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aviation

The poem Robin Olds wrote for his F-4 Phantom II.

by Till Daisd September 29, 2021

“It’s an unusual pilot… who does not give his bird a private touch of loving gratitude before he leaves her nest,” Col. Robin Olds, 8th TFW Commander at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base

This short piece of prose was phrased by the legendary USAF triple ace Robin Olds, commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base from where he flew over 100 F-4 combat missions against North Vietnam, and appeared on Richard Pike book Phantom Boys Volume 2.

The Wolf Pack hero shares these verbal images:

Like a . . brooding hen . . she squats . . half asleep . . above her egg clutch.

Her tail feathers droop . . beak juts forward belligerently . . back looks humped . . and wingtips splay upward.

Sitting there . . she’s not . . a thing of beauty.

Far from it.

But she is my F-4, and her nest is a steel revetment—her eggs six [6] M-117, 750-pound bombs. This avian has fangs—very unbirdlike.

They nestle under her belly and cling to her wings.

She is ready to go.

But so am I.

She receives me and my back-seater, and we become a part of her as we attach ourselves to her with straps and hoses and plugs and connectors.

Read the ode Robin Olds wrote to the F-4 Phantom II

A surge of juice and a blast of compressed air and she comes alive. We are as one—tied together—the machine an extension of the man—her hydraulics my muscles—her sensors my eyes—her mighty engines my power.

She screams and complains as we move through shimmering heat waves along an endless expanse of concrete. Final checks . . then her nose pointed down nearly 2 miles of runway.

And we are ready.

Throttles forward, then outboard—THUMP, THUMP—the afterburners kick in. Now my bird roars and accelerates rapidly toward her release from mother earth, leaving a thunder behind that rattles windows and shakes the insides of those who watch.

I look over at my wingmen as we climb effortlessly toward a rendezvous with our tanker. All is well with them, and I marvel again at the transformation of our ugly duckling into a thing of graceful beauty—yet she’s businesslike… menacing… thrusting forward and upward with deadly purpose. Refueling done, we drop off and lunge forward, gathering speed for this day’s task.

We hurtle across the Black, then the Red Rivers, pushing our Phantoms to the limit of power without using afterburners, weaving and undulating so as not to present a steady target for the gunners below.

Then a roil of dust down to our left, and the evil white speck of a surface-to-air missile rises to meet us. We wait and watch. That missile is steady on an intercept course, and we know we are the target. Then, on signal .. we start down.

The missile follows—and now HARD DOWN—stick full forward—the negative G forces hanging us in our straps.

The missile dives to follow, and at a precise moment we PULL, PULL—as hard as we can—the positive Gs now slamming us into our seats with crushing force. Our heavy bird with its load of bombs responds with a prolonged shudder, and we are free for the moment, the missile passing harmlessly below . . unable to follow our maneuver.

On to the target—weaving, moving up and down, leaving the bursts of heavy flak off to the side or down below. The F-4 is solid . . responsive, heeding my every demand quickly and smoothly. We reach the roll-in point, and go inverted, pulling her nose down, centering the target in the combining glass as we roll into our 70-degree dive toward the release point.

My Phantom plunges toward the earth through an almost solid wall of bursting flak. Then “PICKLE!” And the bird leaps as her heavy load separates and we pull with all our force around to our egress heading.

There are MiGs about, and my F-4 becomes a brutal beast… slamming this way, then that – snarling with rage… turning, rolling, diving, hurtling skyward like an arrow, plunging down with savage force.

The melee over, the rivers crossed and headed for our post-strike refueling, and my bird is once again a docile, responsive lady, taking me home… letting my heartbeat slow… giving me comfort in having survived . . once again.

The flock gathered close by, and we slowly circle each other—top, bottom, and each side, looking for flak rips, leaks, and . . jagged holes.

None found… we press on to meet our re-fueling ticket home and gratefully take on fuel from our tanker friends.

A bit of follow-the-leader up and over the beautiful mountains of dazzling white nimbus, just to relax—to enjoy the special privilege given us in flying this magnificent bird—and the home runway lies ahead there near the little town of Ubon-ratchitani.

Landing done, post-flight checks finished, engines shut down, and my F-4 vents its tanks with a prolonged sigh.

It’s speaking for both of us… glad it’s over… anticipating a brief respite before the next day’s work.

It’s an unusual pilot… who does not give his bird a private touch of loving gratitude before he leaves her nest.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

September 29, 2021 0 comment

History

F-16 vs. MiG-29: the first time in dogfighting

by Till Daisd September 28, 2021

written by Till Daisd

For the American pilots, the Fulcrum’s low-speed maneuverability and helmet-mounted sight system were its most striking performance characteristics

The MiG-29 was a severe threat to Western pilots since it was made in reaction to a new generation of American fighters, such as the F-15 and F-16.

East Germany was one of the nations that purchased the Fulcrum. After German unification, Luftwaffe (German Air Force) MiG-29s remained in service and were employed not only for national Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) service but also as enemy aircraft during NATO air drills, demonstrating the MiG-29’s incredible air-to-air capabilities.

