Grumman

The Buffalo became the first monoplane fighter aircraft for the US Navy in 1939 after defeating the Grumman F4F Wildcat in a competition

The F2A Buffalo was one of the first US monoplanes with an arrestor hook and other modifications for aircraft carriers, designed and manufactured by the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation. The Buffalo became the first monoplane fighter aircraft for the US Navy in 1939 after defeating the Grumman F4F Wildcat in a competition. The Buffalo was unstable and overweight when the US entered the war, especially when compared to the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero, even if it was superior to the Grumman F3F biplane it replaced and the early F4Fs.

The Buffalo was ordered by several air forces, including the British Royal Air Force (RAF), and employed in South East Asia.

The RAF in the Far East was made up virtually exclusively of obsolete aircraft, as revealed by Mark Stille in his book Malaya & Dutch East Indies 1941-42. Few aircraft were available to bolster the Far East due to the demands of the war in Europe and North Africa and the beginning of Lend Lease supplies to the USSR. With few exceptions, those that were sent east were second-rate.

In the year before the war began, the RAF did establish a number of new squadrons in Singapore, and in the six months before the war began in December 1941, the number of aircrews assigned to the RAF Far East Command doubled. The new squadrons came primarily from recruits from training units, while a few combat veterans of the fighting in Europe were also deployed there.

The Brewster Buffalo served as the squadron of the Far East air command’s standard fighter. This aircraft was chosen due to its availability rather than its capabilities. Four Buffalo squadrons, including the 243 RAF, 21 and 453 RAAF, and 488 (NZ) RAF Squadrons, were present in the Far East when the war first broke out. There were 118 primarily inexperienced aircrews in these units. 28 of them perished throughout the campaign, either by death or capture.

One can consider the situation of the 488 (NZ) Squadron, RAF, to be typical. The squadron, which had its founding in Wellington in September 1941, set off for Singapore on September 11 and reached there on October 11 after a stop in Australia. The following day, the squadron received its official designation. The new unit was transported to Singapore’s Kallang Airfield, where it was based throughout the battle. Squadron Leader Wilf Clouston was a wise choice to establish the first New Zealand fighter squadron as the squadron commanding officer.

He was a New Zealand-born pilot who had served with the RAF since 1936. The aircrews were transferred to Kluang in Malaya for Brewster Buffalo conversion training after arriving in Singapore. Except for Clouston and his two flight leaders, none of the pilots had any prior experience. The 21 Buffalos were actually hand‑me‑downs from 67 Squadron when it left for Burma; exactly zero were operational. There were also no tools or spare parts.

To make the majority of their aircraft operational, the New Zealanders stole enough spare parts from the 243 Squadron and a Dutch squadron at Kallang that also flew the Buffalo. The 488 Squadron lost 12 aircraft and two pilots before entering combat while trying to establish operational status. Since there were no radios on board, communication during the flight was only possible through hand gestures. The lax work schedule put in place by the British hindered the training. The workday was limited to 7:30 to 12:30, with most afternoons off. No one was allowed to work on Sunday, and Wednesday was designated as a half-day holiday.

When Buffalos from 488 Squadron first encountered Japanese forces, the outcome was obvious. Eight Buffalos took off on January 12 to stop a raid of 27 bombers that were being escorted by fighters. They were attacked by Zeros with a height advantage before they could get to the bombers’ altitude. Two Buffalos were shot down and the other four were damaged as a result of the forced disengagement; no Japanese aircraft were lost. 30 minutes later, a second flight of six Buffalos took off, but only one made contact with the Japanese, and the pilot cut off the action to stay alive.

Five damaged airplanes were written off the following day. These initial engagements supported the squadron’s conclusion that the Japanese were superior to the Buffalo. By January 24, 488 had only three Buffalos left. It was given nine Hurricane fighters as new equipment. On the morning of January 27, the Japanese arrived with 27 bombers after the ground crews spent an inordinate amount of time getting the nine Hurricanes ready. Two of the fighters were destroyed and the remaining seven were seriously damaged when the bombers dropped their payloads on Kallang.

But compared to the Buffalo, the Hawker Hurricane was a huge advance. In actuality, the latter was a complete failure as a fighter. Early on, the British realized this and decided the aircraft was unfit for use in Europe. The Buffalo was regarded as adequate against a subpar enemy, like the Japanese, though. Lack of speed and maneuverability were the Buffalo’s difficulties, which are both bad traits for a fighter. The British made their Buffalos heavier, which decreased their top speed to 204 mph and their rate of ascent to 2,600 feet per minute. It took an exhausting 35 minutes to reach 25,000 feet, the maximum altitude at which the aircraft could operate.

The Buffalo was initially well-equipped with four.50-caliber machine guns. The RAF changed the heavy .50-caliber armament for lighter.303 machine guns and lowered the amount of ammo in order to lighten the aircraft and improve its performance. Also decreased was the fuel load. As a result of these modifications, pilots frequently encountered the problem of running out of fuel or ammunition.

Malaya & Dutch East Indies 1941–42 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by Jim Laurier via Osprey and Crown Copyright