MiGKiller

“Someone was going to die within the next two minutes, and it wasn’t going to be me or my wingman,” said Gary North, the first USAF pilot to down an enemy aircraft in the F-16 and the first pilot to score a kill with the AIM-120 AMRAAM

Operation Southern Watch (OSW) began on Aug. 27, 1992, with the stated purpose of ensuring Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (UNSCR 688) of Apr. 5, 1991, which barred fixed and rotary wing aircraft from airspace south of the 33rd parallel.

However, air operations conducted by Saddam Hussein’s air force during ’91-’92 showed he had no intention of complying with resolution 688. As explained by Donald J. McCarthy, Jr. in his book “The Raptors All F-15 and F-16 aerial combat victories,” countless military engagements between coalition forces and Iraqi command and control systems, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites, radar sites, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites took place from the very end of the 1991 Gulf War until the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

One of the most famous clashes took place on Sunday, Dec. 27, 1992, when an Iraqi MiG-25 (NATO reporting name “Foxbat”) fighter violated the no-fly zone and entered airspace south of the 33rd parallel.

On that day, at approximately 10:42 a.m. local time, the then-Captain Gary “Nordo” North (who was flying the F-16D No. 90-0778, callsign Benji 41), led a flight of four F-16s on a routine OSW mission. As the Viper drivers were refueling from a KC-135, they heard urgent transmissions between a formation of four F-15s in the no-fly zone and AWACS controllers. An Iraqi fighter (that one F-15, having been close enough to gain visual acquisition, confirmed it as a “Foxbat”) had crossed the border into the no-fly zone and now was speeding north to safety with the F-15s in hot pursuit. The Foxbat quickly reached north of the thirty-second parallel, and the F-15s, now low on gas, left the area.

As told by Craig Brown in his book Debrief: A Complete History of U.S. Aerial Engagements 1981 To The Present, North and his wingman refueled with only enough gas to allow them to cover their assigned on-station time in the no-fly zone and crossed the border into southern Iraq while the third and fourth aircraft in their group continued to refuel. Within minutes, AWACS controllers ordered the two F-16s toward an Iraqi aircraft heading south toward the 32nd parallel to ensure the Bogey did not cross into the no-fly zone. A few minutes later, AWACS controllers directed the Vipers to intercept another high-speed contact that originated in the north and crossed into the no-fly zone approximately thirty miles west of the F-16 formation. The Iraqi fighter was forced to turn north to safety before the F-16s, armed with two AIM-120A Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, could engage it.

AWACS radar monitored another aircraft, northeast of the F-16s, flying south toward the no-fly zone, but this time as the F-16s flew to intercept the fighter, an Iraqi SAM radar site began tracking the Vipers. At this point, North ordered the third and fourth aircraft in his group, now with a full load of gas, to fly north at their best speed. Again, AWACS radar reported a radar contact entering the no-fly zone to the west of North’s formation at high speed at 30,000 feet.

The Bogey was flying directly towards them on an easterly heading.

Nordo called for a tactical offset to the north to “bracket” the F-16s between the MiG and the thirty-second parallel, creating a blocking maneuver and trapping the Iraqi fighter in forbidden airspace. The MiG could not escape back into Iraqi territory without a fight. “Someone was going to die within the next two minutes, and it wasn’t going to be me or my wingman,” North said.

North requested clearance to fire as he visually identified the aircraft—a MiG-25 Foxbat armed with AA-6 “Acrid” radar-guided missiles. He directed his wingman to employ his electronic jamming pod, and again, he requested clearance to fire. He finally heard “BANDIT-BANDIT-BANDIT, CLEARED TO KILL” over his headset. At approximately three nautical miles, at fifteen degrees nose high and fifteen degrees right bank, North locked up the MiG-25 and fired an AMRAAM, which guided to impact and destroyed the Russian-built Foxbat.

On Oct. 28, 1998, Col. Paul “PK” White interviewed North for an article he authored, “Nordos’ MiG Kill,” where North described the moment of missile impact: “I saw three separate detonations, the nose and left wing broke instantly, and the tail section continued into the main body of the jet, and finally one huge fireball.”

