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B24

Owen J. Baggett, the B-24 Copilot who shot down a Japanese Zero with his Colt.45 while hanging from his open parachute

by Till Daisd February 11, 2024

Owen J. Baggett pulled out his service pistol, a Colt.45, at the perfect moment. He fired four shots, striking the Japanese pilot in the head and bringing the Zero down

The initial B-24 Liberator prototype was created in 1938 by Consolidated Aircraft, a Lockheed Martin legacy company. It was intended to outperform the US Army Air Corps’ B-17 Flying Fortress in terms of speed and payload capacity. Eventually, the B-24 would have a long, tapered wing on top of its fuselage, enabling remarkable long-range cruising performance. A B-24 was faster than a B-17 and could carry a 5,000-pound bomb load for 1,700 miles at 290 miles per hour, so it was able to carry a bigger payload and had a longer range than its cousin.

B-24s served in every theater of the conflict, from Africa to Germany and India to the Pacific Islands, despite being retired at the end of the war.

On March 31, 1943, the 9th Bomb Squadron of the 7th Bomb Group (BG) was dispatched to Pandaveswar (northwest of Calcutta) to demolish a railroad bridge at Pyinmana, which is located close to two enemy fighter sites and roughly midway between Mandalay and Rangoon. The formation was led by Col. Conrad F. Necrason, 7th BG commander. First Lieutenant Lloyd Jensen piloted the B-24 on his right wing, with Second Lieutenant Owen J. Baggett serving as copilot. Baggett was going to achieve what is thought to be the only distinction in Air Force history on that mission.

Zero fighters attacked the B-24s before they could reach their target. The crew of Baggett’s aircraft had to bail out after it was struck in the fuel tanks and caught fire. The Zeroes attacked again as they descended with parachutes, killing two crew members and injuring Baggett’s left arm.

Pretending to be dead, Baggett observed as a curious Zero pilot neared him, executing a remarkable feat of aerial maneuvering to obtain a more intimate view of the wounded American. The Zero crashed when Baggett pulled out his service pistol, a Colt.45, and fired four rounds, striking the Japanese pilot in the head.

After being taken prisoner, Baggett was greeted and treated like a hero by the Japanese camp commander, a colonel, who was impressed by his skillful shooting at the Zero. This exemplifies the strange Bushido code of the Japanese military, which gave honor and bravery in combat a high priority.

Following the war, Baggett went back to the US and established himself in Texas, living a quiet existence with his family. At the age of 85, he passed away in 2006. Baggett’s heroism in using his Colt.45 to fire down a Japanese Zero while hanging from an open parachute will go on in history as a testament to his bravery and tenacity.

Both Air & Space Force magazine and National Public Radio have deemed Baggett’s feat to be genuine.

Photo by Unknown

February 11, 2024 0 comment

History

The legendary Tuskegee Airmen member Brig. Gen. Charles McGee passed away

by Till Daisd July 22, 2023

written by Till Daisd

On January 16, 2022, retired Brig. Gen. Charles McGee, a renowned member of the Tuskegee Airmen, passed away at 102 years old

On January 16, 2022, retired Brig. Gen. Charles McGee, a renowned member of the Tuskegee Airmen, passed away at 102 years old. Throughout his career, McGee completed 409 air combat missions.

He was one of the last surviving pilots from the Tuskegee Airmen — a group of African American pilots who were credited not only for their service in World War II but also for breaking barriers.

McGee was one of just 8 combat-experienced pilots left out of the 355 Tuskegee pilots, according to WTOP News.

McGee, who was born on December 7th, 1919, in Cleveland, excelled as a leader from a young age and attained the rank of outstanding Eagle Scout. He continued to lead throughout his military career after entering the US Army as a pilot on October 26, 1942, according to the article Tuskegee Airman celebrates 102nd birthday at 12th FTW by Lori A. Bultman, 502nd Air Base Wing Public Affairs.

On June 30, 1943, McGee earned his pilot’s wings. He flew his first mission on Valentine’s Day in February 1944 while stationed in Italy with the 301st Fighter Squadron of the 332d Fighter Group.

McGee-Tuskegee — Retired Brig. Gen. Charles McGee, a documented Tuskegee Airman, holds up a bottle of cola to honor the tradition of shooting down an enemy aircraft during his tour of the 99th Flying Training Squadron on Dec. 6, 2021, at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

McGee escorted Consolidated B-24 Liberator and Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers over Germany, Austria, and the Balkans while flying the Bell P-39Q Airacobra, Republic P-47D Thunderbolt, and North American P-51 Mustang fighter planes during World War II. McGee had completed 137 combat missions by the time he was elevated to the rank of captain. In December 1944, he traveled back to the US and started working as an instructor for North American B-25 Mitchell bombers at Tuskegee Army Air Field. He remained there until the base’s closure in 1946.

During the war, McGee was transferred to Lockbourne Air Field in Columbus, Ohio, where he took the position of base operation and training officer before being enrolled in an air refueling unit and attending a technical course for aircraft maintenance. McGee flew P-51 Mustangs once more in the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron at the start of the Korean War, flying 100 missions and rising to the rank of major.

He continued his career as a fighter pilot in the US Air Force, the Department of Defense’s newest aviation division. Then-Lt. Col. McGee flew 172 combat flights in a McDonnell RF-4 photo reconnaissance aircraft during the Vietnam War. This concluded a 30-year active service career in which he participated in 409 combat missions as a fighter.

Since his retirement about 50 years ago, he has been honored with numerous awards, including the Congressional gold medal and inclusion into the National Aviation Hall of Fame by President George W. Bush.

