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history

Mike Adams, the only Pilot who died during the X-15 Flight-Test Program

by Till Daisd December 20, 2021

At a height of around 62,000 feet and a speed of roughly 3,800 feet per second, the X-15-3 aircraft broke up because the weights on it increased above their structural limits

A well-known and important figure in aviation history is the X-15. Its goal was to fly quickly and high, testing the aircraft and putting the pilots through challenges that might later face astronauts. In addition to being the first piloted aircraft in the world to reach hypersonic speeds, or more than five times the speed of sound, it made the first manned flights to the farthest reaches of space. In the 1960s, the X-15 was a crucial tool in the development of spaceflight, and X-15 pilots who flew at altitudes greater than 50 miles were awarded astronaut wings.

In total, 199 flights were made by the three X-15 aircraft between 1959 and 1968. It was a collaborative project between the US Air Force, US Navy, and US NASA.

Almost every X-15 flight experienced some sort of technical issue or malfunction; occasionally, there were many issues on a single flight. It is remarkable that during the 199 flights of the whole X-15 program, just one pilot, Mike Adams, perished.

Mike Adams was the twelfth (and last) pilot in the X-15 program, according to John Anderson and Richard Passman’s book X-15 The World’s Fastest Rocket Plane and the Pilots who Ushered in the Space Age.

The Story of Mike Adams, the only Pilot to lose his life during the X-15 Flight-Test Program

Michael Adams, a veteran pilot with six prior X-15 flights, boarded the machine on November 15, 1967, for a mission intended to test a guidance display and carry out several experiments. He had practiced the specifics of this flight in the simulator for more than 21 hours. He descended to 45,000 feet at about 10 a.m. as usual and then climbed to 266,000 feet. After takeoff, an electrical disturbance caused the MH-96 dampers to trip out as the plane rose to a higher altitude.

The dampers were reset by Adams. To more precisely manage the experiments, he then changed the sideslip indicator’s mode to a vernier attitude control mode. In order to see his sideslip during the approach to landing, he intended to reset this back to indicate the yaw angle when returning to base. However, he was unable to see the airplane yawing at a crucial point in the flight as a result of this equipment shift.

After burnout, he experimented with wing-rocking while soaring, and as he neared his max altitude of 266,000 feet, the rocking became extreme. His instrument was accidentally adjusted to show pitch attitude rather than yaw, thus he was unaware that his yaw had drifted to 15 degrees. The aircraft began to yaw violently around 15 seconds later, and Adams informed Pete Knight that “the airplane seems squirrelly.”

He soon after claimed that he was spinning and experiencing strong accelerations. The ground crew was unable to provide assistance since they were mostly unaware of the airplane’s hypersonic spin characteristics. When Adams recovered, he was yawed 90 degrees, flying upside down, and descending at supersonic speed, according to the ground data that was later correlated with the flight data.

The Minneapolis-Honeywell adaptive flight control system (MH-96), which is on and locked in, causes the aircraft to oscillate between its limits, up and down, preventing Adams from correcting his attitude and flying his way home. Adams pulled out of the spin, and he probably would have had a successful landing, but for the fact that the MH-96 was on and locked in. The X-15-3 aircraft broke up at a height of around 62,000 feet and a speed of roughly 3,800 feet per second because the weights on the aircraft increased above their structural limits. In close proximity to Johannesburg, California, it struck the desert floor. There was talk about Adams having slight vertigo; this may have prevented him from seeing the yaw buildup or from resetting the yaw indicator to the yaw setting.

Adams’s death shows the dangers of flight testing a new aircraft in previously untested regions of flight, and of flying experiments in which certain research-data measuring instruments may have caused an electrical disturbance that affected the MH-96 from operating at its top quality and in conditions it was not designed for. All of these factors could have had an impact on the disaster.

Because his flight was above 50 miles high, Adams was posthumously awarded an astronaut rating. Despite being the only accident in 199 flights, the tragedy was a setback for the X-15 program. The disaster had a significant role in the decision to end the X-15 program because the goals for the aircraft had been met. Only seven more flights were scheduled after that.

Photo by NASA

December 20, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

SR-71 crew’s encounter with Soviet MiG-31 over Barents Sea

by Till Daisd December 15, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“I assumed the Soviet MiG-31 fighter pilot would like nothing better than an opportunity to fire his missiles at an SR-71 Blackbird. Certainly, the SR-71 Blackbird would be a prized target,” Ed Yeilding, former SR-71 pilot

Major Mikhail Myagkiy, a retired Soviet MiG-31 pilot, participated in several attempts to intercept SR-71 Blackbirds during Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Operations Program (PAROP) missions to the Barents Sea area.

According to his logbook, Myagkiy has conducted 14 successful SR-71 intercepts:

21 August 1984

14 March 1985

18 March 1985

15 April 1985

17 July 1985

19 December 1985

20 January 1986

31 January 1986

21 February 1986

28 February 1986

1 April 1986

6 October 1986

23 December 1986

8 January 1987

SR-71 Aircrew remembers a Memorable Encounter with a Soviet MiG-31 Interceptor over the Barents Sea

Two of these intercepts were carried out by Ed Yeilding aboard an SR-71. Yeilding discusses the intercept from October 6, 1986, in Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions (Revised Edition), written by Paul F. Crickmore.

As Yeilding recalls one of his “Barents missions was especially memorable because we had an encounter with a Soviet MiG-31. Because most details of Blackbird flights were classified at that time, I made no notes about the encounter, so I cannot verify the date of the encounter. I am certain that RSO Curt Osterheld was with me at the time. Curt and I had only two tours together at Mildenhall, so the encounter was between 25 Aug 1986 and 8 Oct 1986, or between 14 Apr 1987 and 7 May 1987. (I don’t remember why that second tour was only three weeks.) I think the encounter might have been the last flight of our first tour. My flight records show we had a 4.1-hour mission with Blackbird tail ‘980 on 6 Oct 1986.

“On that memorable MiG-31 encounter mission, I was glad to be flying with Curt, an outstanding RSO admired by all, and, by the way, one of the most popular Habus. There we were, 71,000ft, starting our Mach 3.0 reconnaissance track, heading east just outside the territorial waters of Russia’s Murmansk area coastline. I knew Curt was very busy in the rear cockpit with his many duties monitoring and managing cameras, sensors, and navigation. I kept a constant crosscheck of the many indicators and controls in the front cockpit, watching carefully for potential system failures, and maintaining stable airspeed and the most efficient altitude for our weight.

“After Curt and I completed our first pass flying south-east parallel to the Russian border, gathering imagery and electronic intelligence, our mission track turned us left about 90° and northwards, directly away from Russia over the Barents Sea. After the turn and perhaps another minute in that northerly direction, we turned 180°, and flew directly towards and perpendicular to the Russian coast.

“Our altitude then was probably about 75,000ft. At that altitude, we could see the horizon 335 miles away and see the slight, but noticeable, curvature of the earth. The view was grand. Ahead were miles off the Barents Sea and snow-covered Russia beyond. In the distance far ahead, at perhaps 100 miles, I could see a long, bright white Russian contrail flying directly toward us, but at a much lower altitude. I knew it must be a Soviet fighter, probably a MiG-31, then the newest Soviet supersonic interceptor. I raised my periscope and saw that we too were leaving a long contrail. I knew the fighter could see our contrail as easily as I could see his. Since we were flying a routine reconnaissance track that the Soviets had seen many times, I knew the fighter knew exactly where we would start our 90° right turn to parallel the coast in a westerly direction.

