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MiG

When Capt. James Jabara was nearly shot down by future ace Capt. Boris Abakumov

by Till Daisd October 8, 2023

Jabara of the 334th FS/4th FW dived alone after his sixth MiG was downed in F 86A 5 49 1318, making him the first “ace” of the jet age. This occurred in the late afternoon of May 20, 1951.

Capt. James Jabara of the US Air Force was the first jet-versus-jet ace in history.

After taking down his sixth MiG in F 86A 5 49 1318 on May 20, 1951, Jabara of the 334th FS/4th FW dived alone because his wingman, 1Lt Salvadore “Jack” Kemp, had become separated from him early in the battle. This made him the first “ace” of the jet age. More than 50 MiG-15s were at that time dogfighting Sabres in the skies over “MiG Alley,” according to Peter E. Davies in his book F-86A Sabre Korea 1950–1951.

White smoke began to emerge from the jet pipe of Capt. V. A. Nazarkin’s 196th IAP aircraft after Jabara collided with it. The MiG-15 slowed to 195mph and went into a terminal spin. Jabara tracked it down to 6,500 feet, where he was startled to notice red tracers passing by his plane. Future five-victory ace Capt. Boris Abakumov and his unidentified wingman had made Jabara their target. The freshly crowned ace found it difficult to maneuver as his aircraft kept dipping to the right due to his right external fuel tank stubbornly remaining under the wing when he tried to discard it earlier in the battle.

Jabara was saved by squadronmates Capt. “Mo” Pitts and 2Lt. Rudy Holley after a tense pursuit in which they chased the MiGs off his tail and damaged one. At 3,500 feet, Nazarkin’s jet exploded after he ejected. According to Soviet reports, Snr. Lt. Mikhail Zykov, Jabara’s sixth victim, flew his damaged MiG back to Antung despite having sustained serious injuries during the battle.

But Jabara was then sent back to the US for special duty following his fifth and sixth victories.

In January 1953, he went back to Korea at his own request. He achieved a total of 15 air-to-air jet victories during the Korean War by the end of June after taking out nine additional MiG-15s. During World War II, Jabara was also credited with 1.5 wins over Europe. (During World War II, the German Luftwaffe claimed 22 jet pilot aces, but all of the claims used Allied prop-driven aircraft.)

Jabara, who was a colonel at the time, was killed in a car accident in November 1966 while en route to a new assignment.

F-86A Sabre Korea 1950–51 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force, Gareth Hector and Jim Laurier

James-Jabara — #K6896 Major James Jabara, 835 So Dellrose Str., Whichita, Kansas of the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, who became the 1st jet ace of the Korean Conflict on 20 May 1951, is shown standing in the cockpit of his F-86 “Sabre” jet in full combat fluing gear. April, 1953 (U.S. Air Force Photo)

October 8, 2023 0 comment

History

First American F-16 MiG-killer painted in a scheme resembling the Desert Camouflage Uniform worn during the first Gulf War

by Till Daisd October 3, 2023

written by Till Daisd

The Desert Camouflage Uniform used in the First Gulf War and a related experimental camouflage livery that was developed at the time serve as inspiration for this “What if” design

On June 17, 2022, an F-16D Fighting Falcon painted in a historical color scheme was unveiled at the 310th Air Maintenance Unit hangar by the 56th Equipment Maintenance Squadron at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona. It was the first American F-16 to achieve an aerial victory, as Senior Airman Caleb F. Butler explained in the article Luke AFB Unveils Newest Heritage Jet.

“The aircraft before you earned the moniker ‘MiG Killer’ as a result of the events that took place on Dec. 27, 1992,” said 1st Lt. James Mobbley, 56th EMS Fabrication Flight officer in charge, at the unveiling ceremony. “On this day, Lt. Col. Gary “Nordo” North, who was flying this F-16D, tail number 0778, led a flight of four F-16s on a routine Operation Southern Watch mission in Iraq.”

An armed MiG-25 Foxbat flew into the no-fly zone during this mission.

Nordo-F-16 — An F-16D Fighting Falcon sits on display during an unveiling ceremony at the 310th Air Maintenance Unit hangar on June 17, 2022, at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. Lt. Col. Gary “Nordo” North utilized this jet to eliminate an enemy MiG-25 Foxbat during Operation Southern Watch. It is the first American F-16 to earn an aerial victory.

According to what we have already said, Nordo ordered a tactical offset to the north to “bracket” the F-16s between the MiG and the 32nd parallel, resulting in a blocking maneuver and trapping the Iraqi fighter in forbidden airspace. Without a fight, the MiG was unable to return to Iraqi territory. “Someone was going to die within the next two minutes, and it wasn’t going to be me or my wingman,” North said.

North recognized the aircraft as a MiG-25 Foxbat outfitted with AA-6 “Acrid” radar-guided missiles and asked for permission to fire. He again asked permission to fire before ordering his wingman to use his electronic jamming pod. On his headset, he eventually heard “BANDIT-BANDIT-BANDIT, CLEARED TO KILL.” AIM-120 AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Anti-Aircraft Missile) was fired by North after locking up the MiG-25 at three nautical miles, fifteen degrees nose high, and fifteen degrees right bank. The missile was directed to hit and completely destroyed the Foxbat built in Russia.

F-16D-MiG-Killer-OSW — An F-16D Fighting Falcon sits on display during an unveiling ceremony at the 310th Air Maintenance Unit hangar on June 17, 2022, at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. The names of the corrosion control team members responsible for painting the jet can be seen in the lower right corner of the photo. The corrosion control team’s responsibilities revolve around preventative maintenance in an effort to prevent or control corrosion, supporting aircraft generation, and pilot training. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Caleb F. Butler)

In addition to being the first aerial victory for an American F-16, this battle also saw the first AIM-120 AMRAAM kill.

To commemorate North’s actions and the Air Force’s heritage, 12 Fabrication Flight Airmen who were assigned to Luke AFB’s corrosion control department created the paint scheme for this jet. Almost 13 gallons of paint and 1,500 man-hours were used for the paint job.