Yet, McGee’s career did not stop with receiving accolades. In fact, according to his family, the last three years of his life were some of the greatest. He flew three state-of-the-art business jets to commemorate his 99th and 100th birthdays. His last journey was made in an Air Force T-37 VIP Air Transport on December 6, 2021, to visit the 99th Flying Training Squadron, 12th Flying Training Wing, at Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph in honor of his 102nd birthday.

During a heritage tour of the 99th Flying Training Squadron, McGee and many members of his family observed a T-1A Jayhawk with his name on the side on the nearby flightline. Three of McGee’s children were among the visitors who later went to a facility with flight simulators and took part in a training mission in a T-1A aircraft simulator.

A model T-7A Red Hawk was given as a gift at the end of the visit, and squadron members serenaded McGee as a cake was placed in front of him. The Tuskegee Airmen and the P-51 Mustang “Red Tail” aircraft that they flew during World War II are remembered in the Air Force’s newest trainer aircraft, the T-7 Red Hawk.

According to a statement from McGee’s family, he was a “living legend known for his kind-hearted, and humble nature, who saw positivity at every turn.”

Photo by U.S. Air Force photo by Sean M. Worrell

July 22, 2023 0 comment

History

The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission, USAAF’s worst-ever air fight.

by Till Daisd May 14, 2023

written by Till Daisd

Despite the attack causing significant damage to both factories, 60 of the 376 bombers—or roughly 1 in 6—were shot down, and more than 600 Airmen perished, went missing, or were captured

The US accelerated the development of its heavy bomber forces in Europe in the summer of 1943, and more B-17s and B-24s were sent against Germany targets. Nonetheless, they ran the risk of being shot down by Luftwaffe fighters if they went past the range of their P-47 escort.

Deep inside of Germany, on August 17, the targets were the Messerschmitt fighter factory in Regensburg and the ball bearing plants in Schweinfurt.

Both raids were intended to take place concurrently, with the Regensburg force landing at airfields in North Africa, in order to weaken the German resistance. Regrettably, fog prevented the Schweinfurt force from taking off on schedule, but the Regensburg force did.

Remembering the Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission, USAAF's most disastrous air battle to date. — B-17 going down after severe flak damage.

Due to this, enemy fighters attacked the first force, touched down, rearmed, and refueled, and then fought the second group that had been delayed. For a large portion of the operation, the bombers were on their own against wave after wave of German fighters. Despite the attack causing significant damage to both factories, 60 of the 376 bombers—or roughly 1 in 6—were shot down, and more than 600 Airmen perished, went missing, or were captured. The worst air fight ever for the USAAF.

B-17 Formation — Boeing B-17F formation over Schweinfurt, Germany, on Aug. 17, 1943.

On September 6, Stuttgart was the intended objective; 45 of the 262 attacking aircraft perished. Even though P-47s had jettisonable belly fuel tanks, which slightly increased their range, they were still unable to provide escort protection well beyond Germany’s western border.

On October 14, 1943, the second Schweinfurt attack, commonly known as Black Thursday, only increased the devastation. Initial predictions were incorrect—unescorted heavy bombers could not defend themselves against hostile fighters on their own. Sadly, USAAF fighters at the time lacked the range to fly alongside bombers during deep enemy territory operations.

B-17s — B-17 Flying Fortress bombers flying through dense flak.

The North American P-51B Mustang was the actual answer to this problem. The long-range P-51B not only reduced bomber losses but also soon established air superiority over Europe, which helped pave the way for D-Day in numerous ways.

Just roughly 25% of the Eighth Air Force bomber crewmen completed their 25-mission tours in 1943, according to the National Museum of the United States Air Force; the remaining 75% were killed, badly wounded, or captured. Bomber crews bravely continued their strikes mission after mission despite knowing how unlikely it was that they would complete their deployments.

In order to achieve the air superiority necessary for the success of Operation Overlord, the American campaign goal for the 1943 daylight bombing sorties deep into Germany was to cripple the Luftwaffe fighter force. Due to the Germans’ success in achieving their own goal of destroying enough Eight Air Force bombers, the Americans were forced to halt their bombing campaign in the middle of October 1943, preventing the Eighth Air Force from completing this campaign objective.

Photo by U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army Air Force, and Rama via Wikipedia

May 14, 2023 0 comment

History

The B-29 could have experienced a higher loss rate over Germany in 1943 than the B-17 and B-24

by Till Daisd March 17, 2023

written by Till Daisd

The B-29 saw most of its action in the Pacific theater of World War II. How would the B-29 have fared in the air conflict over Germany if it had been made available in 1943?

The first B-29, designed in 1940, took to the skies for the first time on September 21, 1942, replacing the B-17 and B-24. The Superfortress was deployed to Asia in December 1943 by the U.S. Army Air Forces leadership, where its tremendous range made it especially well-suited for the lengthy over-water flights against the Japanese homeland from bases in China. B-29s started attacking Japan from the islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the final two months of 1944.

Hence, the B-29 saw most of its action in the Pacific Theater of World War II, but how would it have fared if it had been made available in 1943 and engaged in the air conflict over Germany?

‘The short answer is I don’t think it would have been very effective in 1943, and in fact may have been a deathtrap over Europe, with higher losses than the B-17 or B-24,’ Willard Foxton, an Aviation Expert who made several World War II documentaries, explains on Quora.

‘Essentially there are three reasons –

‘1.) Technological immaturity;

‘2.) Bad USAAF doctrine in 1943 over Europe, which is especially bad for the B-29;

‘3.) The Luftwaffe’s excellent home defense system is far better than the Japanese equivalent.

‘I’ll deal with each in turn, but let’s start with Technological Immaturity.