“I imagined the Soviet fighter pilot was much like me, with a love of aviation and trying hard to be one of the very best. I also assumed he had orders to fire his missiles if I was late with my turn and slipped over Soviet territorial waters to within 12nm of Soviet land, and I assumed the pilot would like nothing better than an opportunity to fire his missiles at an SR-71 Blackbird. Just three years prior, on 1 September 1983, a Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Air Lines 747 that accidentally crossed into Russian airspace north of Japan, killing all 269 aboard. Certainly, the SR-71 Blackbird would be a prized target.

“I believed the Soviet fighter would not fire his missiles as long as we stayed on our usual track, but I also knew he or his ground controllers could mistake our position as being closer than we actually were. In the 1980s, we were not too concerned about missiles as long as we maintained our high altitude and high speed. From my previous years of flying intercepts in the F-4 fighter, I knew the newer MiG-31 would still have difficulty maneuvering to the required launch envelope even if he knew our exact flight path. Also, in the high altitude thin air, we believed that missile maneuverability, range, and proximity fuses were not adequate to bring down the Mach 3 Blackbird. For radar-guided missiles, our low radar reflectivity further decreased the missile ‘probability of kill’, and we had a jamming capability for further assurance. I knew our contrail could help him visually put his piper on us for a heat-seeking missile lock-on’. We had no defenses like flares against heat-seeking missiles, but again, we believed that the missile ‘probability of kill’ was very low due to our high speed and altitude. I was determined to fly the track as planned and get the pictures.

“Flying straight toward each other in our supersonic jets, I was reminded of two gallant medieval knights galloping full speed toward each other, only I did not have a weapon. For survival, Curt and I depended on accurate navigation to keep us just outside Soviet territorial waters to prevent a launch, and we depended on our superior speed and altitude in case missiles were launched.

“The fighter’s contrail was holding constant altitude and was heading straight toward us, but far below, perhaps altitude 40,000ft I guessed. I imagined he might be accelerating for a possible steep climb toward our altitude. I watched our distance indicator count down to our turn point, decreasing a mile every two seconds. As always, I was prepared, if necessary, to start the turn manually with the autopilot roll wheel or with the flight control stick, but at our turn point, the autopilot automatically initiated our 90° turn to the right.

“Our 90° turn toward the west was programmed for 32° of the bank. In the turn, I kept a close watch on my instrument panel as always, ready to handle any malfunction. During my instrument crosscheck, I turned my head frequently to watch the fighter’s contrail and saw that he was in a very steep climbing turn toward us. Perhaps a minute into my turn, while turning my pressure suit helmet with my hands so that I could see behind, I saw the grey metal of the fighter, low at my left 7:30 position, at the top of his steeply climbing contrail. We were still in our right 32° banked turn, but I could see him, barely larger than a dot. I could not discern any identifying features like twin tails or distinctive shapes. From my F-4 experience with intercepts and visual acuity, my best guess is that 8 miles were his closest approach. He appeared to run out of airspeed at the top of his contrail, at maybe 65,000ft or about 10,000ft below us. I saw his nose drop below the horizon and fall away. Curt and I stayed on course and got the pictures.

“During my three years of flying overseas reconnaissance missions, I frequently saw contrails far below of potentially hostile fighters, but that day, above the Arctic Circle over the Barents Sea, was the only time I saw a Soviet fighter get close enough that I could actually see metal, though barely larger than a dot and only because our routine track was predictable. Back at Mildenhall, during our debriefing, our intelligence officer told us, with near certainty, that the interceptor was a MiG-31, the premier Soviet supersonic interceptor at that time.”

In the back seat with Ed on Oct. 6, 1986, intercepted was Maj Curt Osterheld. He recalls:

Remembering Gil Bertelson, the SR-71 driver that saw three sunrises on one particular Blackbird mission

“Ed’s description of operations in the Barents Sea is perfect. We knew that the mission was strategically critical in keeping an eye on the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet. But we were also aware that if something went wrong with the airplane, the crew did not have many options. Given that we were operating under the rules of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Programme (PARPRO), our path was predictable, and the Soviets used us for ‘training’… both for the surface-to-air missiles and fighter intercepts. I do have a very clear memory of turning westbound away from Novaya Zemlya (a.k.a. Banana Island). Looking out the right window and with the help of the mirrors, I could see we were pulling a fat contrail at 75,000ft. Looking down I could see a pair of circular contrails, which, I assumed, were Soviet fighters setting up for a ‘practice’ intercept. We believed that the only chance an interceptor (MiG-31) would have at a decent shot was a ‘beak-to-beak’ pass. I believed like Ed, the velocity of closure and geometry of the required maneuver gave a very low PK (Probability of Kill) to this shot.”

Photo by U.S. Air Force and Dmitriy Pichugin via Wikimedia Commons

Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions (Revised Edition) is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 15, 2021 0 comment

History

Why the Intruder was the ideal CAS aircraft according to ex USMC A-6 pilot

by Till Daisd December 12, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“During Operation Desert Storm the B-52s heavily involved in CAS missions flew ten-hour missions from Diego Garcia. None had the external racks they used in Vietnam. They carried only 56 500-lb bombs. Two A-6s did more damage than a B-52” Capt Tom Uryga, former USMC A-6 pilot

During the Vietnam War, the Grumman A-6 Intruder served as the “Main Battery” of carrier aviation, and it was still in use by the US Navy and US Marine Corps (USMC) in 1996. The A-6 was still the most effective USMC strike aircraft during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991 because it was a true all-weather, day/night precision bomber.

Capt. Tom Uryga joined the VMA(AW)-224 “Bengals” in the early spring of 1990. He was an Eastern Washington University graduate. Uryga participated in the early ODS strikes as one of the USMC A-6 pilots;

`In the first part of the Gulf War, we started out with deep strikes on Basra, Shaibah, and Tallil. We’d use a mix [of ordnance], since the weather was shitty; 2000-lb LGBs and 2000-lb “steel nose cone”. We’d try to pickle the LGBs right in the middle of the basket. On the first night of the war we came back with better BDA [Bomb Damage Assessment] than the F-117s had.

`My first mission was with a guy named Rob McCarthy, an RAF Exchange officer, and Tornado navigator. He had absolutely no fear of death — he had flown in the airshow demo team for the Tornado where they do the 100-ft inverted near-supersonic pass. Nothing scared Rob.

`First night we flew, we’re heading into Iraq, and we’re heading into Shaibah airfield. This was the first time we had actually flown with the [navigation and formation] lights out and relied on the green formation lights instead – the lights on every jet were different. Some lights had burned out, which meant you couldn’t tell what was what. You thought you were rendezvousing on Battlestar Galactica because of all the different lights.