The 510th Fighter Squadron (“Buzzards”) of the 31st Fighter Wing (FW) from Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, which flew against Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 73 (JG 73) MiG-29s in May 1995 during a German Fulcrum deployment to Decimomannu Air Base, was the first western fighter unit to have the opportunity to face the Fulcrum in mock air combats. According to David Sarvai’s in-depth article “Schlemming with the Fulcrum” for Code One Magazine, which was also posted on www.510fs.org, the location was on the southern edge of Sardinia.

F-16 Vs MiG-29: when the mighty Viper dogfighted with the Fulcrum for the first time

Although the helmet-mounted sight system might prove to be a severe threat, McCoy argued that it was not an insurmountable one. “In a low-speed fight, fighting the Fulcrum is similar to fighting an F-18 Hornet, but the Fulcrum has a thrust advantage over the Hornet. An F-18 can really crank its nose around if you get into a slow-speed fight, but it has to lose altitude to regain the energy, which allows us to get on top of it. The MiG has about the same nose authority at slow speeds, but it can regain energy much faster. Plus, the MiG pilots have that 45-degree cone in front of them into which they can fire an Archer and eat you up.”

But as McCoy explained, even if the helmet-mounted sight system proved to be a formidable threat, it was not an insurmountable one. “Some of their capabilities were more wicked than we originally thought; we had to respect the helmet-mounted sight, which made our decisions to anchor more difficult. In other words, when I got close in, I had to consider that helmet-mounted sight. Every time I got near a Fulcrum’s nose, I was releasing flares to defeat an Archer coming off his rail.” An impression was also confirmed by Lt. Col. Gary West, another Viper pilot and back then Commander of the 510th. “Before coming here, some of our pilots may have thought of the MiG’s helmet-mounted sight as an end-all to a BFM fight. We have found that it is not as lethal as we had expected. We encountered some positions—particularly in an across-the-circle shot or a high-low shot and in a slow-speed fight—where a Fulcrum pilot can look up 45 degrees and take a shot while his nose is still off. That capability has changed some of the pilots’ ideas on how they should approach a MiG-29 in a neutral fight. Below 200 knots, the MiG-29 has incredible nose-pointing capability down to below 100 knots. The F-16, however, enjoys an advantage in the 200-knot-plus regime. At higher speeds, we can power above them to go vertical. And our turn rate is significantly better. By being patient and by keeping airspeed up around 325 knots, an F-16 can bring the MiG-29 to its nose. But the pilot must still be careful of the across-the-circle shot with that helmet-mounted display.”

McCoy and the other two USAF pilots had the chance to fly in German Fulcrums, and they explained some of the several limitations of the MiG-29. “Their visibility is not that good; their disadvantage is a real advantage for us. F-16 pilots sit high in the cockpit. All the MiG-29 pilots who sat in our cockpit wanted to look around with the canopy closed. They were impressed that they could turn around, look at the tail, and even see the engine. Besides visibility, I expected better turning performance; the MiG-29 is not a continuous nine-g machine like the F-16.”

A claim that was backed up by Capt. Michael Raubbach, who was the JG 73’s Fulcrum pilot at the time. “Our visibility is not as good as an F-16 or even an F-15. We can’t see directly behind us. We have to look out the side slightly to see behind us, which doesn’t allow us to maintain visual contact and an optimum lift vector at the same time. This shortcoming can be a real problem, especially when flying against an aircraft as small as the F-16.”

Instead, Capt. Oliver Prunk, then-JG 73 operations officer, said that the Fulcrum’s inability to sustain nine g was related to the nature of the specification that gave rise to the MiG-29. “The aircraft was not built for close-in dogfighting, though it is aerodynamically capable of it, the East Germans flew it as a point defense interceptor, like a MiG-21. They were not allowed to max perform the airplane, explore its capabilities, or their own capabilities. Sorties lasted about thirty minutes. The airplane was designed to scramble, jettison the tank, go supersonic, shoot its missiles, and go home.”

Other restrictions were the fighter’s inability to fly supersonically with the tank connected, a situation that also restricted the MiG-29 to four g’s when the tank had fuel left, and the centerline fuel tank was carried by aircraft.

According to McCoy, the Fulcrum was nonetheless a strong foe to face off against despite these flaws. “The experience confirmed what I knew about the MiG-29’s ability to turn and fight in the phone booth. It is an awesome airplane in this regime. The awe, though, fades away after that first turn-in. The biggest adrenaline rush was getting to that point. After that, I started evaluating it as a weapon.” McCoy was echoed by West who said that the glamour of the Fulcrum could distract the pilots when they saw the MiG-29 for the first time. “When Western pilots merge with a MiG for the first time, they tend to stare at it in awe, instead of flying their jets and fighting, they are enamored by this Soviet-built aircraft that they have spent their lives learning about. Pilots lose this sense of wonder after a first encounter. It is no longer a potential distraction. They are going to know what type of fight to fight and exactly where they may be in trouble. No one can learn these things by reading reports. Air-to-air fighting is a perishable skill. But the lessons we learned here won’t be forgotten. These pilots will know at the merge exactly what they are up against. They will have more confidence. And they know they are flying an aircraft that is superior in maneuverability, power, and avionics.”

West concludes: “When our pilots first arrived here, they almost tripped over themselves because their eyes were glued to the ramp and those MiG-29s. After a few days, though, those MiGs became just like any other aircraft. And that’s the way it should be.”