Noteworthy, this engagement not only marked the first aerial victory scored by an American F-16 but also the first kill for the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

The following video is the original footage of the engagement described in this article.

Photo by Senior Airman Darlene Seltmann and A1C Robert Trubia / U.S. Air Force; Dmitriy Pichugin via Wikimedia Commons

Artwork courtesy of AircraftProfilePrints.com

“Nothing can simulate the Fulcrum like a real Fulcrum. It was incredible to look across the BFM circle, see a real MiG-29 and hear the German pilot in his accent call `schlem’ [German term for sensor lock]. The ability to fight against his jet, the Archer and HMS was awesome.”

The following article, titled Agile Archer 2002: Training MiG Killers and written by Cdr. Nick Mongillo, appeared in the March-April 2003 issue of Naval Aviation News.

From Sep. 4 to Oct. 5, 2002, Exercise Agile Archer pitted Navy F/A-18 Hornets, F-14 Tomcats, and F-5 Tiger IIs against German Air Force (GAF) MiG-29 Fulcrums and U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagles in the skies over NAS Key West, Fla.

The culmination of two years of planning, Agile Archer was the first joint/combined exercise of its kind held in the United States. It was designed to enhance the basic fighter maneuvering (BFM) skills of American pilots.

Sixteen Navy squadrons and 92 Naval Aviators participated in the exercise, from the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC); type wing weapons schools; Strike Fighter Squadrons 27, 82, 86, 106, 122, 131, 136, 147, 195, and 197; Fighter Squadrons 11 and 101; and Composite Fighter Squadrons 12 and 13. During the month-long training detachment, the Navy executed over 200 dedicated one-versus-one sorties against Fulcrums from the JG 73rd Fighter Wing home-based in Laage, Germany, and Eagles from the Florida Air National Guard (FANG).

The Fulcrum represents the Russian counterpart of the modern Western fighter. It carries a capable pulse doppler radar, AA-10 Alamo radar air-to-air missiles, and the GSH-301 30mm cannon. In addition, the combination of the MiG-29’s AA-11 Archer heat-seeking missiles and helmet-mounted-sight (HMS) cueing system gives the fighter a high off-boresight, within-visual-range (WVR) weapon capability that at the time had no fielded equal in the West. The experience of the Fulcrum pilots—the majority of whom previously flew the F-4 Phantom and received pilot training in the United States—combined with the MiG-29’s technical capability equated to a most formidable air-to-air adversary.

For almost 10 years the JG-73 Fighter Wing flew as an aggressor squadron for NATO, training Western fighter squadrons in air combat against the Fulcrum. In addition to their aggressor role, all GAF MiG pilots had expert systems knowledge and briefed the exercise’s participants on the MiG’s combat systems, capabilities, and limitations.

The Navy’s goal for Agile Archer 2002 was to expose as many aircrew personnel as possible to the MiG-29. During a routine BFM training flight, Navy adversary pilots simulated the Fulcrum by flying specific flight profiles. However, no simulation, no matter how accurately flown, can replace the real thing. The Navy leadership wanted its aircrews to observe the MiG up close, indirect simulated combat, with a skilled Fulcrum pilot at the controls employing HMS and Archer.

A typical one-versus-one Fulcrum sortie consisted of one beyond-visual-range (BVR) intercept and two full-up BFM engagements. The BVR intercept allowed the Navy aircrew to practice visual identification against the MiG. During the intercept, the aircrew noted radar detection range, radar warning receiver indications from the MiG’s Slotback radar, positive identification capability, and the ability to defeat the MiG’s radar and heat-seeking missiles. The BFM engagements permitted the Navy aircrew to experiment with one-circle and two-circle game plans and provide insight into the MiG’s slow flight characteristics, visual signature, imposing HMS/Archer off-boresight capability, and impressive energy addition. All engagements with the MiG allowed the Navy aircrew to validate current tactical recommendations and the Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics (SFWT) training program. Detachment pilots unanimously agreed that Navy schools taught the appropriate tactics to counter the MiG-29’s capabilities and provide the foundation for success in combat.