MiG-Killer-F-16D — A bay door of an F-16D Fighting Falcon sits ajar during an unveiling ceremony at the 310th Air Maintenance Unit hangar on June 17, 2022, at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. Lt. Col. Gary “Nordo” North utilized this jet to eliminate an enemy MiG-25 Foxbat during Operation Southern Watch. It is the first American F-16 to earn an aerial victory.

“This ‘What if’ design pulls cues from the Desert Camouflage Uniform worn during the first Gulf War and a similar experimental livery of camouflage that was tested at that time,” said Staff Sgt. Michael Cichonsky, 56th Equipment Maintenance Squadron F-35 low-observable aircraft structural maintainer. “Very few pictures exist of the test scheme since it was hand-rolled using latex paint and only lasted a week before being removed. With this design, we not only pay homage to the history of General North and 0778, but it also allows us to reimagine if this paint scheme was selected for use during Operation Southern Watch.”

Photo by Senior Airman Caleb F. Butler / U.S. Air Force

October 3, 2023 0 comment

History

Ex Egyptian MiG pilots offer a novel viewpoint on Israel’s “pre-emptive” attack on EAF airfields during the Six-Day War

by Till Daisd December 1, 2021

written by Till Daisd

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden under cover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks,’” EAF MiG pilot Tahir Zaki’s phone conversation with Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba

The Israeli attack on four Arab air groups on June 5, 1967, known as “Operation Moked” (“Focus”), has essentially already been covered in great detail. One of history’s most lauded and successful military missions was this one. Simply put: that fateful morning’s “pre-emptive” Israeli onslaught on Egyptian airfields in Sinai, on the Suez Canal, and elsewhere destroyed the UARAF’s fighting capacity (United Arab Republic Air Force, designation of Egyptian and Syrian air forces between 1958 and 1962, and of the Egyptian Air Force until 1969). The IDF/AF also defeated Egyptian resistance by maintaining multiple strike waves over important enemy airfields for most of the day.

According to Tom Cooper and David Nicolle in their book Arab MiGs, Volume 1, on June 5, 1967, six MiG-15s and MiG-17s were flying above Egypt early in the morning. At daybreak, two MiG-17s from No.18 Squadron conducted a CAP above Israel’s border. At least two MiG-15s departed for a training operation at 8:00 a.m. from one of the Suez Canal airfields that were unhindered by the early-morning fog.

El-Arish AB was the target of rocket and cannon fire from Israeli fighter planes at around 08:45 local time. The attack by the Ouragans was so unexpected that the majority of the MiG-17s of the No. 18 Squadron were destroyed before their crews could even understand what was happening. A MiG pilot for the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) could only draw the following conclusion:

`There was no warning at all. The aircraft at el-Arish were completely wiped out. In the evening of that day, pilots and ground crews were sent back to Cairo.’

Somewhat inaccurately, another EAF MiG pilot, Tahsin Zaki later complained: `It is important to point out that in June 1967, the Israelis attacked el-Arish air-field ten minutes before the rest of our airbases, and that the whole battle could have been different if the commander at el-Arish had contacted Meliz AB via the hotline.’

Former Egyptian MiG pilots provide an unprecedented perspective on Six-Day War

Other UARAF airfields were not attacked earlier than El-Arish. A formation of Mirage IIICJs hit Bir Thamada at the exact same moment. FM Fawzy (Maj-Gen, Egyptian Army Chief of Staff for Operations) did, however, later offer a potential explanation for why Israel was able to quickly neutralize No.18 Squadron and el-Arish AB. He claimed that the CO el-Arish AB worked for the Israelis for most of the 1960s and divulged all the specifics of his directives to them.

While Kabrit was the center of UARAF MiG-15 and MiG-17 missions at the same time as el-Arish and Bir Thamada, the IDF/AF did not classify Kabrit as a “major target.” However, SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron, under the command of Yakov Nevo, launched a sustained attack on it. EAF MiG pilot Mustafa Hafez found himself frantically looking for a functioning aircraft to take off and fight back as a result of this causing significant damage:

`I was not actually due to fly that morning. Around 08:20 hrs I was in the mess since I was due to fly later that day. No particular aircraft had been allocated to me since this was normal in our air force. We flew what was available. Suddenly I heard explosions and went outside the mess, and asked people what was going on. Someone said that it must be practiced somewhere. That was when I saw an Israeli aircraft attacking, very low from south to north, coming in towards the runway. It was a Super Mystére.

‘My first instinct was to run towards a ditch, but as soon as I got there I said to myself, “what am I doing here like an idiot?” So I ran to the squadron bus so I could get to the squadron headquarters. There I found the regimental CO. He had previously been my squadron leader at Abu Suweir. His name was Mamdouh Taliba, an excellent man. He was actually heading for his car so I went up to the passenger door. The CO drove to the nearest available aircraft, and I helped strap him in, though we weren’t absolutely sure that this aircraft was ready to go. Just as he was about to close the hood I noticed that the safety pin of the ejector seat was still in, so I pulled it out. I think he took off on a sub-runway as the main runway had already been hit.’

The Israelis were occupied engaging two I1-14s, the aircraft carrying FM Amer (Egyptian Minister of War) and his entourage, which were now flying directly in the middle of their attack, so Wing Commander Mamdouh Taliba and another pilot from No. 31 Squadron were able to launch their attack without being interrupted by SMB.2s. Before the Israeli formation was caught by two MiG-21s and lost two of its own aircraft, both means of transportation were declared as shot down.

Actually, the I1-14 carrying the Iraqi Defense Minister and Egyptian Minister Hussein el-Shafie arrived at Fayid safely before the location first came under attack (and their 11-14 destroyed on the ground). However, after Fayid AB was attacked as well, the aircraft carrying Amer was forced to abort the landing. It turned and crossed over Inchas. Amer gave the pilot the go-ahead to head toward Cairo West after spotting this base on fire. All the time, additional Israeli fighters were flashing by. In the most important phases of the war, the Egyptian military’s Supreme Commander was cut off from his headquarters.