Photo by SrA Tana R. Hamilton / U.S. Air Force

September 28, 2021 0 comment

History

The VNAF Chinook’s pilot that jumped out of his CH-47A

by Till Daisd September 27, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Maj. Ba Van Nguyen managed to disembark his passengers. He then distanced himself and jumped out of the cockpit of his CH-47A Chinook

South Vietnam was taken over by the North Vietnamese in April 1975. As the long-running Vietnam War came to an end, many South Vietnamese desperately tried to flee the nation before it was seized by North Vietnam.

In Operation Frequent Wind, the largest helicopter evacuation in history, the U.S. Navy was actively collaborating with South Vietnamese forces, as we just explained. The last stage of the evacuation of American and Vietnamese citizens from Saigon, South Vietnam, was called Operation Frequent Wind.

This VNAF Chinook's pilot jumped out of his CH-47A after having saved his family. And he made it out alive.

Although the U.S. managed the activities during Frequent Wind, some South Vietnamese pilots decided to flee on their own in a large number of helicopters and aircraft.

Maj. Ba Van Nguyen, of the 237th Helicopter Squadron of the Vietnamese Air Force (also known as the South Vietnamese Air Force or VNAF), landed his CH-47A Chinook helicopter in front of his parents’ Saigon residence on April 29, 1975, at about 10:30 a.m. Nguyen hurriedly boarded the aircraft with his family. He made a second stop a half-hour away, according to Dignity Memorial, to grab supplies and meet up with other squadron members.

He had intended to leave the intense combat in the city by flying to a distant island. Nguyen could hear English conversation bantering on his radio as he was sailing out to sea. At that moment, he realized a U.S. Navy ship might be in the distance, and it could be able to assist everyone on the Chinook. As soon as he saw a ship, he gently and cautiously started to move in that direction. The Huey helicopter, which was smaller, could land on numerous ships, but the Chinook was too large to do so.

Here is an excerpt from NPR’s story from 2010 – “35 Years on, Vietnam Heroes Reunited, Decorated”: “Among all the Hueys on that first day, a crowded Vietnamese CH-47 (a twin-rotor “Chinook,” the heaviest helicopter in the Vietnamese inventory) also attempted to land but was frantically waved off. The aircraft was much too large for USS Kirk’s flight deck, so the pilot hovered low over the fantail and unloaded his precious cargo of men, women, children, and infants—and his aircrew—into the waiting arms of Kirk crewmen below. Then, flying his behemoth helicopter all alone, the pilot moved a short distance off Kirk’s starboard quarter, hovering within inches of the sea. He slowly rolled the Chinook on its right side, escaping the spectacular crash unharmed by diving out the left door in mid-roll. Both main rotors disintegrated on impact and shattered shards of the blades flew across Kirk, splashing into the sea well to port. The crew of Kirk’s motor whaleboat was standing by and rescued the pilot in short order. All crewmen and family members were reunited unharmed on the USS Kirk that day.”

“There was only one CH-47 that came to the USS Kirk FF-1087 in 1975. Your father hovered the helo over the fantail of the Kirk, and his passengers jumped out into the arms of the Kirk crew. He then came to the right of Kirk, rolled the helo to the right, and jumped out on the left side. Your father was a very brave man, and he accomplished a remarkable and professional job to save his passengers and his family. There could hardly have been a more masterful bit of flying or a braver pilot that day,” said Captain Paul H. Jacobs, then USS Kirk (FF-1087) Commanding Officer, to Nguyen’s sons.

About 24 hours later, Nguyen and his family left the USS Kirk and boarded a few other ships that were sailing in the direction of the United States and freedom.

On June 17, 2013, Ba Van Nguyen passed away at the age of 73.

The following U.S. Navy video, called “The Lucky Few,” tells the nearly forgotten story of the incredible CH-47A Chinook mission flown by Maj. Ba Van Nguyen to save his family.

Photo by U.S. Navy

September 27, 2021 0 comment

History

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, this U.S. Naval Aviator helped rebuild and train the Kuwait Air Force

by Till Daisd September 27, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“There was a day we returned from an air strike and a Kuwaiti A-4KU pilot was as happy as he could be when he delivered a 500-pound bomb right to the front door of the headquarters office — until he realized that it was his old office,” Commander Robert E. Noziglia, Jr.

The United States and other coalition forces from the United Nations came together on January 17, 1991, to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

Thousands of military personnel were impacted by Operation Desert Storm in terms of their lives and careers. One of these individuals, Commander Robert E. Noziglia, Jr., who was at the time the aircraft maintenance officer at the Naval Air Weapons Station in Point Mugu, California, played a distinctive role in Desert Storm.

On September 15, 1990, Noziglia was interviewed by Ambassador Edward W. Genhm, Jr., the U.S. representative to Kuwait, in Washington, D.C., Cdr. Noziglia was chosen to lead the reconstruction of the Kuwait Air Force, as stated by Vance Vasquez, then staff writer/photographer for The Missile, Naval Air Weapons Station, Point Mugu, California, in the article A Unique Role in Desert Storm that appeared in the July-August 1993 issue of Naval Aviation News. 86 contract technicians and their supplies were flown to Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, on a Kuwaiti 747 airplane. On September 16, 1990, they left Andrews AFB in Maryland and arrived in Saudi Arabia.