Upon return from a MiG-29 dogfight, one Navy pilot commented on the value of the exercise: “Nothing can simulate the Fulcrum like a real Fulcrum. It was incredible to look across the BFM circle, see a real MiG-29, and hear the German pilot in his accent call `schlem’ [German term for sensor lock]. The ability to fight against his jet, the Archer, and HMS were awesome. This was the best training I ever received in the Navy.”

Navy aircrews also fought the Florida Air National Guard’s slick F-15s. The FANG comprised a wealth of experienced pilots, including combat veterans, Fighter Weapons School instructors and graduates, and several 3,000-hour Eagle drivers. A typical one-versus-one Eagle sortie consisted of two to three BFM hacks. Aircrews opted between perch and high-aspect sets, with most choosing the high-aspect option. Butterfly sets facilitated aircrew experimentation with a variety of game plans.

Navy detachment pilots cited impressive Eagle thrust-to-weight ratios and the ability to put knots on, fast! Eagle drivers liked the Hornet’s ability to square the corner and intimidate with the nose. The detachment pilots unanimously agreed that success in the WVR-BFM arena depended solely on the pilot’s ability, regardless of the modern fighter flown.

The unique exercise helped Navy aircrews hone their skills against a formidable adversary, making them more lethal and capable of defeating a MiG-29 in combat. The participants left with lessons learned to be passed to squadron mates, fleet replacement squadron members, SFWT students, Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program squadrons, and air wings conducting training on ranges at NAS Fallon, Nev.

Photo by Erik Hildebrandt / U.S. Navy

“The MiG pilot was trying to converge on an aircraft moving at 600 knots at 100 feet altitude. He just got too low. It was pitch black, with no moonlight or lights from any cities…,” Capt. Tim Bennett, F-15E pilot during Operation Desert Storm

Designed to replace the General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark, the F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seat, dual-role, totally integrated fighter for all-weather, air-to-air, and deep interdiction missions.

The F-15E saw action for the first time during Operation Desert Storm, the campaign that took place between Jan. 17, 1991, and Feb. 28, 1991, to free Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion.

It was during this conflict that U.S. Air Force (USAF) Capt. Tim Bennett served as a flight leader with the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron.

Since the first night of war, he has flown a total of fifty-eight combat missions in the F-15E.

As Bennett himself explained to Barry D. Smith in his article Tim Bennett’s War published in the January 1993 issue of Air Force Magazine, “We were based at Al Kharj AB in central Saudi Arabia. We lived in tents the whole time. On the first night of the war, when you were stepping out to your plane, you thought, ‘Holy –, here we go.’ You are obviously scared, but you know you have a job to do. Once you got into the airplane, you had so much to do that things just flowed along.”

After the take-off, Bennett’s Mudhen (as the Strike Eagle is dubbed by its aircrews) refueled from a tanker and crossed the border just after an F-117 attack. He and his Weapons System Officer (WSO), who in that mission was Capt. Dan “Chewie” Bakke, passed Baghdad and began to search for the Scuds sites placed near an airfield called H-2. “We wanted to hit all the fixed sites before they could launch against Israel. H-2 was looking real bad because they put up some fighters that night to try to get us. We had twelve planes going in there.”

About eighty miles out from H-2, they got some radar contacts from some MiG-29 Fulcrums and MiG-23 Floggers. The Iraqi aircraft knew where the F-15Es were and moved to intercept them. A Fulcrum radar spiked Bennett’s Strike Eagle: “We could see them coming down. They knew there was more than one of us, and we’re trying to find the end of the train to work up the rear of the formation. We got spiked and lost it, got spiked again, and lost it again. Everybody in our formation could keep pretty good track of them on radar and would lock a missile onto them as they approached.”

But to avoid revealing their positions, none of the American pilots wanted to shoot unless they had to.