After this initial attack, there was a short break, and Mustafa Hafez continued looking for a serviceable aircraft.

‘Then I tried to find another aircraft. They were all either damaged or being serviced or were not ready to go. Then I went to hangar….’

Around 08:50 hrs., a second attack on Bir Thamada occurred, and the pilots of No. 25 Squadron hurried to take off. A number of them took off as the base was attacked by Ouragans, who claimed to have destroyed six MiGs. The final UARAF jets that attempted to roll for takeoff were less fortunate; both MiG-17s blew up after taking numerous hits from Israeli cannon fire. Nothing comparable occurred at el-Sur; all of the MiG-15bis from the No. 24 Squadron that were still parked there, along with a few MiG-17s from the No. 18 Squadron, were destroyed on the ground.

Meliz AB also managed to scramble numerous MiG-17s despite being hit by Israeli Ouragans at roughly 08:55 hrs. in June 1967 and despite not being a typical MiG-17-base. However, their pilots were instructed to fly toward the direction of the West rather than fighting weaker opponents. With this, the forces of Air Group 2 and 12 consisting of MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircraft stationed in Sinai practically ceased to exist.

In the Canal Zone, the situation on the airfields was getting worse. Around 8:55 a.m., SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron launched a second attack on Kabrit. The two MiG-17s piloted by Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba sighted the Israelis over the base as they were still climbing. The Egyptians tried to escape by turning on their afterburners, but the Israeli formation’s Number 2 first reported damage on a MiG-17’s engine and left wing before claiming that the aircraft had been shot down in a subsequent strike. While the available Egyptian sources dispute any such loss, the commander of the Israeli formation confirmed that this MiG crashed. Mustafa Hafez’s search for an operable aircraft ultimately succeeded as Israeli jets were once more occupied with defying orders and fighting in the air:

‘By this time mechanics started coming back after running away as the first bombs fell. That was when I took off in an available MiG-17F. I didn’t even check if it was armed but only asked if it had been refueled. I took off on a sub-runway. By that time, Mamdouh Taliba landed. I didn’t have any plans, only to try and defend the airfield. Once I was up in the air I could see the smoke from other airfields which had been attacked. I hadn’t even cleared my take-off with the control tower, I just took off. Nor did I have any idea what the rest of the squadron was doing. Then I saw something flying very low. It was a Mirage going west to east, so I half rolled in behind it. It was probably doing a reconnaissance as it was on its own and was not attacking targets on the ground. As I followed it I tried to load [cock] my guns three times, but my MiG- 17 was too slow to keep up and after a while, the Mirage just flew off. Of course, I was angry and frustrated because I was unable to shoot down that Mirage. There was a switch in the cockpit that changed the armament from rockets to guns. And I wasn’t the only pilot to make the same mistake. Hisham Said Abdu, who was another instructor, did the same thing.

‘Almost immediately after that, I saw something else very low with a long exhaust of smoke. It crashed into the Suez Canal. I thought it might have been one of my colleagues but in fact, it was probably a SAM. Then, I landed safely. Another of our pilots tried to take off using the main runway but hit some bomb damage which damaged his aircraft so that he had to eject while still on the ground. He survived but he was very lucky because the minimum height for ejecting was supposed to be 250 meters. His name was Muhammad al-Hadidi. This happened after I had landed.’

The attack on Cairo West, a significant UARAF MiG-17 base, was likely carried out using the Mirage Hafez that was trying to launch the attack. A formation from No. 101 Squadron IDF/AF attacked the airfield at precisely 9:00 a.m., claiming strikes on at least three MiG-17 aircraft. However, a few MiGs were still flying because Wg Cdr Zohair Shalabi scrambled with two wingmen right away. Helwan AB in order to scatter his aircraft after spending some time on a CAP. He arrived there at around 09:30 hrs.

The UARAF pilots at Bir Thamada thought they had been under attack continuously for 15 minutes since they had been hit three times in quick succession. Around 9:00 a.m., the final intact MiG-17 on the ground was destroyed by Mystéres of No. 109 Squadron, marking the end of the airfield’s use as a fighter base. Flight Lieutenant Hashim Mustafa Hassan of the No. 25 Squadron reported the peculiar circumstance that emerged only a short while later when another Israeli formation flew overhead:

`Some 30 seconds from the end of the attack, a second wave of planes arrived… We ran about the desert, looking for cover, but the planes didn’t shoot. They merely circled, their pilots surprised that the base was completely destroyed and that no targets remained. We were the only targets… weak humans scurrying in the desert with handguns as our only means of self-defense. It was a sad comedy… pilots of the newest and best-equipped jets fighting with handguns. Five minutes after the beginning of the attack, the planes disappeared and silence prevailed that encompassed the desert and the noise that destroyed our planes and the airbase, and the squadron. They completed their assignment in the best way possible, with a ratio of losses —100 percent for us, 0 percent for them.’

The third Israeli attack on Kabrit occurred around 9:10 a.m., and then another one occurred at 9:25 a.m. This time, up to 18 MiG-15s and MiG-17s were reportedly destroyed on the ground by Super Mystére B.2s of No. 105 Squadron and Mystére IVAs of No. 109 Squadron IDF/AF, increasing the total to 30 since the war started. However, Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba stated a completely different scenario when MiG pilot Tahir Zaki called him, sometimes after 9:00 a.m. local time, suggesting that their statements were probably certainly exaggerated:

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden undercover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks. But there were about eight or nine open pens and these had one aircraft in each of them. Some of these were attacked.” These were the only real planes that the Israelis attacked. We also had very big hangars at Kabrit, so we put four MiG-17s in each, one in each corner of the hangar where they were less likely to be hit. And they weren’t.’