‘Here’s a harsh truth – the B-29, while a revolutionary aeroplane, was not a very good aeroplane as originally deployed, and these problems would certainly be present in a version deployed in Britain in 1943.

‘Curtis LeMay – the commander of the Superfortress force – said of it “There were scores of defects – either readily apparent – or worse- appearing when an aircraft was actually at work and at altitude”.

‘The Superfortress was incredibly expensive – developing it cost a billion more than the atomic bomb – and it crammed in so many advanced systems, all at the cutting edge of technology, that very few things in it worked perfectly.

Here’s why the B-29 could have had a higher loss rate than the B-17 and B-24 over Germany in 1943 — *Boeing B-29 Superfortress “Enola Gay” landing after the atomic bombing mission on Hiroshima, Japan.*

‘More Superfortresses were lost to mechanical failure than any other cause; in its first 6 months, regularly 10% of bombers that took off would be lost – per mission – to mechanical defects alone.

‘In particular, its R3350 engines – while incredibly impressive on paper, and the most powerful fitted to a WWII bomber – were very unreliable all through the war, especially when the fortress was first deployed.

‘Engine fires and overheating were very common because of the “double stack” cylinder configuration, often leading to engine temperature as high as 300 degrees; this might have been manageable were it not for the unique construction material of the engine.

‘To save weight the R3350 had a magnesium crankcase. You might note now – this is the last example of magnesium being used in aircraft engine construction, for a reason!

‘While magnesium is light and very strong, it’s also highly flammable, and once on fire, almost impossible to extinguish. In 87% of engine fires, the onboard extinguishers were unable to cope, and the fire would burn out the whole engine and wing. The loss stats speak for themselves – of 414 B-29 losses in WWII, 147 of them were to flak and Japanese fighters, 267 to engine fires.

‘Apparently, the fires were an incredible sight to behold – the magnesium burned blindingly bright with a core temperature approaching 5,600 °F (3,100 °C) – and were so intense the main wing spar could burn through in seconds, resulting in catastrophic wing failure.

‘The magnesium was also surprisingly brittle; reports often describe engines starting and shaking themselves to pieces on the runway, and they did not handle damage well.

‘The bulk of these losses were early in the campaign of bombing Japan when the B-29s were flying from China; the problems were eventually ameliorated, but largely because of a doctrinal shift to flying slower and lower.

‘The defensive suite is another likely problem for the European B29; the B29 was fitted with a state-of-the-art suite of 4 remote controlled gun turrets, and a manned tail turret with a 20mm cannon. Linked to 5 networked computerized gunsights the gunners were, in theory, able to shoot with amazing accuracy and even control multiple turrets at once.

‘Sounds great, right? But the problem was the system simply didn’t work. It often failed to keep Japanese fighters at bay and was absolutely plagued with mechanical and technical glitches.

‘Notably the frontal guns – doubled from 2 to 4 to prevent frontal attacks -had very poor ballistics as a compromise for streamlining, leaving a 4-gun turret where it was ballistically impossible to hit a target with more than two guns, with a large blind spot to head on attack.

‘The 200lb CFC computers suffered from terrible build quality and rarely worked as advertised – a common glitch was for the turret to slew 20 degrees and then wildly spray its entire ammunition load in that direction. This fault – caused by bad wiring design – was only tracked down and fixed in January 1945, when the Superfortress had been in action for seven months.

‘A late upgrade enabled you to set the turrets to track motion – a great setting in theory, until in raids over Japan 17 bombers had their bomb-bays riddled with bullets on the bomb run – opening the bomb doors had triggered other bombers in their formations automatic turret fire.

‘The turrets were also impossible to access in flight – so any malfunction or jam could not be repaired in the air. The impressive tail turret fit – with 20mm cannon – was hampered by bad ballistic design so the two machine guns and the cannon could not hit the same target, and the radar guiding of the tail cannon never functioned in combat (eventually the tail cannon & radar were deleted, and the twin .50 cals remained).

‘Ultimately the defensive system was so unsatisfactory that it was removed from all aircraft in February 1945 (bar the tail turret), and the B-29B was built without any turrets at all, as by then the USAAF had realized defensive guns on a bomber – even super advanced defensive guns – were less useful than flying high and fast and at night.

‘Which takes me on to…

‘Bad Doctrine

‘In 1943, the USAAF was wedded to a bad doctrine – the self-defending bomber formation that would fight its way to the target without an escort in daylight.’

Foxton continues:

‘Had the B-29 been deployed in 1943, it would have been deployed like this, and I suspect that despite its speed and altitude advantages, it would have been slaughtered in some kind of disastrous, disappointing deep penetration raid in the Schweinfurt/Ploesti mould (to be fair, like all other attempts to fly self-defending bombers hundreds of miles to defended targets).

‘The B-29 – as such a revolutionary aeroplane – also had a huge crew training problem. There were no experienced instructors because the experience of the type and the conditions it flew in were literally non-existent and at the edge of human experience -so many crews passing the test to fly it were actually very poor. This problem was so bad that even the notoriously hard-assed Le May stood down the entire B-29 force in the Pacific for retraining for several months.

‘Part of this failure of crew training was that atmospheric conditions were also against the B-29 being flown as initially imagined. The US doctrine was formation flying and precision bombing, that was how the initial crews were trained.

‘The B-29 flew sufficiently high that a new phenomenon – 140 mph winds at high altitude, that we now know as “the jet stream”- made formation flying almost impossible and one gust could shatter the mutually supporting defensive boxes US doctrine relied upon. So not only was the core US flying training obsolete but crucially – and unbeknownst on its initial deployment – bombing accuracy with the B-29 initially deployed was woeful. Bombs were dropped into 100 mph+ winds at high altitudes with predictably unpredictable results, rendering the Norden bombsight – the center of USAAF precision bombing doctrine – utterly useless.