This U.S. Naval Aviator helped renconstruct and train the Kuwait Air Force after invasion of Kuwait by Iraq

“The technicians were retired Navy and Marine Corps personnel with A-4 Skyhawk experience,” said Noziglia.

Only a small section of the Kuwait Air Force was able to flee into Saudi Arabia when Iraq invaded and overran the little nation. Three L100-30 (C-130) transport planes, 15 Mirage F1 fighters, 18 A-4KUs, and two TA-4KU Skyhawk attack planes were all saved.

No equipment, tools, or aircraft manuals were available to the Kuwait Air Force when they arrived because they had been left behind in Kuwait. “The aircraft was unique. Since no other country operated A-4KU Skyhawks, we were able to assemble new manuals from information obtained from the United States,” said Noziglia.

The A-4KUs were relocated from Khamis Mushayt and were forward deployed to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia after the technicians arrived. Before the United Nations mandate for Iraq to depart Kuwait was ordered, the A-4KUs were stationed far from Iraq to avoid any potential airstrikes. Under a single command, the Royal Saudi Air Force and the Kuwaiti Air Force were combined.

Noziglia credited the Kuwait Air Force with helping to liberate their nation when Operation Desert Storm first began. “There was a day we returned from an airstrike and a Kuwaiti A-4KU pilot was as happy as he could be when he delivered a 500-pound bomb right to the front door of the headquarters office — until he realized that it was his old office,” recalled Noziglia.

“The Kuwaitis had ‘Free Kuwait’ painted on the sides of their A-4KUs, which became the national motto. The A-4KU flew from 18 to 24 sorties per day and only one A-4KU was lost to antiaircraft artillery fire during the war. The pilot became a prisoner of war,” Noziglia stated.

Cdr. Noziglia took part in Operation Desert Recovery after the war. He said that practically all of Kuwait’s military equipment, including the upgraded Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, had been transferred back to Iraq by Iraqi forces.

It was thought that Iraqi pilots were shown the A-4KU flying procedures after hundreds of Kuwaiti flight officers were seized, enabling them to fly the A-4KUs left behind back to Iraq. Noziglia said that six of the stolen A-4KUs were flown back to Kuwait after technicians began working on them after discovering them on Iraqi airbases. “The aircraft had been sitting around for months,” he said.

Noziglia stayed in Kuwait to oversee the integration of the F/A-18C/D Hornets that McDonnell Douglas was building for Kuwait. The A-4KU and F-1 were both superseded by the F/A-18C/D. “They’re moving from 1960s-vintage airframes in the A-4KU into the year 2000 with their F/A-18C/D Hornets,” said Noziglia.

“Desert Storm was definitely a highlight of my career. I made a lot of good friends with the Kuwaitis, and we developed a good friendship,” Noziglia emphasized.

As a Kuwait security support officer and Navy liaison officer for his work during Operation Desert Storm, Noziglia was awarded the Joint Service Commendation and was also given a note of appreciation from Ambassador Genhm. The Kuwait Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Jaber Khaled Al-Sabah, also gave him the Bronze Star Medal and a letter of recognition.

Photo by Robert E. Noziglia

September 27, 2021 0 comment

History

VF-111 Sundowners F-8 Crusader shot down by North Vietnam’s first ace

by Till Daisd September 25, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Capt. Wilfred K. Abbott pulled the black and yellow handle to launch himself out of the falling F-8 because the controls were non-responsive. Seven years of captivity followed his parachute landing

The F-8 Crusader, which was numerically the most prevalent fighter in the U.S. Navy at the start of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War in 1964 with 482 F-8C/D/Es outfitting 17 frontline units, was known to its pilots as the “last of the gunfighters” due to its quartet of Colt-Browning Mk12 20mm cannons (its great naval rival, the F-4 Phantom II, was armed exclusively with missiles).

During the Rolling Thunder campaign in 1965–1968, it had significant success against North Vietnamese MiG-17 and MiG-21 aircraft, downing 18 aircraft in total—officially representing 53 percent of all MiG claims made by Navy squadrons during this time.

However, on September 5, 1966, the Crusaders of the USS Oriskany suffered a rare F-8 air-to-air loss. On that day, the Sundowners of VF-111 provided four Target Combat Air Patrol (TarCAP) fighters during a strike on enemy transport targets close to Phy Ly. Lt. Cdr. Foster Teague led the first pair, and Capt. Wilfred K. Abbott, a USAF exchange pilot flying since 1958, led the second pair.

Teague took his wingman inward to protect the A-4 Skyhawks, leaving Abbott and Lt. Randy Rime to orbit offshore, as described by Barrett Tillman and Henk Van der Lugt in their book VF-11/111 “Sundowners” 1942-95. Teague egressed when he ran out of fuel, allowing Abbott to move in and continue guarding the A-4s. Situational awareness was compromised when Rime was forced to follow Abbott on a trail due to cloud cover. Abbott and Rime were startled to see two MiG-17s emerge from the clouds while they were circling at 6,000 feet.

Without being noticed, the “Red Bandits” maneuvered into gun range and fired 23 mm cannon rounds at Rime’s Crusader. Abbott took a shot from the stalkers at a 90-degree angle while covering Rime. The challenging gunnery challenge—a close-range, high-deflection shot—was where he put his faith. The USAF pilot had to deal with North Vietnamese opponents who could fire.