`Off to the left side, as we’re crossing the Gulf, you could see the SAM launches and AAA in Kuwait City – huge, holy shit, look at this stuff. Rob’s got his head in the boot, doing updates. We’re getting up there over the salt marshes, and little stuff – red tracers – was arcing below us, with bigger stuff, white tracers, reaching up higher to about 20,000 ft. Then you had some big AAA, big white bursts up at our altitude, but it was less frequent. I think the red stuff was ZSUs – it was disturbing enough, but you knew they weren’t all radar-guided because you didn’t have a lot of radar warning about everything.

`About this time Rob pulled his head out and said, in typical British fashion, “I say, Tom, it appears those blokes are shooting at us.” “No shit, Rob. Put your head back in the boot.”

After weeks of deep strikes and related operations, according to Rick Morgan’s description in his book A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96, on February 20 Marine units switched to Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) as their primary function in order to prepare for the ground assault. The employment of “Kill Boxes,” which were latitude and longitude grids where FACs, familiar with their assigned zone, would call in aircraft to target Iraqi army units as they were located, was crucial to the success of this mission. As the enemy forces realized they had little chance of escaping the Allied air force, the process proved lethally effective and contributed to their eventual mass capitulation.

Former USMC A-6 Pilot explains why the Intruder was the perfect CAS Aircraft — A U.S. Marine Corps Grumman A-6E Intruder from Marine all-weather attack squadron VMA(AW)-224 Fighting Bengals on the flight line at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina

During the last several days of Desert Storm, Capt. Uryga piloted a number of BAI sorties;

`The Air Force called the Kill Box missions CAS – what we Marines called CAS the Air Force called crazy!

`The B-52s [heavily involved in Kill Box operations] flew ten-hour missions from Diego Garcia. None had the external racks they used in Vietnam. They carried only 56 500-lb bombs. Two A-6s did more damage than a B-52. They just salvoed the entire load in one pass. Their BDA pictures showed mile-long strips of closely spaced craters, usually laterally displaced from their targets [largely due to 100-knot high-altitude winds]. Carpet-bombing made a lot of noise but didn’t hit much.

‘The typical Hornet load was four or six Mk 82s or Rockeyes. Without tankers, they had about ten minutes of time-on-station [TOS] in Kuwait. They made one pass, dropped two bombs, and then went feet wet to a tanker, gassed up, came in, and dropped the rest, before going home and getting credit for two combat missions on one flight. Pretty cheesy way to earn air medals. No [Marine] A-6 ever saw a tanker, yet we had more than 40 minutes TOS, even in northern Kuwait.’

The Intruder’s outstanding endurance made it a firm favorite amongst the Marines fighting the war on the ground. One FAC attached to the infantry was an EA-6B NFO, who stated post-war; `Our first three choices for CAS aircraft were, No 1, the Intruder, No 2, the Intruder, and No 3, the Intruder. It had plenty of bombs and enough gas to stick around. The Hornets had less of each, and as for the Harriers, if we didn’t have a target ready for them when they checked in they almost always went right back to the tanker.’

Photo by U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy

A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 12, 2021 0 comment

History

Ex Egyptian MiG pilots offer a novel viewpoint on Israel’s “pre-emptive” attack on EAF airfields during the Six-Day War

by Till Daisd December 1, 2021

written by Till Daisd

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden under cover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks,’” EAF MiG pilot Tahir Zaki’s phone conversation with Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba

The Israeli attack on four Arab air groups on June 5, 1967, known as “Operation Moked” (“Focus”), has essentially already been covered in great detail. One of history’s most lauded and successful military missions was this one. Simply put: that fateful morning’s “pre-emptive” Israeli onslaught on Egyptian airfields in Sinai, on the Suez Canal, and elsewhere destroyed the UARAF’s fighting capacity (United Arab Republic Air Force, designation of Egyptian and Syrian air forces between 1958 and 1962, and of the Egyptian Air Force until 1969). The IDF/AF also defeated Egyptian resistance by maintaining multiple strike waves over important enemy airfields for most of the day.

According to Tom Cooper and David Nicolle in their book Arab MiGs, Volume 1, on June 5, 1967, six MiG-15s and MiG-17s were flying above Egypt early in the morning. At daybreak, two MiG-17s from No.18 Squadron conducted a CAP above Israel’s border. At least two MiG-15s departed for a training operation at 8:00 a.m. from one of the Suez Canal airfields that were unhindered by the early-morning fog.

El-Arish AB was the target of rocket and cannon fire from Israeli fighter planes at around 08:45 local time. The attack by the Ouragans was so unexpected that the majority of the MiG-17s of the No. 18 Squadron were destroyed before their crews could even understand what was happening. A MiG pilot for the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) could only draw the following conclusion:

`There was no warning at all. The aircraft at el-Arish were completely wiped out. In the evening of that day, pilots and ground crews were sent back to Cairo.’

Somewhat inaccurately, another EAF MiG pilot, Tahsin Zaki later complained: `It is important to point out that in June 1967, the Israelis attacked el-Arish air-field ten minutes before the rest of our airbases, and that the whole battle could have been different if the commander at el-Arish had contacted Meliz AB via the hotline.’

Former Egyptian MiG pilots provide an unprecedented perspective on Six-Day War

Other UARAF airfields were not attacked earlier than El-Arish. A formation of Mirage IIICJs hit Bir Thamada at the exact same moment. FM Fawzy (Maj-Gen, Egyptian Army Chief of Staff for Operations) did, however, later offer a potential explanation for why Israel was able to quickly neutralize No.18 Squadron and el-Arish AB. He claimed that the CO el-Arish AB worked for the Israelis for most of the 1960s and divulged all the specifics of his directives to them.

While Kabrit was the center of UARAF MiG-15 and MiG-17 missions at the same time as el-Arish and Bir Thamada, the IDF/AF did not classify Kabrit as a “major target.” However, SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron, under the command of Yakov Nevo, launched a sustained attack on it. EAF MiG pilot Mustafa Hafez found himself frantically looking for a functioning aircraft to take off and fight back as a result of this causing significant damage:

`I was not actually due to fly that morning. Around 08:20 hrs I was in the mess since I was due to fly later that day. No particular aircraft had been allocated to me since this was normal in our air force. We flew what was available. Suddenly I heard explosions and went outside the mess, and asked people what was going on. Someone said that it must be practiced somewhere. That was when I saw an Israeli aircraft attacking, very low from south to north, coming in towards the runway. It was a Super Mystére.

‘My first instinct was to run towards a ditch, but as soon as I got there I said to myself, “what am I doing here like an idiot?” So I ran to the squadron bus so I could get to the squadron headquarters. There I found the regimental CO. He had previously been my squadron leader at Abu Suweir. His name was Mamdouh Taliba, an excellent man. He was actually heading for his car so I went up to the passenger door. The CO drove to the nearest available aircraft, and I helped strap him in, though we weren’t absolutely sure that this aircraft was ready to go. Just as he was about to close the hood I noticed that the safety pin of the ejector seat was still in, so I pulled it out. I think he took off on a sub-runway as the main runway had already been hit.’