‘In 1944, only 1 in 3 B-29s was getting a hit by RAF standards, ie within 5 miles of the aiming point. In daylight, in clear visibility. The truth was it took a painful experience to realize the doctrinally prescribed bombing height of 27–30,000 feet was completely impractical.

‘On top of this, the B-29 in this counterfactual 1943 deployment offers a unique and exciting opportunity to allied commanders. Sure, you COULD deploy it alongside the B-17 and B-24, but then you are sacrificing the incredible technological advantages the B-29 brings.

‘While the B-29 had huge advantages over the B-17 and B-24, it wasn’t so good it was invulnerable to German fighters, particularly in its early configuration with full guns. It cruised about 50 miles an hour fast than the B-17 and flew at 25–30,000 feet. It’s only once you take the turrets off it starts to power up beyond 35,000 feet where fighters severely lack energy.

‘As late as September 1944, when Colonel Paul Tibbets suggested taking the turrets off the B-29 to get higher and thus safer, with the devastating losses over Europe, and the disappointing performance of the B-29 up til that point, LeMay *still* had him checked out by a psychiatrist for combat fatigue before acceding to Tibbets’ request for a test. In 1943, any suggestion to take off the guns or run with an escort – measures that *would* have made the B29 viable – would have been simply rejected out of hand.

‘The USAAF was determined to test the theory of self-defending bombers literally to destruction, and the B-29 in its full turret configuration was the great white hope of this theory.

‘In particular, the range, speed, and promised technological “invulnerability” of the B-29 would have encouraged the 8th air force’s commanders to try for very long raids with it – raids the B-17 and B-24 simply couldn’t do.

‘As we’ve already seen, the CFC gun system was highly unreliable, and self-defending bombers don’t really work, but the point is nobody knew at the time. The B-29 would definitely have been tried on deep penetration raids solo, without escort.

‘The trouble with these raids would be that as well as exposing the B-29’s mechanical and defensive shortcomings, it would also create situations where 70–80 B29s (typical raid size for first six months of B-29 combat career) would be fighting practically the whole German air defense network, a sure-fire recipe for a massacre.

‘Which takes me to…

‘The Luftwaffe’s prowess’

As Foxton explains, ‘While raids at the 70–80 aircraft scale were semi-successfully carried out in the Pacific – albeit often with a ~10{4b4a8f7af628fb0b180f961b7ba32842c69b81c2d3374171931aa15051caf1c9} loss rate from mechanical failure – they were successful because the Japanese in Burma had no radar, no aircraft able to reliably fly high enough to engage the B-29 and very few guns able to shoot high enough to engage the aircraft.

‘That would simply not be the case in 1943 over Europe.

‘There’s a huge difference between flying from a base in China to a target in China, over contested territory, against an enemy with no early warning and no effective defense, to flying over a continent totally dominated by the enemy with industrial grade flak defenses and hundreds of interceptors capable of reaching you, who know which way you are coming and going (interesting fact – the US lost more bombers coming home from raids than on the way in, as the routes were much more predictable).

‘The Japanese lacked a mass of aircraft with 2 stage superchargers able to get high enough to engage the B-29 and cannon armament to bring it down; Japanese aircraft that could get high enough often emptied the rifle-Calibre guns they were armed with and got B-29 kills by ramming (indeed the B-29 in the picture above was brought down by being rammed by a Ki-44)

‘The Luftwaffe had no shortage of aircraft with superchargers to get high up, with both standard day fighters of the Luftwaffe – the FW 190 and Bf 109 – coming equipped with superchargers and cannon-armed as standard. Either was capable of reaching the operational altitude of the B-29 with a combat load and hitting it with the 20mm or even 30mm cannon rounds that had a much better chance of a kill on a big bomber.

‘Going back briefly to the technological problems of the B-29 – as a result of its design, it was paradoxically more vulnerable to cannon fire than the B-17 or B-24. It was the first pressurized bomber, so cannon hits on it often caused explosive decompressions of the cockpit.

‘This – while less spectacular than the James Bond “sucked out of a hole” decompression of Hollywood – was nonetheless deadly and horrifying to crews, wrecking visibility as the aircraft fills with fog, and posing huge risks of oxygen deprivation to crews.

‘By Korea, there was a drill for this, which included teaching pilots to “pressure breathe” in order to avoid passing out, but the problem was barely recognized until the B-29 had been in service for some time – part of the problem with a 1943 deployment of the B-29 would be this sort of thing – which was worked out in low-intensity combat over China and Burma – would be happening in an incredibly harsh, contested airspace environment.

‘I also dread to think what regular exposure to cannon fire and massed flak would do to those highly flammable engines, especially once the Luftwaffe – who were great at analyzing bombers for weak points – figured out how vulnerable the engines were. I think there’s every chance a European-deployed B29 would be regarded as an incredibly costly failure, a hugely hubristic example of US technical overreach.

‘Finally, the real fix for the B-29 was the acceptance that it was *not* an effective high-level, high-speed bomber (without an atomic bomb, at least). What it was, was an incredibly effective, very long-range, very heavy load-carrying bomber.

‘The most effective conventional B-29 raids were carried out at about 5,000 feet, dropping incendiary bombs on Japanese cities. Bringing down both speed and altitude massively helped with the engine trouble, and by this point, Le May had removed the troublesome defensive armament.