The unknown story of the first official American aerial victory of the Vietnam War

The Crusader was struck numerous times, all of which were fatal. Abbott’s instrument panel was broken, his canopy was damaged, and his helmet was knocked off. Abbott pulled the black and yellow handle to launch himself out of the destroyed Vought because the controls were non-responsive. The sole enemy jet loss for the “Sundowners,” he parachuted into seven years of captivity.

Randy Rime just about made it. He escaped his attackers despite being slightly hurt by glass shards from his canopy and just had enough fuel to limp back to the “0-Boat.” He missed the wave-off lights, caught a wire after it had already passed, and his starboard wheel came off. About 300 lbs of JP-5 were still in Rime’s possession, but not enough to make another pass at the deck.

Oriskany then double-checked with the controllers in charge of keeping an eye on enemy radio nets and locating hostile aircraft. It soon became clear that the two MiGs had mishandled an earlier attempt to hit the F-8s before being told to adjust their position for the successful bounce. Abbott and Rime had been refused access to this crucial information for unspecified reasons. Later, Abbott recalled:

How North Vietnam's first ace scored a rare victory over the iconic F-8 Crusader

‘On September 5, I was flying my F-8 Crusader in bright and sunny conditions when I was shot down over North Vietnam. In the ejection, my right leg was broken. After the leg was finally operated on, I was in a cast for about four months. It took about two years, with my roommates’ help, for me to achieve full use of the leg. It was my constant desire not to be a cripple so as to fly again someday. Other than my leg, the treatment and daily routine as a POW were similar to that described by most other veterans. The food was just enough to sustain life. A constant battle was to keep our minds active. In the early years, communication was extremely limited, but in the last couple of years, we were able to conduct our own educational programs — courses in everything from languages and mathematics to meat cutting, duplicate bridge, and Toastmasters.’

Nguyen Van Bay, North Vietnam’s first ace, who had already been involved in the downing of two Crusader aircraft—an RF-8A and an F-8E—off USS Hancock (CVA-19) on June 21, 1966, might have been the cause of Abbott’s demise. He claimed an F-105 and an A-4 later that month (both of which are not supported by U.S. records), adding four additional victories in April 1967. Van Bay was thus one of only four MiG-17 pilots from the Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF) who likely took part in the downing of five or more American aircraft.

VF-11/111 ‘Sundowners’ 1942-95 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force

September 25, 2021 0 comment

History

The Blue on Blue incident, in which two USAF F-15s shot down two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk

by Till Daisd September 25, 2021

written by Till Daisd

26 crew members and passengers aboard the two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters lost their lives in those few seconds, and the F-15 Eagle’s reputation was permanently damaged

On April 14, 1994, disaster struck when two F-15Cs piloted by Capt. Eric Wickson (lead) and Lt. Col. Randy W. May (wingman) shot down two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters carrying 26 crew members and passengers over northern Iraq. May was now the CO of the 53rd Fighter Squadron (FS) and already had the controversial Mi-24 kill to his name from three years prior. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) blamed a series of mistakes that started with the general in charge of the Operation Provide Comfort Task Force and went all the way down.

The day began at 0635 hours with the launch of two F-15Cs, designated “Tiger 01” and “02,” on a sweep of the airspace north of the no-fly zone, before changing to a DCA/CAP mission in the region, as stated by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat. The two UH-60s took off from Zakhu at 06:54 a.m. using the call sign “Eagle,” informing AWACS (call sign “Cougar”) of their departure location and their intended destination. At 0720 hours, Wickson, flying in “Tiger 01,” informed “Cougar” that he had entered northern Iraq. He then ordered his flight to conduct a sweep of the region in search of Iraqi aircraft.

The sad story of the Blue on Blue incident which resulted in the destruction of two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters by two USAF F-15s — The F-15 pilots thought they were attacking a Mi-24 gunship. Indeed, the leader of Tiger flight went as far as to positively identify the helicopter as a ‘Hind’.

The AWACS controller failed to relay the necessary information to the F-15 pilots, who were unaware that a friendly helicopter flight was operating in the very same airspace it was supposed to “delouse” because the ATO did not contain any specific information about the “Eagle” flight.

Two minutes later, Wickson reported a radar contact on a slow-moving, low-flying aircraft that was 40 miles to the southeast of his own location and 52 miles from the southern limit of the no-fly zone. “Cougar” reacted with a “clean there” call, indicating that the AWACS controller’s scope had no targets. While planning an intercept to investigate, the F-15 pilots used IFF to check the contacts for a friendly electronic response.

By 0725 hours (about three minutes after “Tiger 01” had discovered the radar contacts), the distance had shrunk to 20 miles. Wickson again shouted the contacts out to “Cougar,” who reacted this time with “hits there,” indicating that he too had seen the radar contact. The IFF returns were being sent to “Cougar” via the IFF transponders on the “Eagle” aircraft; the AWACS was not picking them up on direct radar returns.

A minute later, Wickson’s reported contacts were still present in the area where the UH-60’s IFF returns were not only clearly visible but also identified as being. Despite this, AWACS still failed to alert the “Tiger” flight to the availability of IFF data in the target area. Each six-second attempt to elicit a response from the target via Wickson’s own IFF interrogations in the commercial and military (Mode IV) modes failed. Wickson then locked the target up. ‘Tiger 01′ and ’02’ moved in closer to make a visual identification.