The Israelis, on the other hand, only acknowledged being duped by Egypt’s dummy planes at Abu Suweir and Cairo West because they thought the majority of them were constructed of inflatable rubber rather than wood.

However, Mustafa Hafez was forced to flee under the most hazardous conditions a second time following the subsequent attack on Kabrit:

`Very soon afterward I took off again in a different aircraft. This was a MiG- 17PF [serial number 2803]. There had been no time for me to report or to be debriefed. I merely changed aircraft. As I started the engine the airfield came under attack again, perhaps it was the second or third attack. I was still inside the hanger, in the cockpit, when I heard the attack. I cleared the hanger doors at full throttle and afterburner. The aircraft was swerving and rocking from side to side as I turned, first to the left to clear another hanger which was facing my hanger, then to the right along a taxiway, then to the left again to cross a small railway line that ran between the hangers and the main sub-runway, then sharp right onto that sub-runway. I was afraid the wingtips would hit the ground. I took off without a pause and climbed as steep as I could, but the enemy had gone. Taliba had also taken off during the attack.’

Wg Cdr Taliba joined Hafez once they were in the air, and the two formed a CAP over Kabrit. They remained in the air until approximately the time of the sixth Israeli raid on Kabrit, which occurred at around 09:40 hrs.

‘He [Taliba] joined me and told me to accompany him as his Number Two (wingman). As I was joining him I saw a SAM coming towards us. We avoided it but Taliba ordered me to land as I only had 450 liters of fuel left. Taliba had landed and I was on my final approach at a height of about 15 to 20 meters when Taliba shouted over the radio, “Hafez! You have aircraft ahead of you!” So I retracted my undercarriage and flap, gave the aircraft full throttle and afterburner. The Israelis were about 100 meters ahead of me. I counted them, one, two, three, four; so I pulled up and tried to follow the last one. But this meant leaving the turn a bit late. I should have turned earlier. The Israelis were a bit lower than me. All five of us started circling, then one came at me head-on and opened fire. This made me so angry that I swore out loud. The Israeli turned to the right. I turned first to the left and then to the right to try and follow him. A head-on attack is very difficult.

‘That was when I was hit in the right wing. We were all flying at about 200 or 300 meters. My right aileron was damaged and I continued turning right, unable to straighten out, so I gained height. The Israeli couldn’t keep with me as a MiG-17 is better in a climb. My aircraft juddered several times and almost went into a spin. I thought it odd that it tried to spin under those conditions [this was perhaps when his aircraft was hit a second time, in the tail and rear fuselage]. While three of the Israeli aircraft attacked our airfield, the fourth one followed me. After the three have strafed the field, the fourth one did the same, then they all flew home.

Meanwhile, I was still turning to the right, unable to straighten up. As I lined up on a runway I used the aileron trim to straighten out. This wasn’t standard procedure. I don’t know if I invented it or maybe it just came by instinct, but it worked. I had no communication with the ground, but I landed OK. The MiG had been badly damaged. The right wing was damaged, the lower part of the rudder had mostly been shot away, the main control rod to the stabilizer was much damaged. The rear fuel tank had also been hit but fortunately, it had been almost empty, and although there had been a fire in the tank, and the alarm had been set off in my cockpit, I had used the fire extinguisher and this did the trick as there hadn’t been enough fuel to cause a big fire.’

Despite the fact that no Israelis witnessed Mustafa Hafez’s MiG-17 really crash, Major Asaf Ben-Nun of No. 105 Squadron claimed a kill. It’s interesting to note that the Israeli Air Force has never “verified” any other IDF/AF pilot’s claim to have shot down an Egyptian MiG-17 on the first day of the 1967 War. Given that the UARAF did not lose a single MiG-17 in an air battle on June 5, 1967, the precise reasoning behind this Israeli decision is still unknown.

The Israelis expanded their efforts to include the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi fronts after being encouraged by this accomplishment. They completely destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) in a matter of hours before inflicting such heavy losses on the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) that the latter thereafter played essentially no active role in the conflict. No operation in history compares to the IDF/AF attack on that day in terms of effectiveness and significance for the success of the entire conflict and the future of the Middle East.

Photo by Francesco Gasparetti from Senigallia, Italy and Oren Rozen via Wikipedia

December 1, 2021 0 comment

History

The 197th and final MiG kill of the Vietnam War achieved by a U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II crew

by Till Daisd September 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Because of relatively lax RoE, the F-4 crew was able to pursue the MiG beyond the 20th parallel

Although the F-4 Phantom II was the most significant fighter-bomber to be used by all three branches of the American armed forces during the Vietnam War, the carrier-borne squadrons that were equipped with the jet were the best at using it in battle. Even though the majority of the aircraft’s operations in Vietnam included ground attacks with a variety of weaponry, the aircraft was a pioneer in the use of long-range, radar-guided missiles in aerial combat.

After many other kinds were replaced, the Phantom II served as the primary U.S. Navy fighter in Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1973. Its effectiveness and adaptability allowed it to carry out a variety of tasks and change roles as needed during the assault on some of the most fiercely fortified territories in the world. F-4 crews were able to benefit from their brethren’s experiences in 1964–68 during Operation Linebacker in 1972–73. Additionally, they were able to put to use the air combat training techniques provided by the US Navy’s Topgun School, which enabled Phantom II crews to defeat enemy fighters with an unequaled level of success in the final year of the Vietnam War.

The 197th and final MiG kill of the Vietnam War took place at 1253 hours on January 12, 1973, when two VF-161 “Chargers” F-4Bs flying a Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) mission from USS Midway (CVA-41) intercepted a lone MiG-17, as stated by Peter E. Davies in his book U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73.

How a U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II crew scored the 197th, and last, MiG kill of the Vietnam War

Lt. Victor Kovaleski and Lt(jg) Jim Wise in ‘Rock River 102’ (BuNo 153045), with Lt Pat Arwood and Ens Lynn Oates in a second F-4B, were vectored to intercept a Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) MiG-17 that had ventured out across the coast to try and down a USAF C-130 Hercules.