Two Fulcrums and three Floggers were trailing the F-15Es, and one Fulcrum came down the left side of the formation. Bennett and Bakke could see the enemy fighter on their radar while it began to move across the formation, and Bennett could see his image also in the head-up display (HUD), which displayed the FLIR image from the navigation pod. The FLIR gave him a small window to see the sky and terrain in front of its aircraft as if it were daylight. The MiG-29 pilot didn’t know that Bennett Strike Eagle was there, but he was trying to roll in on the F-15E about six miles in front of him.

Then, according to Bennett, all of a sudden, it just hit the ground and exploded. “I could see the wreckage spread out along the ground.” The MiG-29 was trying to maneuver behind the F-15E in front of Bennett, and due to the disorientation of the law night flight, the Fulcrum flew into the ground: “The MiG pilot was trying to converge on an aircraft moving at 600 knots at 100 feet altitude. He just got too low. It was pitch black, with no moonlight or lights from any cities. We would not even have seen him if not for our FLIR systems.”

Another MiG-29 came from the right side of the formation and engaged one of the forefronts Strike Eagles. Its pilot, afraid that the Iraqi Fulcrum was trying to shoot missiles head-on at him at low altitude, fired a Sidewinder at it but the AIM-9 lost the Fulcrum.

“After the mission, we put all the HUD FLIR tapes together to figure out what happened next,” recalls Bennet. “We think this MiG-29 came around and got into a beam position on us and lost his radar lock, but we think his radar was in automatic acquisition mode and locked onto one of the Iraqi MiG-23 Floggers. The Floggers didn’t have the systems to get down low with us and were up about 2,000 feet trying to get an infrared lock from the heat of our exhaust. The MiG-29 then shot a missile and destroyed the Flogger.”

Photo by U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army

As the Su-22 climbed after dropping ordnance, Tremel would respond, firing an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile that missed the Fitter. Then Tremel fired another missile, this time an AIM-120 AMRAAM, which shot down the Su-22

As we have previously reported, on July 30, 2017, LCDR Michael “MOB” Tremel, the F/A-18E Super Hornet U.S. Naval Aviator from VFA-87 Golden Warriors, shot down a Syrian Sukhoi Su-22 on June 18 and revealed some details of how he scored his kill during a short interview released to Save The Royal Navy.

But now, in a video first uncovered by The Drive, Tremel, along with the other three pilots who participated in the mission, offer a blow-by-blow account during a special panel at the Tailhook 2017 Symposium, held from September 7-10.

Here you can find the video where Tremel and the other Naval Aviators involved in the sortie describe the first air-to-air kill scored by a U.S. Navy aircraft since Operation Desert Storm (ODS).

Nevertheless, a full description of the engagement is also provided by an article that appeared on Military.com.

The pilots and their aircraft were assigned to Carrier Air Wing 8 (CVW 8)— embarked on the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77). The carrier, which had been launching daily airstrikes from the Persian Gulf, had moved into the Mediterranean in early June, just days before the mission.

“Everyone’s kind of heading to the same place that day, to Raqqa. At that point in time, the [area of responsibility] was pretty hot in that general vicinity and a lot of guys were dropping bombs,” Tremel said.

The mission started out as just another close air support (CAS) sortie over Syria and there was even time en route for a cup of coffee: as Tremel said, both he and his wingman, VFA-87 training officer Lt. Cmdr. Jeff “Jo Jo” Krueger, enjoyed some java at 22,000 feet inbound to Raqqa.

“Again, we briefed CAS, and that was going to be our mission that day, so we felt like it would be in our wheelhouse, what we were doing,” Tremel explained. “But we also trained to all the air-to-air contingencies we might have and we talked about that.”

Once the aircraft arrived in the region coordinated with two other F/A-18 Hornet pilots, already above the area of operation. All four were communicating about events playing out on the ground far below.

“We’re hearing that the situation’s getting more heated on the ground with some of the friendly forces getting closer to some of the Syrian forces so, based on that, we get Jo Jo and MOB on the radio,” said Lt. Cmdr. William “Vieter” Vuillet, a pilot attached to VFA-37 Raging Bulls, another squadron embarked on the Bush.