At 7:27 a.m., Wickson approached within seven miles and called “Tiger 01” to confirm that there was just one helicopter in the area. Standby VID’. In order to avoid any forward-firing weaponry that an enemy gunship could have, he passed “Eagle 01″ at a height of 500 feet and 1000 feet to the left at 450 knots (giving an overtake of 320 knots—”Eagle” was at 130 knots). He then pulled off high and to the right over the top of the helicopter. He noticed that the helicopter was carrying sponsons that were equipped with weapons, but he was unable to identify any other distinctive markings on the green-camouflaged helicopter.

He radioed, ‘”Tiger 01″. VID “Hind” — no, “Hip”‘, at 0728 hrs, before referring to an in-flight silhouette guide to clarify his VID. Wickson then called, ‘”Tiger 01”, disregard “Hip”. VID “Hind”‘. With that he reversed course from the southeast to the northwest, before acquiring a visual on the second helicopter, trailing ‘Eagle 01’ by two miles. His call ‘”Tiger 01”. VID “Hind”, tally two, lead-trail’, prompted ‘Cougar’ to respond, ‘Copy “Hinds”‘. Wickson now sought confirmation of his VID from May in ‘Tiger 02’. “‘Tiger 02”, confirm “Hinds”‘. He later reported receiving the response, ‘Standby’.

The final series of errors started at this time when May flew 2000 feet to the right of the helicopter that was trailing and broadcast “Tiger 02,” tally two, claiming to have both helicopters’ insight. Although May just intended to say that he had the insight into the two helicopters, Wickson misunderstood this signal and believed that May had concurred with his ‘Hind’ VID.

After informing AWACS that two “Hinds” had been engaged, Wickson flew to a location ten miles to the northwest of the helicopters in a planned maneuver that gave the F-15 pilots enough time to launch a successful attack.

As he rolled back towards the helicopters, Wickson called, ‘”Tiger” arm hot, “Tiger 01” is hot’, telling May that he was cleared to fire provided that ROE was met. He then transmitted on the AUX radio, `We’re coming up behind them. There are two in lead-trail. “Tiger 01” is going first. I will shoot the trailer and then you will shoot the leader’. Wickson and May switched to AUTO ACQ mode to acquire their quarry and then attempted a final IFF interrogation, before visually acquiring their respective targets in their HUDs.

‘”TIGER 01″, fox. “TIGER 01”, splash one “Hind”. “Tiger 02”, you’re engaged with the second one. He’s off my nose two miles, right past the fireball. “02” call in. “01’s” off left’. Wickson had despatched the trailing UH-60 with an AIM-120 fired from about four miles out. May followed with an AIM-9 fired about 9000 ft away from ‘Eagle 01’. ‘”Tiger 02″ in hot. “Tiger 02”, splash second “Hind”‘. May reportedly ended the engagement with the words, ‘Stick a fork in him — he’s done!’

The 26 crew and passengers aboard the two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters lost their lives in those few seconds, and the F-15 Eagle’s reputation was permanently damaged. Numerous circumstances contributed to the catastrophe, as explained by Steve Davies and Doug Dildy in their book F-15 Eagle Engaged. The lack of awareness on the part of the AWACS controller resulted in a court-martial. The lack of information in the ATO and Special Instructions (“spins”) cost the career of a very talented, dedicated, and conscientious brigadier general heading the OPC operation. However, the USAF failed to place the blame on the perpetrators of the event.

The F-15 pilots failed in a fundamental fighter pilot responsibility — to be able to correctly visually identify an enemy aircraft from one in their own nation’s military — and miscommunicated the ID. While the squadron commander was the wingman (as was frequently the case in these typically dull and boring missions, the flight lead responsibilities were alternated to give the younger pilots more flight leadership experience), he set the tone in the squadron, failed to convey his true (if later testimony is accepted) appreciation for the situation, and, if he was truly unsure whether the targets were friendly or Iraqi, failed to call off the attack. The Black Hawks were still 40 miles away from the No-Fly Zone line and weren’t going there anyhow at 130 knots. There was certainly enough time, but none was used.

Even worse, the USAF handled the aftermath of the incident appallingly. Initial court-martial charges against the two pilots were withdrawn by the commanding general, reportedly due to a lack of evidence. This prevented the world, and in particular, the grieving loved ones of those who perished aboard the helicopters, from learning the merits of each participant’s conduct. The two aviators received typical, encouraging assignments for their next deployments up until CSAF General Ron Fogleman intervened and resolved the issue. Many people believe that the way the Air Force handled the case’s aftermath was almost as much of a black mark for its reputation as the unfortunate incident itself.

The negative blotch on the otherwise impeccable record of the 53rd FS “Tigers” prevented them from ever fully recovering. Closing the unit was the only way the USAF could end the problem and the suffering. On March 10, 1999, this was completed, leaving USAFE with just one Eagle squadron for the ensuing conflict in its theater.

F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

F-15 Eagle Engaged is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by Sgt. Janel Schroeder and MSGT STEVEN TURNER / U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense

September 25, 2021 0 comment

History

The 197th and final MiG kill of the Vietnam War achieved by a U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II crew

by Till Daisd September 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Because of relatively lax RoE, the F-4 crew was able to pursue the MiG beyond the 20th parallel

Although the F-4 Phantom II was the most significant fighter-bomber to be used by all three branches of the American armed forces during the Vietnam War, the carrier-borne squadrons that were equipped with the jet were the best at using it in battle. Even though the majority of the aircraft’s operations in Vietnam included ground attacks with a variety of weaponry, the aircraft was a pioneer in the use of long-range, radar-guided missiles in aerial combat.