Although it took “three or four passes for the controller to get them hooked up on the MiG,” according to “Bart” Bartholomay, the crew took advantage of more permissive RoE to pursue the MiG beyond the 20th parallel.

The novice MiG pilot Luu Kim Ngo of the 923rd Fighter Regiment (FR) was intermittently detected on the radar as he flew in a low cloud base while flying at a height of about 1000 feet at a speed of 450 knots. At a distance of four miles, the two pursuing U.S. Navy personnel rapidly acquired a visual identification of their prey and closed undetected.

When the MiG pilot finally caught sight of them, according to Wise’s post-mission report, he turned left and leveled out in front of the F-4s after using his faster turn rate to roll in behind them. Then, for whatever reason, he made a sudden 180-degree turn, putting himself in the F-4Bs’ Sidewinder acquisition range. AIM-9G missile fired from “Rock River 102” by Kovaleski immediately severed a portion of the MiG’s tail. When Luu Kim Ngo tried to jump, his parachute did not deploy, and his body was later found in the water. A second AIM-9G shot from Kovaleski caused the MiG to burn in flames as it fell into the water.

Two days later, while en route to Than Hoa on a Blue Tree reconnaissance escort mission, Kovaleski and Ens D. H. Plautz were struck by an 85 mm AAA. Kovaleski and Plautz were forced to leave F-4B BuNo 153068, which had earlier been a MiG killer for Lts. “Bart” Bartholomay and Oran Brown, due to a damaged engine and a major fuel leak in the Phantom II, and wait for an HH-3A helicopter to rescue them from the water. Their F-4B was the final of Midway air wing’s 44 lost aircraft during the conflict.

U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1969-73 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to pre-order here.

Photo by Russell M. Taylor / U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force

September 24, 2021 0 comment

History

MiG Killer F-4! The Vietnam War’s only VF-31 aerial triumph

by Till Daisd September 11, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“It was like something out of the old days. We had a standard Mark One dogfight as if it were right out of WWII. If you could have spoken to the Red Baron, of WWI fame, he could have probably told you some of the maneuvers we used,” Sam C. Flynn, former F-4 pilot

Despite being phased out of the Navy and Marine Corps, the F-4 Phantom II’s history is filled with innumerable accomplishments and successes in combat. The fight between an F-4 Bureau Number 157307 and a MiG adversary aircraft on Yankee Station off the coast of Vietnam on June 21, 1972, is described in the following story, headlined F-4 MiG Killer, written by then JO2 Julius L. Evans and published in the May-June 1989 issue of Naval Aviation News.

Saratoga (CV-59) had been on duty for several months prior to being diverted from her initial deployment to the South China Sea.

Saratoga had just finished her operational readiness-required workups in preparation for the impending Mediterranean journey, although East Coast carriers don’t typically do Western Pacific cruises. She was the ready carrier and was berthed in Mayport, Florida. The crew of the Saratoga was prepared, as all carrier crews are urged to have their seabags ready to detach earlier than intended if necessary. There was not much time left before departure for the Mediterranean.

The necessity emerged suddenly.

Following the conclusion of at-sea workups, Saratoga had 30 days to prepare for deployment. Some crew members took leave and left the area as the ship was being prepared for her imminent deployment to the Mediterranean, while others opted to spend the last few weeks with their families before the men in white manned the rails as the ship returned to deep water operations.

It was the “Phantom Fling” night. The officers and their wives were ready for the gala, which typically attracted the most fighter squadron members who weren’t on deployment. For some of the spouses, finding the ideal clothing took a lot of time, and in preparation for the celebrations, last-minute tailoring was done on a few of the white mess dress uniforms.

The combat in Vietnam, which was thousands of miles away, was getting worse. Many Americans underestimated how difficult an enemy the Vietcong would be. A West Coast carrier was unable to deploy as planned because more power was required at Yankee Station at the last minute. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made their choice without delay. To expand operations, Saratoga would be directed to the Western Pacific.

While the “Fling” was in full swing back home in the United States, commanding officers were told in whispers that Saratoga was to deploy right away. It came as a complete shock. Nobody anticipated deployment in an emergency. The radar intercept officer (RIO), who later flew in Phantom 157307 during the MiG mission, Lieutenant Willian H. John, recalled that once we received notice, we had roughly 72 hours to start moving. “That involved transporting supplies and employees from Oceana, Va., to Mayport, Fla., and preparing the ship with all we required for a Westpac journey.

F-4 MiG Killer! The story of the only VF-31's MiG Kill of the Vietnam War

“We stayed up all night calling everyone back from leave,” John said. “Some personnel had to meet the ship at sea. It was quite an involved process to get everyone back on board and get underway, but we were steaming well within our allotted time.”

Flight activities accelerated once Saratoga arrived at the station and allied with USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). The executive officer of VF-31 and pilot of the MiG mission at the time, Commander Sam C. Flynn, remarked that “we were on the front line flying combat missions from May until June.”

Cdr. Flynn and Lt. John piloted Phantom 157307 as they guided the MiG Combat Air Patrol (MiG CAP), which was made up of two Phantoms. Their task was to fly under the protection of an A-6 Intruder and an A-7 Corsair II strike force attack aircraft, both of which were tasked with attacking objectives between Haiphong and Hanoi.

The MiG CAP was instructed to take up position between the strike force and the airfield where MiGs were most likely to originate. When the USS Long Beach (CGN-9), the MiG CAP’s control ship, reported that MiGs were airborne, the leading aircraft had just finished in-flight refueling.

“We ingressed over an enemy territory about five minutes before the strike force,” Cdr. Flynn said. The ground crew began firing surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at the two F-4s as soon as they crossed ridgelines. When Long Beach directed them north to the MiGs, which were 15 to 20 miles distant, they had just managed to avoid the missiles’ course.