As the pilots prepared to perform their CAS mission, someone spotted a Russian Flanker fighter aircraft circling overhead, which, according to the pilots, was not an unusual occurrence in the region.

Even though, as we have already reported, Tremel said that Russian pilots behaved with great professionalism during their previous encounters, he decided to follow the aircraft and monitor its actions as a cautionary measure since his Super Hornet previously experienced some minor technical issues.

“I’ll extend out in air-to-air master mode while these guys are in air-to-ground master mode to monitor the situation on the ground,” Tremel said. “That’s when I’ll pick up an unknown aircraft approaching from the south.”

Since observers, which included U.S. Air Force (USAF) assets in the region, were sending conflicting information about the identity of the aircraft, Tremel decided the best thing he could do was to get a visual ID on the aircraft and its activities, so he decided to descend and get a better look.

Eventually, a consensus emerged that it was a Syrian plane.

Meanwhile, Krueger worked to streamline radio communications, shedding secondary tasks and focusing on keeping information flowing as the situation unfolded.

After Tremel neared the Syrian aircraft, he said that he was ready to return to his primary job as soon as he could be sure it posed no danger to friendly forces.

“Our whole mission out there was to defeat ISIS, annihilate ISIS,” he said. “So as quickly as we can get back to that mission, that was our goal that day … At any point in time, if this had de-escalated, that would have been great. We would have gotten mission success and [gone] back to continue to drop bombs on ISIS.”

But that was not to happen; in fact, the Su-22 Fitter kept approaching friendly ground forces despite several radio warning calls from the Hornets that tried to persuade it to turn around.

At this point, as explained by Tremel, Krueger advised that the U.S. aircraft should execute “head-butts,” close overhead passes on the Syrian aircraft with warning flares.

They performed three such passes, but they did not affect the Syrian plane.

“After that third one, he [proceeded] to execute a dive and release ordnance in the proximity of friendly forces,” Tremel said.

According to Military.com, as the Su-22 climbed after dropping ordnance, Tremel would respond, firing an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile which missed the Fitter for reasons MOB didn’t explain.

“I lose the smoke trail and I have no idea what happened to the missile at that point in time,” he said.

Then Tremel fired another missile, this time an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which shot down the Su-22.

“The aircraft will pitch right and down and the pilot will jump out and left in his ejection seat,” he said.

To stay clear of the debris field, Tremel executed a quick turn to the left, allowing the ejection seat to pass to the right of his canopy.

The pilots described the events in understated terms but acknowledged adrenaline was high as they returned to operations.

Vieter, who descended to get a visual following the air-to-air engagement, said he and the pilot flying with him, Lt. Stephen “Scotty P” Galecki, could not resist getting on a secure communication channel to tell the tanker crew what happened when they went to refuel.

Vieter and Gasecki opted to continue with their mission, while Tremel and Krueger soon decided to return to the ship.

According to Krueger, it was “no small feat” for Tremel to take the initiative to arm his aircraft and fire ordnance at an armed aircraft for the first time in two-and-a-half decades.

“Looking at the wreckage down below us, It was a different feeling,” Krueger said. “… We had to make some decisions pretty quickly, and I thought that the training and commander’s guidance that we got at that point was a big deal.”

As Tremel explained upon return to the ship, the fanfare was underwhelming; the sentiment was mere that “the show goes on.”

He shook a few hands on the flight deck, then was ushered away, the ordnance remaining on his aircraft quickly reloaded onto other fighters that would launch within the hour.

“It’s extremely surreal to be sitting here in this environment,” Tremel said. “I couldn’t have done it without the guy sitting next to me, Jo Jo, and the other guys that were airborne. It was an absolute team effort, to include all the coordination that went on with the Air Force the entire time we were in the AOR.”

Noteworthy since the decisions by Tremel and other U.S. pilots to fire at the Syrian Su-22 Fitter and at two drones in June, there haven’t been similarly provocative actions by pro-Syrian forces.