After many other kinds were replaced, the Phantom II served as the primary U.S. Navy fighter in Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1973. Its effectiveness and adaptability allowed it to carry out a variety of tasks and change roles as needed during the assault on some of the most fiercely fortified territories in the world. F-4 crews were able to benefit from their brethren’s experiences in 1964–68 during Operation Linebacker in 1972–73. Additionally, they were able to put to use the air combat training techniques provided by the US Navy’s Topgun School, which enabled Phantom II crews to defeat enemy fighters with an unequaled level of success in the final year of the Vietnam War.

The 197th and final MiG kill of the Vietnam War took place at 1253 hours on January 12, 1973, when two VF-161 “Chargers” F-4Bs flying a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) mission from USS Midway (CVA-41) intercepted a lone MiG-17, as stated by Peter E. Davies in his book U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73.

How a U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II crew scored the 197th, and last, MiG kill of the Vietnam War

Lt. Victor Kovaleski and Lt(jg) Jim Wise in ‘Rock River 102’ (BuNo 153045), with Lt Pat Arwood and Ens Lynn Oates in a second F-4B, were vectored to intercept a Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) MiG-17 that had ventured out across the coast to try and down a USAF C-130 Hercules.

Although it took “three or four passes for the controller to get them hooked up on the MiG,” according to “Bart” Bartholomay, the crew took advantage of more permissive RoE to pursue the MiG beyond the 20th parallel.

The novice MiG pilot Luu Kim Ngo of the 923rd Fighter Regiment (FR) was intermittently detected on the radar as he flew in a low cloud base while flying at a height of about 1000 feet at a speed of 450 knots. At a distance of four miles, the two pursuing U.S. Navy personnel rapidly acquired a visual identification of their prey and closed undetected.

When the MiG pilot finally caught sight of them, according to Wise’s post-mission report, he turned left and leveled out in front of the F-4s after using his faster turn rate to roll in behind them. Then, for whatever reason, he made a sudden 180-degree turn, putting himself in the F-4Bs’ Sidewinder acquisition range. AIM-9G missile fired from “Rock River 102” by Kovaleski immediately severed a portion of the MiG’s tail. When Luu Kim Ngo tried to jump, his parachute did not deploy, and his body was later found in the water. A second AIM-9G shot from Kovaleski caused the MiG to burn in flames as it fell into the water.

Two days later, while en route to Than Hoa on a Blue Tree reconnaissance escort mission, Kovaleski and Ens D. H. Plautz were struck by an 85 mm AAA. Kovaleski and Plautz were forced to leave F-4B BuNo 153068, which had earlier been a MiG killer for Lts. “Bart” Bartholomay and Oran Brown, due to a damaged engine and a major fuel leak in the Phantom II, and wait for an HH-3A helicopter to rescue them from the water. Their F-4B was the final of Midway air wing’s 44 lost aircraft during the conflict.

U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to pre-order here.

Photo by Russell M. Taylor / U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force

September 24, 2021 0 comment

History

The unique image of a Concorde in supersonic flight

by Till Daisd September 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

The Tornado crew needed the Concorde to slow down from Mach 2 to Mach 1.5–1.6 in order for them to get the shot

The stunning photograph in this post, which was taken in April 1985, is the only image of a Concorde traveling at supersonic speed.

While piloting a Royal Air Force (RAF) Tornado fighter during a rendezvous with the Concorde over the Irish Sea in April 1985, Adrian Meredith captured the shot.

The Tornado could equal Concorde’s cruising speed, but because of the huge rate of fuel consumption, it could only do so for a short period of time.

After several failed attempts, the Concorde was forced to slow down from Mach 2 to Mach 1.5–1.6 in order for the Tornado crew to get the image. To get the Tornado up to that speed as quickly as possible, everything was removed from it.

The Tornado broke off the rendezvous after only four minutes of rushing to catch the Concorde and trying to keep up, while the Concorde landed peacefully at JFK!

On February 7, 1996, Concorde flew from New York to London in 2 hours 52 minutes and 59 seconds, setting a record for the fastest transatlantic flight.

The supersonic passenger jet airliner Aérospatiale/BAC Concorde was a joint British-French project. With seats for 92 to 128 passengers, it had a top speed of Mach 2.04 (1,354 mph or 2,180 km/h at cruise altitude, more than twice the speed of sound). The plane went into service in 1976 and flew for a further 27 years.

Twenty Concorde samples, including six prototypes and development aircraft, were created as part of the combined development and production effort between Aérospatiale and the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) by an Anglo-French treaty.

Only two airlines, Air France and British Airways owned and operated Concorde.

Regular transatlantic flights were made by the supersonic airliner from London’s Heathrow Airport and Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport to New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, and Grantley Adams International Airport in Barbados; it completed these flights in less time than other airliners could.