Prior to making visual contact with the MiGs during the run-in, the Phantoms were free to fire. The F-4s were unable to see the MiGs on their radar because they were flying higher than expected. Lt. John explained, “After maneuvering against the SAMs, we came in at about 7,000 feet and expected the MiGs to be below us. They were actually well above us.”

According to Cdr. Flynn, when the Phantom met the MiGs, “It was like something out of the old days. We had a standard Mark One dogfight as if it were right out of World War II. If you could have spoken to the Red Baron of WWI fame, he could have probably told you some of the maneuvers we used.”

The wingman started the fight, but the Phantom was at a disadvantage because the MiGs were coming in from overhead. “Our wingman who had the initial tally was unable to achieve an engaging position, so we took the offensive and came behind the lead MiG’s wingman,” Lt. John said.

“When we went high, we followed him, and after a series of loops, turns, and high-speed maneuvers, we locked up the MiG and attempted to fire a Sparrow missile, but it malfunctioned on the aircraft.”

The lead MiG was preparing to fire an Atoll, the Soviet version of a Sidewinder, as it maneuvered behind our wingman. “We had the advantage on our MiG, but after the missile malfunction and switching to Sidewinder, I came out of the cockpit,” Lt. John said, referring to looking out of the cockpit instead of using radar. “Knowing where our wingman should be—10 o’clock high in that a MiG was at his 7 o’clock and pulling lead to fire—I told Nick, our wingman, that he had a MiG at his 7 o’clock who was firing and called Sam off the MiG we were engaging and told him that our wingman was at 11 o’clock high. Sam immediately broke off the chase.”

By the time the lead Phantom arrived, the wingman had dodged two missiles. “Sam told him to keep pulling on the stick and to keep it in the afterburner because the MiG was still at his 7 o’clock,” Lt. John said. Although his wingman was too close to his line of fire, the lead Phantom was able to establish a good firing position on the MiG. “I didn’t know if the missile would guide on the Phantom or the MiG, so I fired a Sidewinder off to the right, hoping that the MiG would turn around to engage me,” Cdr. Flynn continued.

Cdr. Flynn understood that he didn’t have much time to remain inside the Sidewinder envelope since the MiG may outturn the Phantom. “I was about 45 degrees off his tail and realized that he was going to be out of the missile envelope real soon,” Flynn said. A third missile was launched by the MiG at the wingman. When the wingman abruptly drew back, the MiG yo-yoed high, allowing Phantom 157307 to slam into the back of the MiG.

“Once we got in position, we were able to fire two additional Sidewinders at him. The first missed, but the second went right up the tailpipe and blew off part of the empennage, Lt. John recalled. “He went into a flat spin and tried to recover a couple of times, eventually ejected at about 1,000 feet.”

Although the entire action only lasted for about a minute and a half, the Phantom 157307 aircrew will likely remember the adventure for the rest of their lives. “The opportunity to successfully engage in combat instills a feeling of accomplishment,” Cdr. Flynn stated. “You’re honed right to the razor’s edge after 24 years of training for this event; you could say a sense of self-satisfaction sums up everything.”

Lt. John added, “This was like the graduation of all my training. It was an exhilarating experience that very few pilots or radar intercept officers get the opportunity to go through.”

For their gallant efforts, they each received the Navy Silver Star.

Photo by U.S. Navy

September 11, 2021 0 comment

History

How A-6 Intruder crews dodged SAMs and MiGs over Vietnam

by Till Daisd August 29, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Sheets started to jink, making it difficult for the MiG-17 pilot to keep the A-6 in his sights while attempting to draw the MiG down the coast in an effort to run it out of fuel

The Grumman A-6 was developed as a carrier-based attack aircraft to replace the Douglas Skyraider. It stood apart from every other U.S. Navy aircraft thanks to a unique crew arrangement that placed the pilot and bombardier/navigator (BN) side by side to increase mission effectiveness. With improved crew communication, the Intruder became one of the best assault aircraft of the Vietnam War.

Here's how A-6 Intruder crews dodged SAMs and MiGs in the skies over Vietnam

The “Iron Hand” mission, officially known as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), which required the Intruder to attack and destroy SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles) and AAA (Anti Aircraft Artillery), was one of many carried out by the A-6 and required good crew cooperation. In these types of sorties, Intruder pilots had to rely on both their own proficiency with low-altitude flying and the sight of their BNs in order to dodge SAMs.

“You could outfly the SAMs with the A-6,” explains the former A-6 pilot (retired) Rear Admiral Rupe Owens in Rafael Lima’s article Legends of Vietnam: Shoulder to Shoulder The Grumman A-6 was ugly, but it sure could cook; published on Air & Space magazine.com “What you did was make hard turns. At their intercept speed of about Mach 3, the SAMs couldn’t turn with the A-6, especially at a low level.” Owens, who has flown almost every version of the Intruder, remembers approaching a target when several SAMs pointed towards its aircraft, streaming long, bright tails of flame, five in all. “We managed to out-turn them all, but I remember the sound of those five rocket motors from the SAMs as they went by. It got loud. Real loud.”

The Digital Integrated Attack and Navigation Equipment system, or DIANE, which combined an innovative tool that could take into account any angle of climb or dive, speed, G force, and wind with an analog computer to calculate when dropping a payload accurately, allowed the Intruder to demonstrate that it had a true all-weather capability. According to Lima, while Intruders were attacking various objectives, A-7 Corsairs and F-4 Phantoms were flying in formation and releasing their bombs as the A-6 crews instructed using DIANE.

The A-6s attacked moving targets that crossed the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other supply routes with the assistance of Forward Air Controllers (FACs). To complete this mission, the A-6s used specialized equipment like an Airborne Moving Target Indicator, a special doppler radar that collected returns from moving ground objects, as well as ground-based seismic and acoustic sensors that were airdropped along supply trails.

