The B-52 community significantly contributed to returning North Vietnam to the negotiating table during Operations Freedom Train and Linebacker
As part of Operation Linebacker II, Andersen launched 729 sorties from December 18 to December 29, 1972, targeting 34 targets in North Vietnam. During the height of the Vietnam War, Andersen became home to almost 15,000 Airmen, 153 B-52 bombers, and 20 support aircraft.
The bombing campaign was successful because, as a result, the North Vietnamese freed 591 American POWs and went back to the negotiating table, where, less than a month after the operation, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. During Operation Linebacker II, the goal of bringing “peace through strength” was more prevalent than ever.
In memory of the 15 aircraft and 33 crew members who perished during Operation Linebacker II, we share the following article by Yancy Mailes, Command Historical, Air Force Global Strike Command.
President Richard Nixon and his administration received concrete proof that North Vietnam was preparing a massive operation to strike South Vietnam from American intelligence services in the early months of 1972. In order to eliminate the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously undermine South Vietnam’s weak government, north Vietnam planned to invade as much of South Vietnam as they could.
Nixon’s Vietnamization program made the North aware that the United States was gradually drawing down its forces, with just 65,000 troops actually stationed in the South at the time. The Nixon administration intended to respond by ordering the B-52 crews to commence airstrikes in order to pressure the North to discuss a peace agreement.
Under Operation Bullet Shot, a fast buildup of B-52 troops started in early February 1972. By the end of 1971, just about forty B-52Ds, all based at U-Tapao, Thailand, were still operating in the theater after the ArcLight sortie rate at Guam and Kadena had decreased since September 1970. Strategic Air Command (SAC) intended to send 200 B-52s to the area in order to support the upcoming operations.
Beginning in February of that year, SAC crews from the 7th, 96th, and 306th Bomb Wings rebuilt Guam’s B-52 force over the course of the five stages of Bullet Shot. Although there were eventually 54 B-52Ds at U-Tapao and approximately 50 B-52Ds assigned to the 43d Strategic Wing in Guam, SAC still required roughly 100 bombers to meet the demand. As a result, the Air Force established the 72d Bomb Wing Provisional later in July 1972 and sent a complement of B-52Gs to Guam as the preparations continued. In April 1972, the 2nd Bomb Wing alone sent out almost 1,500 personnel and 23 bombers to aid in this operation.
With sortie rates increasing to 1,500 per month on February 14, 1972, the Air Force restarted the Arc Light missions supporting units within South Vietnam’s boundaries. Nixon hesitated to begin an all-out bombing campaign against North Vietnam as the B-52s were deploying to Guam and U-Tapao in preparation for strikes north of the Demilitarized Zone. He had placed all of his faith in the Parisian peace talks. After those talks fell through, North Vietnamese forces launched the Easter Offensive on March 30, 1972, while it was still dark outside.
Soon after, on April 5, the Nixon administration gave the go-ahead for strikes on the region north of the DMZ, and Operation Freedom Train began. Heavy strategic bombing was used at the outset of the B-52 campaign, as various military authorities had repeatedly advised since 1965. Strategic bombing was viewed by many senior USAF officers as a way to force the adversary to the negotiating table; this idea was obviously influenced by World War II.
However, every B-52 crew heading north was concerned about the risk of losing a B-52 to an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM). While the SA-2 was occasionally launched at B-52 crews flying over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1967, none of them were in the line of fire.
Twelve B-52D crews bombed Vihn facilities on April 9 after taking off from U-Tapao. An enemy SAM struck one of the B-52s during this flight, tearing off the majority of an external wing tank. The crew managed to fly the injured bomber south and land at Da Nang airport despite the damage. Bomb crews tested the main ring of SAM sites surrounding that city as well as the fortifications close to Haiphong Harbor a few days later after attacking a rail yard and a POL store close to Hanoi. The adversary fired 35 missiles, but none of them were able to harm us. But it soon became apparent that the B-52 might be pursued by the enemy.
Up until May 8, when the Air Force changed the operation’s name to Linebacker, Operation Freedom Train was still in effect. According to the Air Force, Linebacker was used to disrupt the extensive rail system that North Vietnam used to import supplies and weaponry from China. Before those supplies reached North Vietnam and vanished on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the United States determined it would be preferable to intercept them. The activity persisted until October 23, 1972. Nixon suspended all air operations above the 20th parallel because it looked that the bombing campaign had gotten the North back to the bargaining table at that point. However, Arc Light missions kept going in South Vietnam.
The B-52 community was crucial in bringing North Vietnam back to the negotiating table during Operations Freedom Train and Linebacker. But regrettably, SAC planners continued to deploy strategies from the early stages of the conflict because SAC had been fortunate and the enemy had not been able to shoot down a B-52. A three-ship color-coded cell embedded in a wave made up a typical mission. SAC launched about twenty-two cells every day during Linebacker.
Throughout these operations, bombs were routinely dropped from a height of 30 to 35,000 feet by a trail of aircraft that included two or three waves, spaced an hour or more apart. Additionally, the formation would maintain a constant airspeed of 470kt over SAM-infested areas and roughly 430kt over targets with weak defenses. Most of the time, the cells took identical directions, elevations, and departure paths. Due to the enemy’s ability to launch massive SAM salvos, they were able to swiftly understand the B-52 community’s tactics. Fortunately, during Operations Freedom Train and Linebacker, they did not hit a B-52, but this mistake would be disastrous for the subsequent campaign, Operation Linebacker II.
The adversary ultimately shot down a B-52 during the bombing pause that Nixon ordered to allow the North time to negotiate. The crew of Olive 2, one of 18 B-52Ds belonging to the 307th Strategic Wing at U-Tapao, Thailand, participated in a bombing strike against targets in and near Vihn on November 22, 1972.
Two SAMs sped up from the ground and detonated beneath the jet just as the crew unloaded their bomb load.
Before crossing the Mekong River and flying over Thailand, the crew of the crippled B-52 flew their aircraft more than 100 miles. Once there, the crew made a forced landing and the six soldiers were swiftly rescued from the jungle by a combat rescue team. Only 10 B-52s had been lost in battle up to this time, but this was the first to be hit by enemy fire.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