The Israelis were occupied engaging two I1-14s, the aircraft carrying FM Amer (Egyptian Minister of War) and his entourage, which were now flying directly in the middle of their attack, so Wing Commander Mamdouh Taliba and another pilot from No. 31 Squadron were able to launch their attack without being interrupted by SMB.2s. Before the Israeli formation was caught by two MiG-21s and lost two of its own aircraft, both means of transportation were declared as shot down.

Actually, the I1-14 carrying the Iraqi Defense Minister and Egyptian Minister Hussein el-Shafie arrived at Fayid safely before the location first came under attack (and their 11-14 destroyed on the ground). However, after Fayid AB was attacked as well, the aircraft carrying Amer was forced to abort the landing. It turned and crossed over Inchas. Amer gave the pilot the go-ahead to head toward Cairo West after spotting this base on fire. All the time, additional Israeli fighters were flashing by. In the most important phases of the war, the Egyptian military’s Supreme Commander was cut off from his headquarters.

After this initial attack, there was a short break, and Mustafa Hafez continued looking for a serviceable aircraft.

‘Then I tried to find another aircraft. They were all either damaged or being serviced or were not ready to go. Then I went to hangar….’

Around 08:50 hrs., a second attack on Bir Thamada occurred, and the pilots of No. 25 Squadron hurried to take off. A number of them took off as the base was attacked by Ouragans, who claimed to have destroyed six MiGs. The final UARAF jets that attempted to roll for takeoff were less fortunate; both MiG-17s blew up after taking numerous hits from Israeli cannon fire. Nothing comparable occurred at el-Sur; all of the MiG-15bis from the No. 24 Squadron that were still parked there, along with a few MiG-17s from the No. 18 Squadron, were destroyed on the ground.

Meliz AB also managed to scramble numerous MiG-17s despite being hit by Israeli Ouragans at roughly 08:55 hrs. in June 1967 and despite not being a typical MiG-17-base. However, their pilots were instructed to fly toward the direction of the West rather than fighting weaker opponents. With this, the forces of Air Group 2 and 12 consisting of MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircraft stationed in Sinai practically ceased to exist.

In the Canal Zone, the situation on the airfields was getting worse. Around 8:55 a.m., SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron launched a second attack on Kabrit. The two MiG-17s piloted by Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba sighted the Israelis over the base as they were still climbing. The Egyptians tried to escape by turning on their afterburners, but the Israeli formation’s Number 2 first reported damage on a MiG-17’s engine and left wing before claiming that the aircraft had been shot down in a subsequent strike. While the available Egyptian sources dispute any such loss, the commander of the Israeli formation confirmed that this MiG crashed. Mustafa Hafez’s search for an operable aircraft ultimately succeeded as Israeli jets were once more occupied with defying orders and fighting in the air:

‘By this time mechanics started coming back after running away as the first bombs fell. That was when I took off in an available MiG-17F. I didn’t even check if it was armed but only asked if it had been refueled. I took off on a sub-runway. By that time, Mamdouh Taliba landed. I didn’t have any plans, only to try and defend the airfield. Once I was up in the air I could see the smoke from other airfields which had been attacked. I hadn’t even cleared my take-off with the control tower, I just took off. Nor did I have any idea what the rest of the squadron was doing. Then I saw something flying very low. It was a Mirage going west to east, so I half rolled in behind it. It was probably doing a reconnaissance as it was on its own and was not attacking targets on the ground. As I followed it I tried to load [cock] my guns three times, but my MiG- 17 was too slow to keep up and after a while, the Mirage just flew off. Of course, I was angry and frustrated because I was unable to shoot down that Mirage. There was a switch in the cockpit that changed the armament from rockets to guns. And I wasn’t the only pilot to make the same mistake. Hisham Said Abdu, who was another instructor, did the same thing.

‘Almost immediately after that, I saw something else very low with a long exhaust of smoke. It crashed into the Suez Canal. I thought it might have been one of my colleagues but in fact, it was probably a SAM. Then, I landed safely. Another of our pilots tried to take off using the main runway but hit some bomb damage which damaged his aircraft so that he had to eject while still on the ground. He survived but he was very lucky because the minimum height for ejecting was supposed to be 250 meters. His name was Muhammad al-Hadidi. This happened after I had landed.’

The attack on Cairo West, a significant UARAF MiG-17 base, was likely carried out using the Mirage Hafez that was trying to launch the attack. A formation from No. 101 Squadron IDF/AF attacked the airfield at precisely 9:00 a.m., claiming strikes on at least three MiG-17 aircraft. However, a few MiGs were still flying because Wg Cdr Zohair Shalabi scrambled with two wingmen right away. Helwan AB in order to scatter his aircraft after spending some time on a CAP. He arrived there at around 09:30 hrs.

The UARAF pilots at Bir Thamada thought they had been under attack continuously for 15 minutes since they had been hit three times in quick succession. Around 9:00 a.m., the final intact MiG-17 on the ground was destroyed by Mystéres of No. 109 Squadron, marking the end of the airfield’s use as a fighter base. Flight Lieutenant Hashim Mustafa Hassan of the No. 25 Squadron reported the peculiar circumstance that emerged only a short while later when another Israeli formation flew overhead:

`Some 30 seconds from the end of the attack, a second wave of planes arrived… We ran about the desert, looking for cover, but the planes didn’t shoot. They merely circled, their pilots surprised that the base was completely destroyed and that no targets remained. We were the only targets… weak humans scurrying in the desert with handguns as our only means of self-defense. It was a sad comedy… pilots of the newest and best-equipped jets fighting with handguns. Five minutes after the beginning of the attack, the planes disappeared and silence prevailed that encompassed the desert and the noise that destroyed our planes and the airbase, and the squadron. They completed their assignment in the best way possible, with a ratio of losses —100 percent for us, 0 percent for them.’

The third Israeli attack on Kabrit occurred around 9:10 a.m., and then another one occurred at 9:25 a.m. This time, up to 18 MiG-15s and MiG-17s were reportedly destroyed on the ground by Super Mystére B.2s of No. 105 Squadron and Mystére IVAs of No. 109 Squadron IDF/AF, increasing the total to 30 since the war started. However, Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba stated a completely different scenario when MiG pilot Tahir Zaki called him, sometimes after 9:00 a.m. local time, suggesting that their statements were probably certainly exaggerated:

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden undercover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks. But there were about eight or nine open pens and these had one aircraft in each of them. Some of these were attacked.” These were the only real planes that the Israelis attacked. We also had very big hangars at Kabrit, so we put four MiG-17s in each, one in each corner of the hangar where they were less likely to be hit. And they weren’t.’

The Israelis, on the other hand, only acknowledged being duped by Egypt’s dummy planes at Abu Suweir and Cairo West because they thought the majority of them were constructed of inflatable rubber rather than wood.

However, Mustafa Hafez was forced to flee under the most hazardous conditions a second time following the subsequent attack on Kabrit:

`Very soon afterward I took off again in a different aircraft. This was a MiG- 17PF [serial number 2803]. There had been no time for me to report or to be debriefed. I merely changed aircraft. As I started the engine the airfield came under attack again, perhaps it was the second or third attack. I was still inside the hanger, in the cockpit, when I heard the attack. I cleared the hanger doors at full throttle and afterburner. The aircraft was swerving and rocking from side to side as I turned, first to the left to clear another hanger which was facing my hanger, then to the right along a taxiway, then to the left again to cross a small railway line that ran between the hangers and the main sub-runway, then sharp right onto that sub-runway. I was afraid the wingtips would hit the ground. I took off without a pause and climbed as steep as I could, but the enemy had gone. Taliba had also taken off during the attack.’