In order to give the Intruders’ crews the opportunity to carry out a second strike by dropping Mk 82s, these sorties were carried out by first dropping Rockeye cluster bombs to destroy vehicles’ gas tanks or ammunition caches. If the secondary fires were insufficient, they then moved on to preplanned secondary targets. According to Marine Corps Bruce Byrum (now a retired general), another Vietnam veteran who logged more than 3,000 hours as an A-6 pilot, these flights might be extremely terrifying and the A-6 could end up being the ideal target for AAA. Byrum detailed this possibility to Lima.

“Sometimes at night, the enemy anti-aircraft fire used colored tracer rounds fired aimlessly into the night sky when aircraft were detected flying in the area, to warn all vehicles on the road that we were there.”

However, the night strike against pre-designated targets was the most frequent mission carried out by the Intruders throughout the Vietnam War. Sometimes these missions were carried out in broad daylight, as was the case in May 1972 when a flight of four A-6s carrying Mk 20 Rockeye bomblet canisters proceeded toward the enemy airstrip of Bai Thuong. Roger Sheets, a Navy pilot, and air group commander piloted the lead Intruder. He directed the flight to Bai Thuong with the aid of the radar and visual indications provided by his BN Charlie Carr, a Marine Corps captain. “The A-6 was the all-weather attack aircraft,” says Carr to Lima “Monsoon season never affected our operations.”

However, because it was a bright day, Sheets and Carr could see North Vietnam clearly, and any other aircraft in the area could as well, including the enemy MiGs that Carr noticed as the Intruders climbed to 200 feet and approached their objective. However, Sheets armed the more than three tons of ordnance carried by its Intruder while the MiGs were 1,500 feet in the air.

“We came in underneath this wheel of MiGs,” Carr says, “maybe 12, 15 of them. We were hoping to catch them on the ground and bomb the hell out of ’em.” Despite the fact that the airbase had been informed, Sheets kept the A-6 level and straight. A little while later, he thumbed the release on the stick to release all 12 Mk 20s over the airstrip before turning the Intruder hard to the left.

But now the Intruders had another problem. “Now the MiG-17 was on our tail,” Carr says. Even though Sheets had no chance of positioning himself to fire given the A-6’s slower speed, Carr chose to arm the aircraft’s Sidewinder missiles. Instead, he started jinking, making it difficult for the MiG pilot to keep them in his sights while attempting to drive the MiG down the coast in an effort to run it out of fuel.

Carr recollects seeing smoke rising from the MiG’s 37-mm cannon before an F-4 finally showed up like a big brother arriving late to a fight. Sheets and Carr managed to return to the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) after the Phantom launched a missile, which caused the MiG to burst into flames. This story makes it clear that MiGs were one of the reasons A-6 crews chose the safety of darkness or bad weather.

No matter the hour, A-6 aircrew were able to fly low and quickly thanks to the usage of the terrain-following radar. However, as Carr says, only approximately a quarter of his trips from the Coral Sea were at night due to the complexity of carrier operations. “But missions from land,” he concludes, “were almost all at night.”

Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps

August 29, 2021 0 comment

History

How the Buff was trasformed into a MiG Killer by B-52 tail gunners

by Till Daisd August 28, 2021

written by Till Daisd

The two BUFF MiG kills occurred during Operation Linebacker II, the Christmas-time strategic air assault against the logistical and industrial hub of North Vietnam

The Boeing B-52 is the quintessential example of strategic airpower in action. Originally designed to carry a hydrogen bomb over intercontinental distances, the Stratofortress saw extensive use in conventional bombing during the Vietnam War, turning it into a MiG killer by downing two MiG-21 fighters.

Both MiGs were destroyed during Operation Linebacker II, the Christmas-time air onslaught against North Vietnam’s logistical and industrial core that got underway after the Paris peace talks ended in failure. Two B-52D tail gunners from the 307th Strategic Bomb Wing stationed at U-Tapao RTAFB (Royal Thailand Air Force Base), Thailand, continued the long tradition of tail gunners from prior wars by shooting down two North Vietnamese Fishbeds during this air operation.

Here's how B-52 tail gunners made of the BUFF a MiG killer

The four.50-caliber M3 machine guns installed at the rear of the D model of the Stratofortress made it possible for these accomplishments, and they possibly made the B-52 the last strategic bomber to shoot down an enemy fighter. The 600-round weapons on board the A-3A fire control system search and tracking radar may be handled remotely from the forward fuselage by the gunner or manually by a tail gunner.

On December 18, 1972, 129 bombers (42 B-52Ds from U-Tapao, 87 BUFFs between B-52Ds and B-52Gs from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam) were launched to attack rail yards and logistical facilities in and around Hanoi as well as the MiGs bases at Kep, Hoa Loc, and Phuc Yen. This was the first of the two MiG kills. B-52 Stratofortress: The Story of the BUFF from Drawing Board to the Skies over Afghanistan by Bill Yenne claims that the bombers flew in three aircraft cells for mutual ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) defense.

The B-52D Tail No. 56-0676, callsign Brown III, which had Sgt. Samuel O. Turner working as a tail gunner was one of the bombers. Numerous SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles) were fired throughout the bomb run to the target, and anti-aircraft fire of all calibers exploded close to Brown III.

When the B-52Ds arrived at their objective and dropped their bombs, several MiGs took off to intercept them as they were flying back to base. Turner was able to lock on to the incoming Fishbed and, as it was in the firing line, he opened fire on it, hitting the back of the MiG-21, which burst into a big inferno. One of the MiG-21s was prepared to launch its missiles toward Brown III. According to Donald J. McCarthy, Jr. in his book MiG Killers A Chronology of U.S. Air Victories in Vietnam 1965-1973, this kill was the first for a bomber crew since the Korean War, and it had also been confirmed by MSgt. Lewis E. Le Blanc, who was a tail gunner on another B-52.

At the Fairchild AFB Heritage Park in Spokane, the B-52D with the tail number 55-0676 is still on display and still carries the iconic MiG Killers logo, a red star under the cockpit.

