MiGKillers

“We can go faster than any blue force is ever trained, up into almost Mach 2.0 to show them what it’s like if the enemy were to do that, which is one of their tactics”

Uttered proudly in unison after a briefing before an air-to-air fight, “Have at you!” inspired by the 1975 film “Monty Python and the Holy Grail” signifies being the enemy squadron who will defend its battlefield, regardless of the cost.

Pilots from the 18th Aggressor Squadron (AGRS) take on the role of “Red Air” during large-scale exercises and train “Blue Air” pilots during Red Flag-Alaska (RF-A). Using a red star overlaid by a target on the sleeves of their green flight suits and red flags with a hammer and sickle, they’re marked throughout the mission as experts in enemy tactics.

“Our call in life is to know, teach, and replicate the enemy and be the best bad guys in the business so joint and coalition forces can learn to survive,” said Lt. Col. Julio Rodriguez, 18th AGRS commander. “Our job is to know the enemy, how they fight, and how they think, bringing that into the air, teaching blue forces to stay alive and win the fight.”

During RF-A and other exercises around the U.S. Pacific Air Forces area of operations, these seasoned pilots use their expertise to train thousands of U.S. Air Force (USAF) joint and coalition partners each year.

“From the youngest lieutenant, the captain, the flight lead, or the mission planner coming into the combat air forces, we want them to know that even though they are highly trained, they still have to look out for the unknown—we provide that unknown,” he said.

The training the Aggressors provide during RF-A integrates various forces into joint, coalition and multilateral units, training from simulated forward operating bases.

An ‘outside’ perspective

“Planning how to deconflict the threat means less work in the air to get the job done.” said RSAF Lt. Cedric Goh, a 425th Fighter Squadron F-16 Viper pilot who participated in RF-A 16-2, said. “When things happen differently than what was planned, we work as a team to adjust and bring the dynamic scenario back in our favor.”

Goh emphasized the unique training opportunities placed him in a near-real combat situation and that learning to fight in and out while staying alive and covering his wingman was the number one goal.

When he sees the 18th AGRS logo, Goh said he thinks of one thing, “That red star means threat; time to bring the fight to them and kill that enemy.”

According to Goh, participation in RF-A and working with the 18th AGRS signifies a continued commitment to peace, stability, and alignment within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Valuable training space

RF-A keeps fighters in the air through 10 simulated combat sorties flying within the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) which includes one conventional bombing range and two tactical bombing ranges containing 510 different types of targets and 45 threat simulators in more than 67,000 square mile airspace; training space roughly the size of Missouri.

“That large space forces pilots to figure out the logistical problem of working in such a large scale similar to an entire theater of operations,” Rodriguez said. “The multiple uses the JPARC provides is imperative to the success of our training.”

Speed, altitude, and terrain are some of the unfamiliar characteristics pilots may not encounter while training in other airspace.

“We can go faster here than any blue force is ever trained, up into almost Mach 2.0 to show them what it’s like if the enemy were to do that, which is one of their tactics,” Rodriguez added.

The ‘Best of the Best’

Aggressors come from multiple fighter pilot roles in the U.S. Air Force and have had the experience of sitting in the Blue Air ejection seat. The average Aggressor pilot has at least 1,000 fighter hours “behind the stick” and hundreds of hours of study to culminate that experience into becoming one thing…

“You have to be bad; being an Aggressor is a different mindset,” he said. “You have to leave the blue we have flown for years. You have to be an Aggressor first and an F-16 pilot second. We have to be professional with our knowledge and honest with our capabilities,” Rodriguez said. “There is a large amount of studying mixed with knowledge from intelligence professionals from across the United States, who provide us with the data on enemy engineering and tactics. We as the operators have to formulate that into what the enemy does and work that into realistic training.”

The most challenging part of living the Aggressor life is the high demand for their capabilities. Rather than Blue Air using internal assets to train, they call on the Aggressors from Eielson and Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, to travel around the world to support exercises other than their home flags.

They divide their limited assets into the most valuable training, like RF-A, without burning out the personnel who fly and maintain the jets.

“Our goal is to dominate the skies,” said Rodriguez. “Statistics prove that if you can survive those first 10 sorties, you will most likely [survive] in the long term. If you can do that in a training environment, it is much more beneficial. Yes, they might ‘die’ in the exercise, but we would rather have them die in a simulation where we can debrief later rather than explode into chunks of metal. After a Red Flag, these pilots have those 10 sorties under their belt and they are no doubt the ones who will be able to go out and accomplish a mission.”