Wg Cdr Taliba joined Hafez once they were in the air, and the two formed a CAP over Kabrit. They remained in the air until approximately the time of the sixth Israeli raid on Kabrit, which occurred at around 09:40 hrs.

‘He [Taliba] joined me and told me to accompany him as his Number Two (wingman). As I was joining him I saw a SAM coming towards us. We avoided it but Taliba ordered me to land as I only had 450 liters of fuel left. Taliba had landed and I was on my final approach at a height of about 15 to 20 meters when Taliba shouted over the radio, “Hafez! You have aircraft ahead of you!” So I retracted my undercarriage and flap, gave the aircraft full throttle and afterburner. The Israelis were about 100 meters ahead of me. I counted them, one, two, three, four; so I pulled up and tried to follow the last one. But this meant leaving the turn a bit late. I should have turned earlier. The Israelis were a bit lower than me. All five of us started circling, then one came at me head-on and opened fire. This made me so angry that I swore out loud. The Israeli turned to the right. I turned first to the left and then to the right to try and follow him. A head-on attack is very difficult.

‘That was when I was hit in the right wing. We were all flying at about 200 or 300 meters. My right aileron was damaged and I continued turning right, unable to straighten out, so I gained height. The Israeli couldn’t keep with me as a MiG-17 is better in a climb. My aircraft juddered several times and almost went into a spin. I thought it odd that it tried to spin under those conditions [this was perhaps when his aircraft was hit a second time, in the tail and rear fuselage]. While three of the Israeli aircraft attacked our airfield, the fourth one followed me. After the three have strafed the field, the fourth one did the same, then they all flew home.

Meanwhile, I was still turning to the right, unable to straighten up. As I lined up on a runway I used the aileron trim to straighten out. This wasn’t standard procedure. I don’t know if I invented it or maybe it just came by instinct, but it worked. I had no communication with the ground, but I landed OK. The MiG had been badly damaged. The right wing was damaged, the lower part of the rudder had mostly been shot away, the main control rod to the stabilizer was much damaged. The rear fuel tank had also been hit but fortunately, it had been almost empty, and although there had been a fire in the tank, and the alarm had been set off in my cockpit, I had used the fire extinguisher and this did the trick as there hadn’t been enough fuel to cause a big fire.’

Despite the fact that no Israelis witnessed Mustafa Hafez’s MiG-17 really crash, Major Asaf Ben-Nun of No. 105 Squadron claimed a kill. It’s interesting to note that the Israeli Air Force has never “verified” any other IDF/AF pilot’s claim to have shot down an Egyptian MiG-17 on the first day of the 1967 War. Given that the UARAF did not lose a single MiG-17 in an air battle on June 5, 1967, the precise reasoning behind this Israeli decision is still unknown.

The Israelis expanded their efforts to include the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi fronts after being encouraged by this accomplishment. They completely destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) in a matter of hours before inflicting such heavy losses on the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) that the latter thereafter played essentially no active role in the conflict. No operation in history compares to the IDF/AF attack on that day in terms of effectiveness and significance for the success of the entire conflict and the future of the Middle East.

Photo by Francesco Gasparetti from Senigallia, Italy and Oren Rozen via Wikipedia

December 1, 2021 0 comment

History

The Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui rocket-powered interceptor, the Japanese Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet

by Till Daisd December 1, 2021

written by Till Daisd

On July 7, 1945, the prototype J8M1 Shusui made its one and only powered flight at a high cost

Germany and Japan came to an arrangement in late 1943 wherein the latter would provide its Axis ally with a prototype, blueprints, and motors for the ground-breaking rocket-powered Me 163 Komet interceptor. Japan was also to receive further technical data pertaining to the aircraft’s production process. Both the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) and Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) expressed a strong interest in developing licensed versions of the Me 163 to aid in preventing anticipated B-29 Superfortress bombing raids of the Japanese home islands by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF).

Remembering the Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui rocket-powered interceptor, the Japanese Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet that never was

Japanese military attachés bought a license for a Walter HWK 109-509 rocket engine from the Germans for 20 million Reichsmarks after learning about the Komet and its potential. Despite these agreements, Japan encountered obstacles in getting a full Me 163. On March 30, 1944, the Japanese submarine RO-501 sailed from Kiel, Germany, bound for Kobe, Japan, with a disassembled model and its rocket engine. On May 13, 1944, U.S. Navy ASW aircraft flying out of the escort carrier Bogue sank RO-501 in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

Additionally, when the USS Sawfish (SS-276) sank the Japanese submarine I-29 off the Philippines on July 26, 1944, the Me 163 technical data, blueprints, and engines loaded into the I-Boat were also lost.

Due to these setbacks, as described by Mark Chambers in his book Wings of the Rising Sun, the Japanese were compelled to create their own Komet using a general Me 163 instruction manual that IJNAF engineer Cdr. Eichi Iwaya had acquired. The resulting aircraft, given the IJNAF’s J8M1 Shusui (“Sharp Sword”) and the IJAAF’s Ki-200 designation, was going to be made by Mitsubishi. The Yokosuka-based 1st Naval Air Technical Arsenal also produced the Walter HWK 109-509 engine in the Japanese nation.

Three J8M gliders, known as the MXY8 Akigusa (“Autumn Grass”), were also built by the Arsenal to gather fundamental aerodynamic and handling data for the rocket-powered aircraft. On December 8, 1944, the MXY8 successfully conducted its first flight over the Hyakurigahara airport, with Lt. Cdr. Toyohiko Inuzuka serving as the test pilot. By that time, Japanese engineers had created the 3,307lb thrust Toko Ro.2, their own version of the Walter HWK 509A rocket engine. Last but not least, the J8M1 was to be equipped with two 400-rpm 30mm Ho-155 cannons.

On July 7, 1945, the prototype J8M1 made its pricey first and only powered flight. After a successful rocket-powered takeoff, Lt. Cdr. Inuzuka jettisoned the undercarriage dolly, and the aircraft rocketed upward at a 45° angle. However, the engine shut off as the plane ascended to a height of 1,300 feet, forcing the J8M1 to stall.

Just as Inuzuka was about to successfully glide the plane back to the airstrip, he collided with a small building close to the runway, causing the J8M1 to crash and catch fire. Inuzuka passed away from his wounds the next day. Until the Ro.2 engine could be changed and the issue fixed, all upcoming J8M1 flights were canceled. When the war ended on August 15, 1945, flight testing was supposed to resume along with the J8M2’s development. Seven J8M1/Ki-200s had been made altogether by that point.

Soon after VJ Day, American occupation forces in Nagoya recovered three J8M1s, which were then transferred to the United States in November 1945. One of them was scrapped at “Pax River,” where two of them were transported for a thorough evaluation. In October 1946, one was moved to the Naval Air Station (NAS) Glenview, Illinois, where it was displayed before being scrapped.

