explained some of the several limitations of the MiG-29. “Their visibility is not that good; their disadvantage is a real advantage for us. F-16 pilots sit high in the cockpit. All the MiG-29 pilots who sat in our cockpit wanted to look around with the canopy closed. They were impressed that they could turn around, look at the tail, and even see the engine. Besides visibility, I expected better turning performance; the MiG-29 is not a continuous nine-g machine like the F-16.”
A claim that was backed up by Capt. Michael Raubbach, who was the JG 73’s Fulcrum pilot at the time. “Our visibility is not as good as an F-16 or even an F-15. We can’t see directly behind us. We have to look out the side slightly to see behind us, which doesn’t allow us to maintain visual contact and an optimum lift vector at the same time. This shortcoming can be a real problem, especially when flying against an aircraft as small as the F-16.”
Instead, Capt. Oliver Prunk, then-JG 73 operations officer, said that the Fulcrum’s inability to sustain nine g was related to the nature of the specification that gave rise to the MiG-29. “The aircraft was not built for close-in dogfighting, though it is aerodynamically capable of it, the East Germans flew it as a point defense interceptor, like a MiG-21. They were not allowed to max perform the airplane, explore its capabilities, or their own capabilities. Sorties lasted about thirty minutes. The airplane was designed to scramble, jettison the tank, go supersonic, shoot its missiles, and go home.”
Other restrictions were the fighter’s inability to fly supersonically with the tank connected, a situation that also restricted the MiG-29 to four g’s when the tank had fuel left, and the centerline fuel tank was carried by aircraft.
According to McCoy, the Fulcrum was nonetheless a strong foe to face off against despite these flaws. “The experience confirmed what I knew about the MiG-29’s ability to turn and fight in the phone booth. It is an awesome airplane in this regime. The awe, though, fades away after that first turn-in. The biggest adrenaline rush was getting to that point. After that, I started evaluating it as a weapon.” McCoy was echoed by West who said that the glamour of the Fulcrum could distract the pilots when they saw the MiG-29 for the first time. “When Western pilots merge with a MiG for the first time, they tend to stare at it in awe, instead of flying their jets and fighting, they are enamored by this Soviet-built aircraft that they have spent their lives learning about. Pilots lose this sense of wonder after a first encounter. It is no longer a potential distraction. They are going to know what type of fight to fight and exactly where they may be in trouble. No one can learn these things by reading reports. Air-to-air fighting is a perishable skill. But the lessons we learned here won’t be forgotten. These pilots will know at the merge exactly what they are up against. They will have more confidence. And they know they are flying an aircraft that is superior in maneuverability, power, and avionics.”
West concludes: “When our pilots first arrived here, they almost tripped over themselves because their eyes were glued to the ramp and those MiG-29s. After a few days, though, those MiGs became just like any other aircraft. And that’s the way it should be.”
Photo by SrA Tana R. Hamilton / U.S. Air Force