U.S. officials say Syrians seem to have understood the message.

However Tremel’s account confirms what was already stated about the air war in Syria by Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Renken, the F-15E driver who shot down a “pro-Syria regime” Shahed 129 drone on Jun. 8 after the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacked U.S.-backed fighters in southern Syria.

For Renken in fact the Syrian conflict has evolved far beyond simply striking Islamic State targets on the ground.

“What this recent event has proven is that you can’t take for granted that you know what the fight is going to look like,” Renken said.

“You need to walk in ready for it to metastasize into any hybrid variation,” he pointed out.

Photo by Navy Lookout Twitter profile, Alan Wilson from Stilton, Peterborough, Cambs, the UK via Wikipedia, Radomil talk via Wikimedia Commons, Lt. Chris Pagenkopf, Specialist 2nd Class Sara B. Sexton  / U.S. Navy and  Staff Sgt. Andy M. Kin / U.S. Air Force

LCDR Tremel admitted that the shoot-down required two missiles

Save The Royal Navy had the opportunity to speak with LCDR Michael Tremel, the fighter pilot from VFA-87 who is credited with shooting down the Syrian Su-22 on Jun. 18, 2017, near Tabqah, 20 miles west of Raqqa, after the attack aircraft had dropped bombs near the U.S. backed forces, in the form of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

As we have already explained his Su-22 shotdown represented the first air-to-air kill scored by a U.S. Navy aircraft since Operation Desert Storm (ODS). During ODS two F/A-18C Hornets belonging to VFA-81 Sunliners downed two Iraqis Chengdu F-7As (the Chinese version of the MiG-21 Fishbed) on Jan. 17, 1991, and an F-14A Tomcat from VF-1 Wolfpack shot down an Iraqi Mi-8 helicopter on Feb. 6, 1991.

However, as reported by Save The Royal Navy, here’s Tremel description of the air engagement.

“The whole incident lasted about eight minutes… I did not directly communicate with the Syrian Jet but he was given several warnings by our supporting AWACS aircraft… So yes, we released ordnance, and yes it hit a target that was in the air, but it really just came back to defending those guys that were doing the hard job on the ground and taking that ground back from ISIS.” He continued “I didn’t see the pilot eject but my wingman observed his parachute. When you think about the shoot-down, in the grand scheme of things… we [our squadron] flew over 400 missions in support of friendly forces on the ground” he said. On encounters with Russian aircraft, he said: “They behaved with great professionalism at all times.”

Moreover, LCDR Tremel also admitted that the shootdown required two missiles, an AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile that was deceived by flares deployed from the SU-22 and then an AIM-120 AMRAAM, which destroyed the Fitter.

Finally, according to the Alert 5 weblog, the jet involved has been identified as the F/A-18E Super Hornet AJ-302 BuNo. 168912 (that you can see in the main picture of this article) and not the F/A-18E BuNo. 168914 as first reported. The air-to-air kill mark has been painted below the canopy.

Photo by Alan Wilson from Stilton, Peterborough, Cambs, the UK via Wikipedia and Navy Lookout Twitter profile

LCDR Tremel is in front of F/A-18E ‘AJ302’ BuNo. 168914, where he was flying when he downed the Fitter

The unique photo in this post shows LCDR Tremel, the U.S. Naval Aviator from the VFA-87 Golden Warriors, who shot down a Syrian Sukhoi Su-22 on June 18, 2017.

As you can see in the picture, Tremel is in front of the F/A-18E ‘AJ302’ BuNo. 168914 (whose model has apparently been changed from 304 to 302) that he was flying when he downed the Fitter near Tabqah, 20 miles west of Raqqa, after that, the attack aircraft had dropped bombs near the U.S.-backed forces in the form of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Super Hornet features the kill mark of the air-to-air victory under the cockpit canopy too.

The photo appeared on the Navy Lookout Twitter profile last night and was then reposted on Facebook by the world-famous modern military aviation author Tom Cooper.