On December 24, 1972, Christmas Eve, the second Stratofortress aerial victory of the Vietnam War occurred. During the bomb run, the B-52s were assaulted by the MiGs, and thirty BUFFs that took off from U-Tapao had to hit rail yards at Thai Nguyen and Kep, 40 miles north and northeast of Hanoi. A1C Albert E. Moore, the tail gunner of the B-52D Tail No. 55-0083, Diamond Lil, noticed one of them on the radar sight. At 4,000 yards, he latched onto the Fishbed and started firing at the blip on his radar scope until it vanished.

In his combat report, according to a lengthy essay by Tom Docherty that was published in FlyPast magazine’s December 2015 issue, Moore wrote: “I observed a target on my radar scope 8 o’clock low at 8 miles. I immediately notified the crew, and the ‘bogey’ started closing rapidly. It stabilized at 4,000 yards, at 6 o’clock. I called the pilot for evasive action and the EWO for chaff and flares. When the target goes to 2,000 yards, I notified the crew that I was firing. I fired at the bandit until it ballooned to three times in intensity then suddenly disappeared from my radar scope at approximately 1,200 yards. I expected 800 rounds in three bursts.”

This kill too was confirmed by another tail gunner, TSgt. Clarence W. Chute, reported: “I went visual and saw the ‘bandit’ on fire and falling away. Several pieces of the aircraft exploded, and the fireball disappeared in the undercast.”

Also preserved and on display at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado is the B-52D tail number 55-00083. According to Vietnamese authorities, a B-52 downed a MiG-21 on April 16, 1972, earning its third air-to-air win.

General George L. Butler, who was in charge of Strategic Air Command (SAC) at the time, announced the removal of the gunner post and the deactivation of the B-52’s guns on September 16, 1991. As a former B-52 gunner explained to us “we (Gunners) were done away with for two reasons 1) Budget. It was very expensive to maintain the Fire Control System. It was the ONLY system on the jet that had never been updated. It still used vacuum tubes! If a part broke and couldn’t be located, it had to be made. This was very expensive. And 2) Missile technology had become advanced enough to shoot aircraft down from beyond visual range. The guns were obsolete unless a fighter was dumb enough to try and get close enough to use its guns on the BUFF. Those are the facts.”

Since then, a generation has passed since the BUFF had a tail gunner, and the days of a fighter having to be cautious when attempting to get behind a B-52 are long gone.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

August 28, 2021 0 comment

History

How the Mohawk became a MiG killer

by Till Daisd August 26, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Although it wasn’t intended, the Mohawk actually shot down a MiG during the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War, the OV-1 was responsible for the U.S. Army’s air-to-air win.

The Grumman OV-1 was a full battlefield surveillance aircraft that could provide almost any information a battlefield commander would need, and could even destroy it if required. It was created to satisfy the U.S. Army’s request for a tiny, two-seat, twin-engine surveillance aircraft.

A MiG was something that the Mohawk wasn’t intended to shoot down, yet it did so during the Vietnam War.

OV-1 Vs MiG-17: the story of how the Mohawk became a MiG killer

Two OV-1As from the 131st Aviation Company were flying at 2000 feet above the Ashau Valley on a morning in mid-February 1968. The Ashau Valley was one of the North Vietnamese Army’s two strongholds in South Vietnam, the other being the U Minh Forest to the north of Saigon. One of the most seasoned Mohawk pilots in the squadron, Capt. Ken Lee piloted the flight. The two pilots maintained their altitude to use the OV-1 side-looking radar and infrared detection equipment to observe the enemy activity in the valley because they were aware that there were more than 6,000 permanent troops and one of the most technologically advanced complexes of anti-aircraft batteries in the world in the jungle below them.

According to Wayne Mutza’s account in U.S. Army Aviation in Vietnam, Lee suddenly felt his aircraft being hit. He turned right away when his wingman cried at him from half a mile away, “You got a MiG behind you!” As Lee leveled his wings, a MiG-17 flew by at 275 speeds to his left, emerging from a dive 200 feet below him and turning around to retaliate on the two Mohawks. Lee realized that engaging the MiG would have been his only opportunity to avoid being shot down. Lee was carrying a load that allowed the OV-1A to carry a 2.75-inch rocket pod and a.50-caliber machine gun under each wing.

The MiG pilot made a serious error when he slowed down to launch his attack, and Lee launched 38 rockets in two shots, four of which connected with the MiG. Additionally, Lee fired numerous machine gun shots at the adversary fighter. I fired around 100.50-caliber bullets at him, and I could see the tracers entering the fuselage. His power was stopped when he hit his engine. When Lee opened fire, the MiG was climbing, so they dipped into a cloud bank. Three to five seconds after pulling to the right to emerge from the clouds, Lee spotted the MiG emerging.

The airplane had an overturned nose, a low right wing, and orange flames. The MiG circled one of the Ashau’s surrounding mountains before turning into what Lee knew to be a blind valley, but since he was flying so low, Lee would not have been able to exit the valley without colliding with the hillside and he was unable to observe the MiG crash.

Lee saw numerous bullet holes in the tail and aft fuselage of his aircraft after they arrived back at Phu Bai Airbase, but he and his wingman were told not to discuss Lee’s likely MiG kill with anybody. The Army actually feared that the U.S. Air Force (USAF), who had designated shooting down MiGs as their sole domain, would have forced them to either disarm the Mohawks or possibly hand them over to the USAF.

A few weeks later, Lee took a flight from Phu Bai to Ubon, where he met Col. Robin Olds, commander of the 8th TFW. Olds revealed to Lee that he had heard reports of a Mohawk shooting down a MiG and was curious to learn that Lee was the pilot in that particular duel. In May, Lee flew a different mission that made a stop in Ubon. After he landed, Robin Olds and Chappie James asked him to follow them to the Officer’s Club, where they informed him that the MiG he had been describing had in fact been shot down. When Lee asked how they knew, Olds said to him “We know things you guys don’t and will never find out.”

Photo by U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, J. S. (Steve) Bond, and Atsushi Tsubota via Wikipedia

August 26, 2021 0 comment