‘These raids were possible against a much-weakened 1945 Japan, with no effective night fighter counter, very poor airborne interception radar, and lacking the extraordinary levels of low-level light flak present in Germany in 1943. Even against the far less deep air defenses of North Korea in the Korean War, the B-29 could not operate without an escort by day, or by night at a low level.

‘So, even if a doctrinal switch in 1943 *was* possible, the conditions to use the B-29 in its most effective configuration simply do not exist.’

Foxton concludes:

‘In conclusion, while I concede the B-29 was a revolutionary aircraft and technological wonder, it contained several technological dead ends (magnesium engines and remote gun turrets), and a 1943 deployment against the Luftwaffe at its peak would show up these flaws in absolutely catastrophic ways.

‘Ultimately, I think like the P-38 Lightning, the B-29’s success in the Pacific is as much a reflection of the poor quality of Japanese aircraft after 1942 as much as it is a reflection of US technical superiority.’

Photo by U.S. Air Force

March 17, 2023 0 comment

History

The reason why the Boeing B-17 is the best bomber

by Till Daisd March 15, 2023

written by Till Daisd

Boeing had no idea that when they created the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, their creation would become the benchmark for high-altitude bombing

For the majority of warbird enthusiasts, a B-17 Flying Fortress is unrivaled. The Fort epitomizes what a heavy aircraft should look like, according to Brent William Perkins in his book Memphis Belle: Life of a B-17 Flying Fortress, with the traditional lines of the early military. The B-17 stands out from competing designs thanks to its broad wings, large sweeping tail, angled windshield, and distinctive nosepiece.

A B-17 appears to be a warrior only by sitting still, while yet displaying the elegant curves of a Hollywood star. With its large and deep wings, it finds its place in the air, bristling with heavy machine guns in all directions and sitting tail low as if ready to take off. The bomber was created under the Boeing idea known as the model 299 and was given the nickname “The Flying Fortress” by Richard Williams, a reporter for the Seattle Times. A flyable prototype has to be completed in less than a year as of April 1934.

Military strategists were looking to airpower to assure complete victory since the war was bound to break out. At the time, the US arsenal lacked a bomber that could handle the demands that aerial warfare would place on it. The US Army Air Corps (the USAF was not founded until 1947) had more demanding requirements for combat survival, range, and precision weapon delivery than the aircraft in the stocks at the time could accommodate. A call was made. Create a bomber that can sustain 7,000 feet with the designed usable load and one engine out for ten hours at 25,000 feet while climbing to 10,000 feet in five minutes.

A Mighty Fortress: why the Boeing B-17 is the best bomber ever built — Boeing Model 299

It was done by Boeing. On July 17, 1935, 299 rolled out of the factory after just spending $275,000. Little over a year after it first hit the drafting tables, the 299’s bomb bay could hold up to 4,800 pounds of armaments. They had no idea that the aircraft they had created would set the bar for high-altitude bombing well into the next century.

After only 14 hours and 5 minutes of test time and one month and three days since rollout, the 299 departed Seattle, Washington, for Wright-Patterson near Dayton, Ohio. It rolled out the runway in Ohio after nine hours and three minutes. 233 mph was the average ground speed. This flight outperformed the burgeoning Douglas B-18, which was actually just a DC-2 that had been strengthened. Also, it eclipsed the much-debated Martin B-10.

The Air Corps placed an order for thirteen YB-17s on January 17, 1937. A little more than eight years of production would pass before the plane’s completion in August 1945, when 12,731 Fortresses were produced. About 10,000 of these are thought to have really departed the country for assignments all across the world. Around 4,500 B-17s were lost in battle, mostly when flying out of the European Theatre of Operations and the unsinkable aircraft carrier known as the United Kingdom, despite the Fort’s amazing ability to endure severe battle damage. The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress made history when the powerful Eighth Air Force unleashed the largest air armada ever from this island. During this time, the sky raged for a thousand days.

Is the B-I 7 the most advanced bomber ever created? The Consolidated B-24 Liberator and the B-17 have been at odds for many years. Was the B-24 a superior aircraft? For far too long, this question has absorbed far too many people. Compared to the B-17, the Liberator could fly higher, carried more cargo, and be faster. Even though they were paired off for fighting, their functions were rather distinct. The Flying Fortress and the Liberator were never intended to be rivals; rather, they were meant to complement one another. They were both effective bombing platforms, thus the rivalry was unavoidable.

The War Department conducted a thorough search across aircraft manufacturers for the new bomber designs that were sorely needed, and the two bombers were the end result. The -17 and the -24 were the best design proposals. They merely based their ideas on what was required at the time. Think about the numbers. Up to 18,188 of the enormous twin-tailed leviathans known as B-24s were produced. By the conclusion of the war, the B-24 had undergone so many changes that it was no longer able to outperform the B-17 in terms of distance or speed.

War Wartime Impact – the capacity to enter enemy airspace, withstand threats from the enemy, carry the right bomb load, properly deliver the cargo, and return home.

Defensive Characteristics – From single-barrel machine guns through electronic countermeasures, stealth, and even speed. What bomber defends itself better than any other?

Range – Could the bomber launch, ingress, loiter, deliver, and return?

Available Bomb Load – How many different kinds of weaponry and how much weight could it carry?

Accuracy – the outcome of the bomb delivery system and the stability and predictability of the aircraft.

Survivability – Evading or withstanding enemy ground fire and aerial attack. What bomber had the lowest loss-to-sortie ratio?

The German Gotha bombers, the Heinkel 111, the B-17, B-24, Lancaster, Aichi D3A Val, the B-47 Stratojet, the B-52 Stratofortress, the FB-111, the B-58 Hustler, the B-1 Lancer, the B-2 Spirit, and more rank among the best aircraft ever created from the start of aerial bombing to the present day.