However, along with the tempo, there is a reward that comes with constant hard work.

“I love being part of the advisory air with the big red star on the back of my helmet, flying a sortie, and being able to walk up to the Blue Air after and tell them, ‘You did a great job today. You survived. You knew the threat, understood the threat, and accomplished the mission,’” said Rodriguez. “That success, being the best support possible, and seeing the outcome, is my reward. If you know the enemy and know yourself, you are going to win.”

Photo by Airman 1st Class Kyle Johnson, Staff Sgt. Shawn Nickel and Airman 1st Class Cassandra Whitman / U.S. Air Force

F-15 Eagle pilot Col. Rick N. downed a SU-7/17, making him the only wing commander to record an aerial victory in Operation Desert Storm

On May 25, 2021, former F-15 Eagle pilot Col. Rick N. Parsons passed away in Colorado Springs, Colorado, at his home with his wife of 54 years, Nancy Parsons, by his side, The Gazette reports.

Parsons was born on March 7, 1944, in Lyndonville, New York.

He graduated from Lyndonville High School in 1962 and from the US Air Force Academy (USAFA) in 1966. On September 3, 1967, he married his high school sweetheart, Nancy Custer, in Lyndonville, New York.

After leaving the Air Force Academy, Parsons dedicated 26 years to defending the United States. His service in defending our nation included two tours in Vietnam and one tour in Saudi Arabia, flying over 5,000 hours in the T-38, F-4, F-15, and F-16.

Parsons commanded the 32nd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) Wolfhounds at Soesterberg Air Base (AB) and the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB). On Feb. 7, 1991, Parsons downed a SU-7/17, making him the only wing commander to record an aerial victory in Operation Desert Storm.

After retiring as a Colonel from his decorated career in the Air Force, Parsons began a second career as a Certified Financial Advisor in Monument, Colorado.

In celebration of his life’s hard work, after fully retiring, Parsons and his wife built a beautiful home in Guffy, Colorado, which they enjoyed for 13 years before returning to Colorado Springs. He enjoyed spending time with his ’66 USAFA classmates, playing softball and pickleball, and watching the Rockies, whether they won or lost.

However, he spent most of his weekends with his grandchildren—always an enthusiastic spectator, whether in person or online for sports or theater productions.

Nickel in the Grass.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

The nose art graphic is roughly 6 feet by 4 feet, featured on both sides of the F-15, and appears to display the American flag. But a closer look reveals the hundreds of names of members in the 104th Fighter Wing

After about six months of designing and planning, the 104th Fighter Wing’s flagship F-15C Eagle received new nose art graphics.

According to Alert 5, this Eagle, F-15C #85-125, scored a kill against an Iraqi MiG-29 Fulcrum on Jan. 17, 1991, using an AIM-7 Sparrow missile.

As told by Staff Sgt. Hanna Smith, 104th Fighter Wing, in the article, the 104th Fighter Wing Flagship F-15 receives symbolic graphics, the nose art graphic is roughly 6 feet by 4 feet, featured on both sides of the F-15, and appears to display the American flag. But a closer look reveals the hundreds of names of members of the 104th Fighter Wing.

Master Sgt. Leo Burbee, 104th Maintenance Group aircraft structural maintenance supervisor, was part of the team behind the jet’s nose art decals.

“The original inspiration behind the decals was the importance and tradition of having Airmen’s names featured on a jet,” said Burbee. “Typically, the only names on a jet are those of the pilot and dedicated crew chief. So by putting all the members’ names from the wing within the decals on the flagship jet, it really demonstrates how we are all here on the same team, for the same reason.”

The team also included a special component in the design process. They paid tribute to the wing’s history by including the names of the wing’s fallen.

“In addition to all of the names of all the current 104th Fighter Wing members, we also added all of the names that are a part of the base’s F-100 memorial,” said Burbee. “The memorial commemorates all of those who lost their lives while serving the 104th Fighter Wing. We incorporated all of those names into the graphic in a special golden color so they would always be represented as part of the unit.”

After the concept was nailed down, Burbee worked with Lt. Col. Peter Carr, 104MXG commander; Tech. Sgt. Derek Jendrysik, 104MXG aircraft structural maintenance technician; and Tech. Sgt. Ryann Parker, a 104MXG maintenance command support staff member, created the actual design for the decals.