After the disaster of Air France Flight 4590 on July 25, 2000, in which all of the passengers and crew perished, the aircraft was eventually decommissioned in 2003. Aérospatiale and BAC’s successor business, Airbus, stopped providing maintenance assistance for Concorde in 2001, which also played a role in the overall decline of the commercial aviation sector.

Photo by Adrian Meredith / Crown Copyright

September 24, 2021 0 comment

History

The pilot who conceived Operation Bolo, Col. John “JB” Stone, takes one last flight with the Wolf Pack

by Till Daisd September 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Col. John “JB” Stone came up with the idea for the strategy that would later play a crucial role in aviation history over a few inexpensive beers with Olds and careful consideration of the available resources

The Wolf Pack’s founding in 1967 under Robin Olds’ leadership is well known, although some people might not be aware of the origin of the plan to disguise F-4s as F-105s.

Captain John “JB” Stone of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) was given the task of figuring out how the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) would counter the threat posed by the North Vietnamese MiG-21s at the time. Over a few cheap beers with Olds and a critical analysis of the materials at hand, he came up with the idea that would eventually play a crucial role in the history of aviation.

On January 2, 1967, F-4s from the 8th TFW made their way into North Vietnam from the west using the same altitude, formation, and path as an F-105 bomb attack. Additionally, they had electronic jamming pods for F-105s that they carried and employed. The MiGs approached to intercept what they believed to be an F-105 strike after the North Vietnamese fell for the bait. In order to stop the MiGs from fleeing to China and to orbit their bases, which prevented the MiGs from landing, 366th TFW F-4s arrived in North Vietnam from the east at the same time.

Despite a few issues brought on by the overcast weather, Operation Bolo was a resounding success. With no USAF losses during the 12-minute encounter, F-4 aircrews downed seven MiG-21s and injured two others or over half of the operating force of the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF).

Four days later, two more MiG-21s were brought down by a different trick, this one imitating an F-4 reconnaissance aircraft. For several months, these severe losses significantly decreased MiG activity.

The narrative of JB Stone comes full circle on his recent visit to Kunsan after 51 years have passed.

In the Olds room at Kunsan, JB talked to the Airmen of the Wolf Pack about Operation Bolo and shared his experiences, knowledge, and stories with them.

He took to the skies once more with the Pack. His flight was hosted by the 80th Fighter Squadron “Juvats,” which is another instance of how the narrative has come full circle since JB’s son flew with the Juvats in the late 1990s.

Photo by USAF

Source: Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea Facebook page

September 24, 2021 0 comment

History

“The Bastard,” the only SR-71C ever built

by Till Daisd September 23, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Because it was a hybrid made of the first YF-12A’s rear fuselage and a functional engineering mockup of an SR-71A forward fuselage created for static testing, SR-71C S/N 61-7981 was known as “The Bastard.”

The intriguing video in this post was recorded at Hill Air Force Base (AFB) in June 2016, and it features SR-71C, “The Bastard,” S/N 61-7981, the final SR-71 to be produced and the only C model Blackbird ever made. Its hybrid construction, which combined the rear fuselage of the first YF-12A (S/N 60-6934) with a functioning engineering model of an SR-71A forward fuselage made for static testing, earned it the moniker “The Bastard”.

After the second of the two B-model trainers crashed on January 11, 1968, a new plane was constructed to take its place. On March 14, 1969, the C model took off for the first time from the Lockheed facility in Palmdale, California, with Lockheed test pilot Steve Belgeau serving as the reconnaissance systems officer and Blackbird Chief Project Pilot Robert J. Gilliland at the controls. On September 3, 1970, it was handed over to the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB, California, following flight testing.

The aircraft only had 556.4 flight hours, not counting the 180.9 hours accumulated when it was still registered as YF-12A S/N 60-6934, when it made its final flight on April 11, 1976, and was taken out of service on June 24, 1976. At the Lockheed facility in Palmdale, California, it was subsequently processed for long-term storage.

The aircraft was given to the Hill Aerospace Museum by the Air Force in April 1990 after Utah Senator Orrin G. Hatch’s intervention, and the museum immediately started organizing its transfer from Beale AFB to Hill AFB.

In order to establish the best approach to disassembling, packaging, and transporting the aircraft, representatives from the museum, the Air Force Heritage Foundation of Utah, the 67th Aerial Port Squadron, and the 405th Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS) flew to California in July 1990.

Then, in August 1990, a sixteen-person crew from the 405th CLSS traveled to California and disassembled the plane into three main parts and other minor parts, including a J58 engine and start cart, palletizing them all for transportation on a C-5 Galaxy cargo plane. However, no cargo aircraft was immediately available to bring the disassembled parts back to the base after the operation was over. All activities would have to wait.

The majority of the palletized components were retrieved from Beale AFB by officials from the 67th Aerial Port Squadron and the 405th CLSS in the spring of 1991, leaving only the larger portions that needed to be transported by cargo aircraft. One year after the dismantling process started, in August 1991, air transport was ultimately organized using a C-5 from Travis AFB.

The airplane parts were assembled in a sizable hangar owned by the 405th CLSS for reassembly and restoration once all the pieces had finally arrived on base. The challenging two-month process of putting the aircraft back together involves volunteers, Air Force Reservists, and numerous active-duty personnel. The finished airplane was transported to the museum and shown there on October 16, 1991.

Source: U.S. Air Force

Photo by U.S. Air Force

September 23, 2021 0 comment

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