The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress is widely considered to be the greatest bomber ever produced based on the aforementioned standards. The American military, it seems, shared those sentiments. It wasn’t until the late 1960s that the Baker 1-7 was officially retired from service.

Early in the War, there was a discussion over which plane was superior, and it is still going strong now. General James Doolittle made his careful comparisons, in which he partially claimed that performance was sacrificed to accommodate the armor and armament’s additional weight in order to enhance the B-24’s defensive capabilities. The Army Air Corp’s attempt to upgrade the Liberator included some highly odd measures, such as grafting the entire front of a B-17G to a B-24J.

Only three tests were flown by this aircraft, and the findings were utterly inappropriate. The hybrid bomber had poor longitudinal and directional stability and could only climb to an altitude of 18,000 feet. One observation in the study report noted that the installation added to the B-24J’s already excessive basic weight. But the Bombardier and Navigator reported that they favored the increased room in the forward compartment over the traditional B-24 arrangement.

Memphis Belle: Biography of a B-17 Flying Fortress is published by Schiffer Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by Airwolfhound from Hertfordshire via Wikipedia, UK San Diego Air & Space Museum, and Senior Airman Curt Beach/U.S. Air Force

March 15, 2023 0 comment

History

Operation Tidal Wave

by Till Daisd December 12, 2022

written by Till Daisd

The USAAF lost 214 soldiers in Romania, according to the Romanian Gendarmerie, but several B-24 aircraft had crew members who were so badly burned that it was impossible to identify them

Operation Tidal Wave was one of the boldest and most controversial air raids of World War II.

The Ploesti oilfields in Romania served as both a major strategic air power target and Germany’s single most important fuel supply in 1943. However, the Tidal Wave raid, which used B-24s flown from Libya to destroy the refineries, ended up being one of the most expensive US Army Air Force (USAAF) operations to date, with roughly a third of the force being shot down. Although clearly valiant, the mission’s outcomes—for which five Medals of Honor were given—were in doubt. Initial evaluations claimed that 40% of Ploesti’s refinery capacity had been lost, however, subsequent research found that the damage was swiftly fixed and output levels increased.

According to Steven J. Zaloga in his book Ploesti 1943, Gen. Alfred Gerstenberg (who led the Luftwaffe in Romania from February 15, 1942, to August 27, 1944), in his initial report to Berlin, acknowledged the damage to the refineries but noted that it would not significantly affect the supply of fuel to Germany and its allies. The attack also resulted in devastating losses for the USAAF. Senior Romanian and German leadership met in Bucharest on August 3, 1943, to examine the takeaways from the Ploesti raid.

The meeting included Marshal Ion Antonescu, General de escadra Gheorghe Jienescu (Romanian Air Minister), General de divizie Gheorghe D. Marinescu (Romanian Air Defenses), German Ambassador Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, Gen Gerstenberg, Oberst Woldenga (German fighter forces), Gen Kuderna (commander of 5.Flak Division), and others.

Operation Tidal Wave: Why the 1943 Raid on Ploesti Oilfields Failed to Diminish the Supply of Fuel to Germany and its Allies — B-24 Liberator Through flak and over the destruction created by preceding waves of bombers, these 15th Air Force B-24s leave Ploesti, Romania, after one of the long series of attacks against the No. 1 oil target in Europe.

Even though the raid had significantly damaged the refineries, Gerstenberg pointed out that they were still in operation and that production might resume normally in a few weeks. Despite numerous recommendations for enhancing air defense, Ploesti’s Flak defense was determined to be the single most crucial cause of the raid’s demise. The conference felt that the Flak was too spread and that only about a third of the German and Romanian antiaircraft weaponry in Romania was concentrated in Ploesti and the Prahova valley.

Consequently, a program was started to focus the Flak defenses on the most critical places, including Bucharest, Ploesti, the Cernavoda bridge, the port of Constanta, and the manufacturing cities of Reqita and Brasov. As a result of the assumption that subsequent raids would come from high altitudes following the failure of the low-altitude raid, there was also universal agreement on the necessity for more antiaircraft guns, notably heavy batteries of 105mm. It would also be necessary to deploy more radar stations and increase the fighter force.

The FARR (Fortele Aeriene RegalenRomane, Royal Romanian Air Force) launched 54 flights with 13 kill claims while having 31 available aircraft and crews on August 1. In the proximity of Ploesti, the Luftwaffe operated 26 aircraft with crews, carried out 69 missions, and recorded 15 kills. The other five kills claimed by Jagdgeschwader are not included in this. 27 from the Greek base at Kalamaki/Tanagara attacked the retreating Tidal Wave force over the Ionian Sea.

Romanian assessments seriously downgraded the number of bombers lost to fighters. Many of the bombers that fighters claimed to have shot down had already been mortally injured by flak, and the fighters had only shown up to provide the finishing blow. After the Tidal Wave, one of the key technical assessments was that the fighter aircraft needed to be updated with a 20mm cannon because the machine-gun-equipped fighters could not damage a heavy bomber effectively enough.

An enormous overstatement was made by the Tidal Wave bomber crews when they claimed to have shot down 52 hostile aircraft. In the final battles over the Ionian Sea, the Luftwaffe lost two BF 109G-2 aircraft destroyed and four damaged from I./JG.4, and two Bf 109Gs destroyed and one damaged from JG.27. Night-fighter losses were one Bf 110E-4 destroyed and four damaged from NJG.6. Two JAR 80 fighters were lost by the FARR, three were damaged, and one Romanian Bf 110C was also destroyed. During the encounters, at least two Romanian Bf 109G-2s were also damaged.