The third Shusui was sent to the USAAF, examined there, and then moved to Hollywood, California, where it was also on display for the public. In 1948, Ed Maloney purchased this airplane from a Los Angeles fairground and subsequently added it to his ground-breaking Air Museum in Claremont, California. Since then, after being restored, it has remained a part of this collection and is now on display at the Planes of Fame Museum in Chino.

In 1961, an unfinished J8M 1 was found in a cave near Yokosuka at Sugita. Two years later, it was presented to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. The aircraft, which had been abandoned for a long time, was refurbished by Mitsubishi between 1997 and 2001 and is now on exhibit in the company’s museum in Komaki Minami.

Photo by Alan Wilson from Stilton, Peterborough, Cambs, UK via Wikipedia

Wings of the Rising Sun is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 1, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

The U.S. Navy F-4B made an emergency landing aboard the USS Ranger after Vietnamese AAA destroyed its radome

by Till Daisd November 30, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Due to the damage, the F-4B was later broken up for spare parts at Subic Bay, Philippines

The main image of this article shows a U.S. Navy McDonnell F-4B Phantom II (BuNo 150643) of Fighter Squadron VF-142 Ghostriders. From May 5, 1964, to Feb. 1, 1965, VF-142 was part of Attack Carrier Air Wing 14 (CVW-14) on the USS Constellation (CVA-64).

CVW-14 flew the first strikes of the Vietnam War. During a photo reconnaissance mission to the Thanh Hoa Bridge, the F-4B 150643 of the fighter cover (call sign “Dakota 207”, piloted by Fred Ferrazzano) was struck by a 57 mm shell at an altitude of 150 m. This impact destroyed the nose cone, with some parts being ingested by both J-79 engines. Additionally, it was later discovered that the force of the impact had twisted the main spar.

The pilot was able to recover aboard the USS Ranger (CVA-61). Due to the damage, the plane was later broken up for spare parts at Subic Bay, Philippines. Note that the aircraft is carrying an AIM-9B Sidewinder missile.

Noteworthy, 26 years after this incident, another VF-142 aircraft, this time a Grumman F-14B Tomcat (BuNo 161433) aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), had to make an emergency landing when the nose cone came off because of a latching mechanism failure at a height of 8,200 m over the Persian Gulf.

During the departure, the radome came in contact with the canopy, broke out the forward glass, and shattered the windscreen. The pilot suffered a broken right collarbone and glass in both eyes but managed to bring the jet back to the ship for a perfect two-wire landing.

With all the forward glass so badly damaged, the only way to see forward was through a three-inch hole in the left windscreen. The pilot was LCDR Joe Edwards, and the RIO was LCDR Scott Grundmeier. LCDR Edwards was medevac’d to Bahrain for eye surgery, then home to the US.

That time a VF-142 F-14 Tomcat with missing radome made an emergency landing aboard USS Eisenhower

For their remarkable achievement, both crew members received Distinguished Flying Crosses.

Photo by Commander Fred Ferrazzano / U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy via HOME OF M.A.T.S.

November 30, 2021 0 comment

History

The first Top Gun Graduates to kill a MiG was one of these “Phantom Boys”

by Till Daisd November 30, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Beaulier went after the second MiG, using a ‘lag pursuit’ tactic to give his F-4J Phantom II the correct distance for an AIM-9D shot…

After their MiG-21 shoot-down on March 28, 1970, Lt. Jerry Beaulier (left) and Lt. (jg.) Steve Barkley (sporting his famous mustache) of VF-142 are shown eagerly inspecting a celebratory bottle of champagne, perhaps taken from the carrier battle group commander.

Both men were Topgun grads from the very first class, and Barkley had served as a pilot in the USAF. When he thought back on his many years of working with Jerry, he said, “Being a bit older and possibly more focused on quality and survival, our missions tended to be quite well planned and “by our book.” Nobody ever saw a MiG at that stage of the war, much less get within Sparrow range of a bandit. Despite this, they meticulously planned their strategy for such a situation and conducted numerous BARCAP missions in the hopes of being able to attract a MiG to the surface of the sea.

These Men were the first Top Gun Graduates to score a MiG Kill

According to Peter E. Davies’ account in U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969–1973, on March 28, 1970, Beaulier and Barkley were launched in F-4J “Dakota 201” (BuNo 155875) as the replacement spare for VF-142 CO Cdr Ruel E. Gardner in a CAP flight led by CVW-14 commander and F-8 MiG killer Cdr Paul Speer. They carried three external fuel tanks, two AIM-7Es, and three AIM-9Ds in preparation for a prolonged fighter sweep. The flight, which was vectored into MiG-21s by PO White aboard the destroyer USS Horne (DLG-30), the day’s “Red Crown” radar control ship, included a third F-4J with the crew of Lt. Cdr. Gary Hakanson and Lt. (jg.) Dave van Asdlen.

At the 25-mile range, they were cleared to fire AIM-7Es, but Hakanson’s radar was inoperative, and Barkley’s also died as they approached the target, ruling out Sparrow launches. ‘I was really disappointed — the perfect set-up for a head-on shot and no radar! I fought it for about five miles and then gave up’ recalled Barkley. It was later realized that the radar in Speer’s F-4 was also faulty, being limited to a one-mile range.

Beaulier closed after spotting the MiGs 10,000 feet above them. The MiGs dove in their direction as the F-4Js rose to intercept. Beaulier wheeled behind the leading MiG-21, but his F-4 quickly ran out of fuel since he was still towing three external tanks that created drag. The first MiG’s “Atoll” attempt at Speer’s Phantom II was unsuccessful, but Beaulier pursued the second MiG using a “lag pursuit” strategy to put him in position for an AIM-9D hit. The missile’s seeker head wasn’t properly set, yet it still managed to explode inside the MiG-21’s exhaust. We stopped and got a look as the unlucky aircraft fell into the cloud below us at the MiGs’ “four o’clock” position. We never witnessed an ejection, Barkley observed.

Pham Thanh Nam, an inexperienced 921st FR pilot, perished in the collision. As the Rules of Engagement (RoE) at the time prohibited assaults on MiGs unless they threatened a reconnaissance or BARCAP mission, the F-4 crew’s success could not be acknowledged publicly. Eventually, a report was made public that claimed Beaulier’s MiG-21 had been intercepted as it was attacking an RA-5C.

A MiG kill was a significant accomplishment for the F-4 pilots, especially during a period of relatively limited activity on the ground. Successful crews were also honored with specially crafted cakes, widespread media coverage, and congratulations visits with top war managers. Even though aircraft carriers were primarily platforms for attack aircraft, similar praise for successful assault aircrew and missions was uncommon.

Photo by U.S. Navy

U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

November 30, 2021 0 comment

History

Why the C-130 is still USAF mainstay of Medevac

by Till Daisd November 27, 2021

written by Till Daisd

The C-130 can immediately abandon its current mission and function as an aeromedical evacuation platform, thanks to its architecture

The C-130 Hercules has been a workhorse of aeromedical evacuation since the Vietnam War and continues to be a reliable platform to transport patients over long distances, enabling Airmen to deliver vital care in the air, support disaster relief efforts, and return warfighters to their families.

