aircraftcarriers Archives - Aviation Wings

The nickname for the USS John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier became “The Can Opener” and for good reason.

The USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) aircraft carrier (on the evening of November 22, 1975, the twelfth anniversary of the assassination of its namesake) and the USS Belknap (CG 26) guided missile cruiser collided in heavy seas off the coast of Sicily, in the Mediterranean Sea. Shraderlaw claims that the incident caused fires on Belknap, which quickly spread. Due to the water conditions, several nearby ships found it difficult to help the damaged ship.

The aluminum superstructure of Belknap quickly melted and collapsed due to its inability to withstand the fire’s intensity. It was not until the following day that the fires were contained, and by that time Belknap was not seaworthy. Along with one John F. Kennedy, seven sailors perished on the Belknap, and 47 other crew members were hurt.

‘The nickname for the JFK became “The Can Opener” and for good reason,’ says Paul Montgomery, Boiler/Eng Controls USS JFK CV67 (79-81), on Quora.

‘The JFK was doing night flight ops and would have been traveling at nearly 30 knots because of this. US Carriers have to have at least 25 knots to launch and recover planes.

‘The ship it smashed into, the USS Belknap was alongside at around 1500 yards when there was some confusion as to an order the captain gave. He intended to slow and make a left (port) turn behind the JFK. A junior officer took the order to mean “hard left turn” which cut right in front of the JFK. Luckily it was not a broadside. Here the story is vague even after just two years and me asking crew that was on the JFK at the time. What I have concluded is that the Belknap had time to turn her course about 120 degrees and nearly pass in front of the JFK before contact. Here is the resulting damage to the Belknap.

The night USS Belknap Guided Missile Cruiser and USS John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier collided in the Mediterranean Sea — An overhead amidships view of the damaged superstructure of the guided missile cruiser USS *BELKNAP* (CG-26) the day after it collided with the aircraft carrier USS *JOHN F. KENNEDY* (CV-67) during night operations.

‘This is what she looked like before.’

Montgomery continues;

‘The JFK did not hit the ship with the bow. Had it done this, the Belknap would have most likely sunk in two parts. The Belknap is a guided missile cruiser and not a small ship. They dwarf Destroyers, Frigates and Escorts. All the damage was done by the superstructure on the underside of the Kennedy. Here is what she looked like.

‘A refueling line carrying Jet Fuel was ruptured on the JFK during the collision and sprayed fuel over and into the Belknap which caused a raging fire, a boiler to explode and munitions to cook off.

‘You should not get the idea that aircraft carriers are tougher than other warships; they are not. Had the JFK plowed into the Belknap broadside, the ship’s bow would have been punctured near the water line, and she would have taken on water. How much would depend on the ship’s condition state? During general quarters, all watertight doors are kept closed and flooding would have been minimal. Still, the ship would have been severely crippled in the speed it could make.

‘Seven sailors lost their lives that night, six on the Belknap and one on the Kennedy.’

The ship’s superstructure was completely destroyed after the fire, but the hull was basically intact. After being towed back to the United States, Belknap was decommissioned and brought into the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The ship was rebuilt from the weather deck up throughout the following four years.

After rebuilding was complete, Belknap was re-commissioned and returned to service in 1980. The ship played a role in several major deployments over the remainder of its active career, including the American intervention in Lebanon in 1983 and as the flagship of the Sixth Fleet in 1985 and 1986. In 1989, Belknap served as an accommodation vessel for the President of the United States, George H. W. Bush, during his meeting in Malta with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Belknap remained with the Atlantic Fleet until 1995 when it was decommissioned. During a training exercise in 1998, naval gunfire sank the ship. After the disastrous fire in 1975, it was decided that all cruisers in the future would have steel superstructures. This decision was further supported when the British ship HMS Sheffield, which had an aluminum superstructure, was struck by an Exocet missile during the Falklands War and was largely destroyed by fire.

Photo by U.S. Navy

On November 25, 1944, the kamikaze campaign had just been going for a month. The US Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was the primary target of the Japanese, who mainly avoided it for the majority of the first few days of the campaign

On November 25, 1944, the kamikaze campaign had just been going for a month. The US Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was the primary target of the Japanese, who mainly missed it for the majority of the first several days of the campaign. There had been a few strikes, but most of the carriers hit by kamikazes between October 26 and November 25 had been escort carriers, as explained by Mark Lardas in the book The Kamikaze Campaign 1944-45. Assault on fast carriers has only resulted in one hit, the Essex-class Yorktown on November 5. Yet on November 25, Japan spun the wheel of destiny and won big.

TF38 was making a third visit to a patch of ocean off Luzon’s eastern coast to attack naval targets around Luzon. The fast carriers were coming back to that region every week to conduct airstrikes, as the Japanese had observed. On the days the American carriers were supposed to arrive, they continued air searches over the area and discovered them.

This time, the US Navy was the one that was taken off guard. The US was understaffed, with fewer planes available for CAP and fighter sweeps centered on the airfields surrounding Luzon since only two of TF38’s three carrier groups were deployed.

In the early afternoon of November 25, the Japanese launched a series of kamikaze raids. Also, rather than the airfields close to Manila where the US fighters were looking for them, the kamikazes originated from southern Luzon. Three waves of kamikaze aircraft hit both US carrier groups between 12:30 and 13:00. By the time the attacks ended, four carriers had been struck: the Essex-class fleet carriers Essex, Intrepid, and Hancock, and the light carrier Cabot.

In comparison to other carriers in the larger fleet, the Cabot was more vulnerable. Based on the hulls of light cruisers, light carriers have less defensive margin than fleet carriers. They had one-third of the 40mm armament carried by the Essex-class ships and half the displacement of the fleet carriers, as well as a far weaker antiaircraft battery but lacked five-inch guns. Hence it was difficult for a light carrier to shoot down an approaching kamikaze.

This was demonstrated on November 25 when a kamikaze attacked the carrier shortly before 1300 hours. When the kamikaze approached, the Cabot opened fire with all of its 40mm Bofors in an effort to stop it, but it was unable to do so because there was not enough steel in the air to do so. Despite receiving a number of hits, the aircraft was not stopped by any of them. It advanced persistently under the influence of momentum and collided with the Cabot on the port side of the forward flight deck. It destroyed the port catwalk, and a portion of the forward gun gallery, and left a 6-foot hole in the flight deck.

A second kamikaze dived at the Cabot a short while later. This time, the kamikaze was forced to miss and splashed into the nearby water by the carrier’s anti-aircraft fire.

The Kamikaze Campaign 1944–45 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by: Adam Tooby via Osprey

Aviation stories, Aviation glories

aircraftcarriers

In 1975, USS Belknap and USS John F. Kennedy collided in the Mediterranean Sea

The nickname for the USS John F. Kennedy aircraft carrier became “The Can Opener” and for good reason.

The day a kamikaze aircraft hit the USS Cabot light aircraft carrier in a direct strike

On November 25, 1944, the kamikaze campaign had just been going for a month. The US Navy’s Fast Carrier Task Force was the primary target of the Japanese, who mainly avoided it for the majority of the first few days of the campaign