According to Romanian reports, between 34 and 36 bombers were shot down over the country, 26 of which crashed outside of the city of Ploesti and nine of which crashed nearby. Due to numerous bombers disintegrating and burning after colliding with the refineries, the number of bombers varied. Officials from Romania sent the US a list of 25 mostly intact aircraft that could be recognized by serial number in 1944. According to estimations, fighters (12), balloon wires, and flak (20) were to blame for the bomber losses (4).

According to the first US assessment, fighters were mostly to blame for five to six of the losses above Ploesti, balloon cables for one, and one or two planes may have been destroyed by bomb explosions or other ground fires. The light 20mm and 37mm guns were blamed for the majority of the Flaknkills by both the Germans and the Romanians. Low-altitude engagements were not well suited for the 88mm guns. The USAAF suffered 214 deaths in Romania, according to the Romanian Gendarmerie, however other aircraft had crew members who were so badly burned that it was impossible to identify them.

The number of casualties on the ground varies between reports. Most recent sources state that there were over 300 fatalities and injuries. The B-24 crash into the women’s penitentiary, which resulted in 61 deaths and 60 injuries, was the single most expensive incident. Three 88mm guns and five 20mm guns were lost in terms of equipment. When their wires were damaged, seven barrage balloons were released, and five more were set on fire and destroyed.

Ploesti 1943 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

December 12, 2022 0 comment

History

When B-17 and B-24 bombers were converted into flying bombs against Luftwaffe’s V-1 sites

by Till Daisd December 6, 2022

written by Till Daisd

The Special Weapons Branch of the Equipment Lab at Wright Field, Ohio, came up with the concept of turning existing airplanes into power-driven controlled bombs in January 1944

At Wright Field, Ohio’s Special Weapons Branch of the Equipment Lab, the concept of transforming existing airplanes into power-driven, controlled bombs first surfaced in January 1944.

The original plan was to employ C-47 transport planes or attack gliders, carrying 10 tons of high explosives, according to Steven J. Zaloga in his book American Guided Missiles of World War II. The USAAF Engineering Division’s Materiel Command expanded the idea to cover a range of bombers, such as the B-24 and B-17. On March 25, 1944, the program was fully launched with the creation of twelve conversion kits. The guidance system was based on the aircraft’s autopilot.

A two-man crew would pilot the aircraft during the initial phase, and once cruising altitude was reached, activate the autopilot and bailout. Then, using a radio-control system, a supporting control aircraft would direct the aircraft toward the target. Any unnecessary weight, such as gun turrets, would be removed from the aircraft. The combat theater enthusiastically supported the program. The commander of the 8th Air Force, Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, proposed using old “Weary Willie” bombers that were available in Britain as the basis for flying bombs in May 1944.

The B-17F and B-24J, now known as the RB-17F and RB-24J, were chosen as the first missile aircraft on June 9, 1944. Two B-17s, one B-24, and one P-38J “Droopsnoot” were chosen as the control aircraft in addition to the dozen missile planes. The project was given the codename MX-541 Castor on June 19.

Project Castor: the story of B-17 and B-24 bombers converted into flying bombs and aimed to destroy Luftwaffe’s V-1 sites — *After completing 80 missions with the 323rd Bombardment Squadron, Aphrodite B-17F (The Careful Virgin) was used against Mimoyecques but impacted short of target due to controller error.*

The priority for Project Castor increased dramatically on Jun. 20, 1944, when Maj. Gen. Alfred Maxwell, Director of Operations of the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAFE), telegraphed an urgent request that the Materiel Command dispatch any available experimental guided weapons to Britain with the highest air priority. Operation Eisbär (Polar Bear), launched by the Luftwaffe against London in early June, involved the new V-1 cruise missile. Strong political pressure was put on the USSTAFE commander, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, to destroy the launch sites, particularly the massive “Heavy Crossbow” bunker launch facilities that were resistant to conventional bomber attacks. It was necessary to launch an explosive strike on the bunkers between ten and twenty feet from the target.

Some preliminary studies had suggested that the radio-control system in use with the Azon-guided bombs could be adapted for this requirement. Two systems—one to control altitude and one to control direction—were integrated because the Azon could only move the bomb along one axis. The 8th Air Force Operational Engineering Section at Bovingdon oversaw a crash program that started under the codename Aphrodite. Maj. Henry “Jim” Rand, the primary Azon expert for the 8th Air Force, developed the Double Azon. The AN/ARW-18 transmitter on the control plane and the AN/ARW-1 receiver on the missile made up the radio link between the “Mother” and the “Baby.”

On June 23, an experimental B-17F “robot” and “mother” ship were completed, and on June 24 in the evening, the first test flight was carried out. The conversion program was given to the USSTAFE Base Air Depot 1 at RAF Burtonwood, and from B1 to B10, a total of ten “Babies” were converted through the end of June. On July 8, Spaatz placed a conversion order for 65 Aphrodite aircraft, with the remaining 15 being filled with jellied gasoline and the remaining 75 with 10 tons of nitrostarch high-explosive (napalm).

On August 4, 1944, the first Aphrodite mission was carried out employing four Babies. Robot B1, which was intended to reach the Watten missile bunker, aborted its first pass due to cloud cover but succeeded on its second. Robot B1 was flown back out toward the English Channel because the B-24 Mother was unable to activate the “Down” control. Before it could be reoriented for another pass, it was hit by flak and went off in an explosion. Robot B4’s aim at Wizernes was successful, but during the final approach, cloud cover briefly obscured the target, and the B-17 crashed about 700 yards past the bunker.