As we have explained, immediately after the Syrian Su-22 dropped its bombs, two American F/A-18E Super Hornets, flying from the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, engaged, firing an AIM-9X Sidewinder—a short-range air-to-air missile—at the Syrian plane from about half a mile away.

But the Syrian jet deployed defensive flares, causing the Sidewinder to miss its target. At this point, LCDR Tremel fired a second missile, in the form of an AIM-120 AMRAAM, which hit its intended target, downing the Syrian warplane and forcing its pilot to eject.

Noteworthy, this Su-22 shotdown represented the first air-to-air kill scored by a U.S. Navy aircraft since Operation Desert Storm (ODS). During ODS, two F/A-18C Hornets belonging to VFA-81 Sunliners downed two Iraqis Chengdu F-7As (the Chinese version of the MiG-21 Fishbed) on Jan. 17, 1991, and an F-14A Tomcat from VF-1 Wolfpack shot down an Iraqi Mi-8 helicopter on Feb. 6, 1991.

The main image of this article does not cause any OPSEC violation since it was already available from the sources outlined above

Photo by Navy Lookout Twitter profile 

The two F/A-18E Super Hornet pilots “did everything they could to try to warn the Fitter away. They did a head-butt maneuver; they launched flares, but ultimately the Su-22 went into a dive, and it was observed dropping munitions and was subsequently shot down.” Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, Pentagon spokesman

The photo in this post shows a U.S. Navy F/A-18E BuNo. 168914 from the VFA-87 Golden Warriors that, as we have already reported, was involved in the shooting down of a Syrian Su-22 on June 18th, 2017.

Noteworthy CNN learned new details of that day’s air-to-air engagement.

According to Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, in fact, the two Super Hornets, which, as we have explained, were flying near the town of Ja’Din, just south of Tabqah, Syria, to provide air cover to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members, “saw the Su-22 approaching. It again had dirty wings; it was carrying ordnance. They did everything they could to try to warn it away. They did a head-butt maneuver; they launched flares, but ultimately the Su-22 went into a dive, and it was observed dropping munitions and was subsequently shot down.”

“Dirty wings” is a military term used to describe a plane carrying armaments. In “a head-butt maneuver, the planes fly just in advance of another to create a heavy wake and get its attention,” Davis explained.

As we have reported immediately after the Syrian Su-22 dropped its bombs, two American F/A-18E Super Hornets, flying from the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, engaged, firing an AIM-9 Sidewinder—a short-range air-to-air missile—at the Syrian plane from about half a mile away.

But as US officials told CNN, the Syrian jet deployed defensive flares, causing the US missile to miss its target. The U.S. pilot shot a second missile, in the form of an AIM 120 AMRAAM, which hit its intended target, downing the Syrian warplane and forcing its pilot to eject.

The officials added that the U.S. pilot saw the Syrian pilot ejecting and saw a parachute deploy, but the US believes the pilot would have landed in ISIS-controlled territory in Syria. The Syrian Armed Forces said in a statement that the pilot was missing.

However, the downing of a Syrian Fitter does not appear to have prevented Syria from attempting a similar bombing on June 20th, according to US military officials. A U.S. official told CNN that another Syrian Su-22 fighter approached what the military assessed as a possible bombing run on the U.S.-backed SDF near Tabqa, Syria, on June 20th.

The official said that coalition aircraft performed a show of force, and the Syrian attack aircraft then aborted its trajectory and left the area.

Moreover, since after the Su-22 shot down Russia said it would treat any U.S. jets in Syria as “air targets,” the Australian government announced that it would “temporarily” halt its airstrikes in Syria.

However, the chief of staff of the Air Force, Gen. David Goldfein, told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday that the de-confliction line “remains open.”

“There’s actually a line we have with the Russians that’s a de-confliction line, and that line remains open and we remain in conversation with them,” Goldfein pointed out.

“So our hope of course is that we return to a little bit sense of normalcy and we continue to keep the dialogue open,” he concluded.

Photo by Alan Wilson from Stilton, Peterborough, Cambs, UK (Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornet ‘168914 / AJ-304’), via Wikimedia Commons