The C-130 is a versatile aircraft that was first put into service in 1956 and is ideal for aeromedical evacuation duty. It is regarded as reliable and tough enough for lengthy operations in the theater and can take off from difficult runways.

A quick look at why the C-130 is still mainstay of medevac more than 60 years after its first flight

A photograph from the past shows the YC-130 Hercules on its first flight, which took place on August 23, 1954, from Burbank to Edwards Air Force Base in California. The Air Force’s Tactical Air Command recognized a need for a medium-cargo tactical transport in 1951 and developed the C-130 to meet that need. The C-130 has had the longest continuous military aircraft production line in history because it is still being produced today. The C-130 and its variants have served as a vital aeromedical evacuation platform for the U.S. Air Force for much of its operational history, transporting patients over large distances safely and enabling AE crews to provide care in the air. (Image courtesy of the U.S. Air Force)

This assists in bringing medical expertise closer to the front lines. In the article, Steady and Ready: C-130 mainstay of medevac, Air Force Surgeon General Public Affairs Shireen Bedi explains that the C-130’s design allows it to rapidly abandon its current mission and function as an aeromedical evacuation platform.

At Kitzingen Air Base in Germany in September 1970, Red Cross supplies, equipment, and portable hospitals were stockpiled into C-130 Hercules airplanes. As part of Operation Fig Hill, which offers emergency relief and medical assistance amid civil unrest, the aircraft was traveling to Jordan. For a wide range of aeromedical evacuation operations, C-130 aircraft have always been able to fly over hostile and occasionally hostile airfields.

It is equipped with electrical and oxygen systems for aeromedical evacuation equipment, it can be modified to carry up to 74 litter patients and is specifically made to lessen the adverse effects of altitude on patients and medical staff.

On October 23, 1984, at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, a hospital bus parks behind a C-130 Hercules aircraft to take victims of the Pines Hotel fire to the local hospital. At a reunion honoring the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the Philippines, more than 200 World War II veterans and their families were lodging at a hotel in Baguio. Since the Vietnam War, the C-130 airframe has developed a reputation as a dependable aircraft with enhanced patient transport capabilities, becoming a cornerstone of the current AE system.

The C-130 platform has been a cornerstone of the modern aeromedical evacuation system, as the pictures in this post demonstrate. It is being deployed as a tactical, intra-theater aeromedical evacuation platform.

In Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on January 16, 2010, a C-130 Hercules aircraft makes a final approach into Toussaint Louverture International Airport as part of the relief effort that sent critical medical personnel and supplies after the region was struck by a 7.0 earthquake. The C-130 is the Air Force’s most modified aircraft, allowing it to fulfill a range of mission requirements, according to the Air Mobility Command Historian Office. The C-130 is a crucial airframe for disaster response because of its adaptability; when necessary, it can be quickly changed in the field from cargo transport to aeromedical evacuations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Perry Aston)

At Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan on May 29, 2014, U.S. Air Force airmen with the 455th Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron got ready to unload patients. In all of Afghanistan, the aeromedical evacuation squadron transports and cares for injured and ill personnel. Aeromedical evacuation personnel must set up their work area, which spans nearly the full length of the aircraft’s cargo section, in an organized manner because space is at a premium on a C-130. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Evelyn Chavez)

On a C-130 Hercules during an emergency flight from Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on February 14, 2010, U.S. Air Force Maj. Debora Lehker, a reserve critical care air transport team nurse, consoles a wounded Canadian army soldier. Members of the Aeromedical Evacuation Team are regarded as flight crew, therefore, in addition to their area of medical expertise, they also need to be knowledgeable about the C-130 aircraft. They must understand how to set up the aircraft to accommodate patient litters and how the electrical systems for the equipment are needed to keep passengers safe while in flight operations. (Courtesy photo)

On March 24, 2017, a C-130 Hercules from Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania, backs up to an ambulance bus from the 60th Inpatient Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, California, during Patriot Delta. The 60th IPTS provided en route patient care and set up the medical manikins as part of the Air Force Reserve exercise Patriot Delta. Through training opportunities like this one, AE crews may learn how to safely and effectively move patients to the back of the plane, provide care while in the air, and guarantee that patients are delivered to the next level of care. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel Phelps)

November 27, 2021 0 comment

History

When a Pitts Special Nearly collided with RAF Jaguar Display Pilot

by Till Daisd November 23, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“For a microsecond, time stands still. The huge red letters on the top wing and fuselage of the Pitts Special spell the name of a well-known cigarette. They sweep past my canopy in slow time. An open-mouthed, white-faced pilot looks across the incredibly small gap between us,” Ian Smith, Former RAF Jaguar Display Pilot

A portion of Flight Lieutenant Ian Smith’s story, “Showing It Off,” from Ian Hall’s book Jaguar Boys is included in the following article.

Speed 100kts decreasing; top of wingover.

It’s the 1979 RAF Innsworth display, and I’m operating out of Rhoose airport.

Fuel check; yes, just enough for the final high-speed pass.

Hard pull back down, and there’s the crowd line over my shoulder. Should get 600kts plus on this pass; not too much G on the pullout, don’t want to bleed off the speed. Radalt height 300ft, 200, 100; push forward to stop it from climbing as the speed continues to increase. Best not go too low on my first display; as well as all the brass, the aircrew appointers work here and I’d like a good posting at the end of this tour.

Background static coming through the headset: “Pitts positioning from hold to display point overhead at 8,000ft.”

“Pitts, hold off. Jaguar high-speed pass and display climb complete in one minute, acknowledge.”

“Roger.”

Perfect; timing spot on. There’s crowd center; 7g; pulling like a bastard into the vertical; quick check left, right, yup that’s vertical; boot full of rudder and aileron to get a vertical roll going; 5,000ft, 6,000ft, 7,000ft, 8,000ft; looking good. Where’s Rhoose? There’s the Bristol Channel, it will be somewhere over that way then.

Whoosh!

Airshow Close Call: That Time a Pitts Special Nearly Collided with RAF Jaguar Display Pilot Doing his Final High-Speed Pass

What the hell’s that?

For a microsecond, time stands still. The huge red letters on the top wing and fuselage of the Pitts Special spell the name of a well-known cigarette. They sweep past my canopy in slow time. An open-mouthed, white-faced pilot looks across the incredibly small gap between us. In an instant, he’s gone, leaving a shocked and very grumpy Jaguar pilot. I swear, if it had been one-to-one aerial combat I could have shot him twice in the head with a 9mm pistol, it was that close.

The Pitts pilot had ignored display protocol and ATC’s implicit instructions to hold off and had maneuvered, unobserved, into the overhead. The consequences of a mid-air crash over the display don’t bear thinking about.

However, no time to dwell on that, I’ll be able to have a frank and meaningful discussion with him later. I now need to head back to Rhoose, that high-speed pass had used up more fuel than I thought. A quick calculation; from my altitude of 20,000ft an idle/idle approach shouldn’t use up much fuel. An idle run-in and break, and there’ll be enough fuel to taxi onto the ramp where the ground crew waits to get the aircraft turned round for the Rhoose display in the afternoon.