The B-17 Mother crew thought Robot B5 was flying too high as it approached the Mimoyecques bunker and attempted to bring it down to the normal 300 feet. The relatively rudimentary controls caused them to crash around 1,500 feet short of the target. The altimeter on Robot B8, which was destined for Siracourt, failed above England. The aircraft experienced a number of uncontrollable climbs before finally stalling and crashing close to Woodbridge in Suffolk, with one crew member safely parachuting out.

On August 6, Mission 2 was carried out using the B-17F “Franklin Yellow” and B-17G “Franklin White,” which were each loaded with 830 gallons of jellied gasoline and a dozen 100lb bombs. Over the English Channel, the Franklin Yellow group came upon a formation of B-24 bombers, which caused the Mother to overshoot the Baby and experience control issues. Franklin Yellow lost control, made a sudden left turn, flipped over on its back, and crashed into the water. When the crew got out, Franklin White appeared to be flying normally, but a little while later the Mother saw that the B-17G was drifting to the right.

As the Baby began to perform complete turns, the situation increasingly got worse. The B-17 was purposefully crashed into the ocean following failed attempts to control Franklin White using the second Mother rather than risk it unintentionally returning to England.

By modifying its remote-control technology for the PB4Y-1 Privateer, the maritime patrol bomber variant of the B-24 Liberator bomber, the US Navy offered to assist Aphrodite. Compared to the basic Double Azon, this remote-control system was substantially more advanced. Two television cameras were installed on the Anvil, one in the nose to aim the robot at the target and the other in the cockpit to monitor the flight instruments. The Naval Air Factory in Philadelphia carried out the Project Anvil adaptations, and on July 7, 1944, the first Anvil PB4Y-1 and two modified PV-1 Ventura motherships left the US.

On August 12, the Anvil PB4Y-1 was sent on its Aphrodite mission, with the Mimoyecques bunker as its target. The formation took off as expected, but before the crew could bail out, the 10 1/2 ton load of Torpex exploded before its time, destroying the Anvil PB4Y-1 south of Halesworth and seriously damaging the surrounding terrain. Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy, the elder brother of the future US president John F. Kennedy and the son of the former US ambassador to Britain, was the plane’s pilot. In order to ascertain what caused the accident, more Aphrodite missions were suspended. The most likely cause, as determined by more recent studies, was a flawed safe-and-arming mechanism.

By the end of August 1944, the Allied forces had taken control of the missile launch sites in France and Belgium, bringing an end to Operation Crossbow, the campaign against the German V-1 sites. The remaining missiles’ targets changed to other valuable, well-defended targets as a result. Missions into Germany at great depth were deemed too risky. On September 3, 1944, a second Anvil Privateer was used at the Kriegsmarine base in Heligoland, attacking a location with fuel dumps and barracks on Dune Island. The Aphrodite program’s first successful mission was this one.

The Castor Project persisted in the US while the makeshift Aphrodite program was running in Britain. Plans to convert 500 missiles and 100 control aircraft were approved on July 5. On July 12, the first RB-17G and RB-24J were sent to be transformed into Castor aircraft. On August 5, 1944, the Castor designations were changed to BQB-17F and BQB-24J for the missiles and CQB-17G, CQB-24J, and CPQ-38 for the control planes. On August 25, this was changed once more when the BQ-7 for B-17 conversions and BQ-8 for B-24 conversions attack drone designations were given to the missiles.

The flight control system employed by the Castor aircraft was more akin to the Navy’s Anvil than the Aphrodite’s Double Azon. Two SCR-549A Block III television cameras, one in the cockpit to monitor the flight instruments and one in the nose to assist with aircraft aiming during the terminal phase, were part of the Castor system. The triple AN-117-A antenna array on the Azon aircraft was replaced with a tiny AN-145 or AN-146 antenna on the Castor Baby aircraft. A set of remote-controlled servos were installed in the aircraft to manage the different flight controls, such as the throttle, propellers, landing gear, and cowl flaps.

In order to track the drone even in overcast situations, the Castor conversions also contained an AN/TPN-1 Eureka navigation beacon that could be tracked by the AN/APN-2 Rebecca navigation aid on the control aircraft. The BQ-7 was equipped with a smoke generator pod under the fuselage that produced a white smoke trail to help the control aircraft even more.

On August 2, 1944, the first Castor BQ-7 detachment from Wright Field reached Britain. Twelve B-17 bombers were modified into BQ-7 drones at RAF Burtonwood, together with five CQB-17G motherships. On August 20, the first drone modification was finished, and on September 11 against the Heligoland submarine pens, the first Castor operation was carried out. Only one of the ten Castor flights that were carried out through January 1945 was barely successful. Flak, equipment failure, and poor weather impacted the program.

One special Castor mission was a plan to attack the German battleship, Tirpitz, in the Alten Fjord in Norway. British munition experts advised using a large hydrostatic bomb that could be detonated underwater because regular high explosives would not be adequate. Boeing engineers developed a technique to remove the fairing behind the B-17 cockpit since these large weapons could not be placed into the bomb bay of the B-17. As a result, a space was made large enough for the weapons to be lowered into the fuselage from above.

This conversion only applied to one aircraft, the Aphrodite B3 “Gremlin Gus II.” After the payload was secured into the fuselage, the opening was faired over with sheet metal, leading to the drone’s new nickname “The Roadster.” In the end, on November 12, 1944, the Tirpitz was sunk by RAF Lancaster bombers with Tallboy penetrating bombs.

The final Castor mission in Europe took place on January 1st, 1945, in Oldenburg. By this time, the 8th Air Force believed that the system was ineffective against targets that were well-defended by flak and in terrible winter weather.

American Guided Missiles of World War II is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force and www.fold3.com

December 6, 2022 0 comment