“How did it go, Sir?” asks Mac as I sit in a trance, locked silently in my thoughts at 8,000ft over Innsworth, musing about what could so easily have been my premature demise.

“What? Oh, no problems. Well, nearly no problems. Where are the bloody Pitts team parked?”

Former RAF Jaguar pilot tells the story of when he was shot down by a RAF Phantom interceptor

What a start to the first display of my first season of Jaguar display flying. During this and the following two seasons, I can honestly say I never got closer to early retirement to the big crew room in the sky. I learned my first lesson in display flying on that sunny day; never ever relax until the jet is in the hangar and you are in the bar.

Photo by Tim Felce (Airwolfhound) and Rob Schleiffert from Holland via Wikipedia, and Flickr

November 23, 2021 0 comment

History

Recalling the tragic 1983 U.S. attack on Lebanon

by Till Daisd November 23, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Lt. Mark Adam Lange, a member of the A-6 crew, was injured during the ejection and passed away shortly after. After being handed over to Syrian forces, B/N Lt. Bobby Goodman spent many weeks in a detention facility close to Damascus

During the Vietnam War, the Grumman A-6 Intruder served as the “Main Battery” of carrier aviation. It was still in use by the US Navy and US Marine Corps in 1996. The A-6 was still the most potent strike aircraft on a carrier flight deck during the 1983 American attack on Lebanon because it was a true all-weather, day/night precision bomber.

The USS Independence (CV-62) continued after Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 and eventually replaced USS Eisenhower (CVN-69), which was departing for home. These were still the days when the Sixth Fleet had two carriers assigned, and CV-62 joined USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), which had CVW-3 — the first “dual A-6” air wing — onboard, as explained by Rick Morgan in his book A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96. Vice Adm. Jerry O. Tuttle, a renowned naval aviator with a background in light attacks, served as both the commander of Carrier Group Two and the commander of the Battle Fleet Sixth Fleet while serving as the senior officer on board CV-67.

The collapse of Lebanon, formerly known as “the Paris of the Middle East,” was at the forefront of world events at this time as many parties engaged in violence and disorder while citing various religious reasons. In order to help stabilize a fast destabilizing situation, the U.S. government sent Marines ashore in Beirut out of concern for a much larger battle involving Syria and Israel. To demonstrate the nation’s resolve, it also positioned two carriers offshore.

According to one of Turtle’s staff officers, Lt. Cdr. Joe Hulsey, ‘we had been on constant alert for weeks, with one carrier being in “alert 30” with aircraft fully loaded and crews briefed, while the other flight deck conducted normal flight ops. This changed every 24 hours in order to share the load. The force was ready, having prepared more than 300 potential targets in the region. We had timing and weapons loads planned for all of them, and all of this information was sent up the chain to Sixth Fleet and CINCEUR [Commander in Chief, US Forces Europe] so that they’d know what we were prepared to do. On top of that, we had Jerry Tuttle in charge. He was exactly who you’d want in that position if you were going over the beach.’

Up until around December 1, when the carriers got orders to stand down from constant alert, the hair-trigger state persisted. Then, at around 03:30 on the morning of the third, a Flash order from Sixth Fleet arrived with a four-hour time on target (ToT) for carrying out strikes against six particular targets in Lebanon. The staff initially thought the order had been sent inadvertently, but as voice and message traffic emerged between the ships and Sixth Fleet, it became clear that “somebody” much higher had ordered military action without giving a damn about what it would take for the operational forces to actually carry it out.

The right ordnance was not loaded, the crews were not briefed, and the aircraft were not ready or correctly spotted on the flight deck. Additionally, only one of the six designated targets had really been prepared by the ships, and the other five were brand-new and were thought to have no military significance. While the ships rapidly woke up, it was confirmed that the ToT was an absolute that had to be met, which led to an all-hands effort to carry out their orders.

What followed was a disaster.

Remembering the ill-fated 1983 U.S. strike on Lebanon — Vought A-7E Corsair II aircraft of attack squadrons VA-15 Valions and VA-87 Golden Warriors of Carrier Air Wing Six (CVW-6) line the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Independence (CV-62) in December 1983. The carrier was operating off the coast of Lebanon in support of the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut. In October 1983 Independence took part in the invasion of Grenada.

Kennedy launched 12 Intruders, of which seven were from VA-85 and five were from VA-75. Independence also put five Intruders up in the air, along with several KA-6Ds (from VA-176). Along with the Tomcats and Prowlers from both carriers, the ‘Indy’ A-7Es also participated. Due to time constraints, ammunition loads were sometimes limited for their intended targets, Syrian tanks, and AAA sites in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, near the Syrian border. Only one Kennedy Intruder managed to escape with a full bomb load. At middle altitude at dawn, aircraft lost contact with the ground and were quickly surrounded by missiles and AAA. The sky was replete with infrared-guided weapons that were immune to the Prowlers’ magic, while EA-6Bs seemed to render any radar-guided SAMs useless.

Buckeye 556 (BuNo 152915), the only Intruder that was fully loaded, had to work hard to keep up with the rest of the formation. Both B/N Lt. Bobby Goodman and pilot Lt. Mark Adam Lange were present on board. As aircraft attempted to dodge the SAMs rising from the ground, the sky was flooded with flares and infrared decoys. A Syrian 9K31 Strela-1 or Strela-2 infrared-guided SAM shortly struck “Buckeye 556,” most likely. Lange soon passed away from wounds sustained during the crew’s ejection from the aircraft. Goodman was handed over to Syrian forces and subsequently jailed for several weeks not far from Damascus. After a flurry of diplomatic activity, including Reverend Jesse Jackson’s attendance, he would be freed.

The Intruders and Corsair IIs delivered weapons through the hail of fire, with VA-176 particularly dropping 25 Mk 82s, 23 Mk 83s, and 30 Rockeyes on its designated targets.

While flying VA-15 A-7E “Active Boy 305” (BuNo 157468), CAG-6 Cdr. Ed. Andrews assumed control of the search and rescue operation for the downed Intruder. He was shortly struck by an infrared-guided SAM himself and was forced to eject. He was later picked up by a helpful fisherman and transferred back to the U.S. Navy. A VA-15 Corsair II called “Active Boy 314” (BuNo 157458) was also struck, but its pilot was able to board Independence and make a full recovery.

Here's how A-6 Intruder crews dodged SAMs and MiGs in the skies over Vietnam

As stated by Lt. Cdr. Hulsey, ‘even six more hours would’ve made all the difference in the world, but they wouldn’t give it to us. We found out later that the source (presumably out of Washington, D.C.) didn’t even get the time zone conversion right in the message, which cost us at least two more hours to prepare.’ As the saying goes, ‘Success has a thousand fathers while failure dies an orphan.’ In this case, it is still unclear who chose the target and ToT. Even though the bombing results were deemed “effective” in official reports, there was a rapid and long-lasting bitter taste of the strike on both ships and across carrier aviation. Professionally, the incident was regarded as nothing less than a failure. As a result, several modifications were made, including the establishment of “Strike U” at Fallon to create and disseminate more successful air wing tactics.

Photo by U.S. Navy

A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

November 23, 2021 0 comment

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