“After I got the American Flag design idea from Master Sgt. Burbee, I worked with Tech. Sgt. Parker from our command support staff section to compile a list of the names of everyone at the 104th Fighter Wing,” said Jendrysik. “The most difficult part of the whole design process was trying to plan around the aircraft’s systems including antennas and lights and then figuring out the largest size font we could use in the remaining space.”

Once the final designs were produced, Burbee and Jendrysik worked alongside Tech. Sgt. Michael Poudrier, 104MXG dedicated crew chief for tail number 125, and Airman 1st Class Thomas Desrochers, 104MXG aircraft structural maintenance technician, for several hours to apply the decals to the jet.

Col. Tom ‘Sling’ Bladen, 104FW commander, was impressed with how the Airmen created and executed the decal project.

“I am proud of and astounded by all of the Airmen involved in this project,” said Bladen. “It was a huge team effort, and the group’s ability to take an idea and then turn it into this beautiful, symbolic representation of our wing on the flagship jet, while dealing with all of the complexities of working around the aircraft’s systems, is really eye-watering.”

For Burbee, being able to have a hand in this experience was rewarding.

“It’s really neat to be able to have a hand in designing and creating something like these decals that are going to have an impact on the members of the 104th FW for years to come,” said Burbee. “What I find even more impactful is the idea that someone who doesn’t get the opportunity to go out on the flight line gets to take their family out during an air show and be able to show them their name on the jet. The idea of that for me is the real reward.”

Photo by Staff Sgt. Hanna Smith / U.S. Air National Guard

The F-15C Eagle 85-0104 was flown by the 67th Fighter Squadron to commemorate this milestone

Taken on July 1, 2020, at Kadena Air Base, Japan, the cool photos in this post feature an F-15C with special paint to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Alliance between the United States and Japan, the cornerstone of stability and security in the region.

The F-15C Eagle 85-0104 was flown by the 67th Fighter Squadron to commemorate this milestone.

The paint scheme was designed by the 18th Equipment Maintenance Squadron and civilian corrosion control team and pays homage to the F-100 that the 67th FS flew over 60 years ago, but was adjusted to fit the F-15’s structure.

Noteworthy, as noted by Alert 5.com, F-15C 85-0104 is one of the MiG-killing Eagles assigned to the two squadrons at Kadena: 85-0104, in fact, shot down a MiG-23 during Operation Desert Storm.

According to Jake Melampy’s book Bases of the World, Volume I: Kadena Air Base, as of 2014, no fewer than eight MiG-killing F-15Cs were assigned to the two Eagle squadrons at Kadena, consisting of F-15Cs 80-0012 (Mi-8 helo), 84-0025 (MiG-23 x 2), 85-0104 (MiG-23), 85-0105 (Mirage F.1 x 2), 85-0107 (MiG-29), 85-0114 (MiG-27 & MiG-23), 85-0119 (MiG-23), and 85-0124 (Su-22).

Each of these aircraft was then decorated with a green star in honor of its accomplishment.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

The three 493rd FS “Grim Reaper” pilots that shot down the Fulcrums were Lt Col Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez, Capt Mike “Dozer” Shower, and Capt Jeff “Claw” Hwang.

Taken after the end of Operation Noble Anvil (the name given to the US portion of Operation Allied Force, OAF), the interesting photos in this post show F-15Cs from the 493rd FS/48th FW, based at RAF Lakenheath, England, featuring ‘weird’ kill markings for the MiG Kills scored during the conflict.

As we have explained in an extensive piece (click here to read the article), the 493rd FS claimed four Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Air Force (FRYAF) MiG-29s were destroyed during the brief campaign.

The three “Grim Reapers” that shot down the Fulcrums were Lt Col Cesar “Rico” Rodriguez (who scored the first kill on Mar. 24, 1999, in F-15C 86-0169), Capt Mike “Dozer” Shower (who scored the second kill on Mar. 24 in F-15C 86-0159), and Capt Jeff “Claw” Hwang (who scored the final two kills on Mar. 26 in F-15C 86-0156). ‘Boomer’ McMurry, who was Hwang’s wingman during the engagement, fired an AIM-120 at one of the two MiG-29s Hwang was engaging, but it was later determined that McMurry’s AIMRAAM had failed to hit its target. Hwang’s near-simultaneous multi-bogey AIM-120 engagement, in fact, had brought down both Fulcrums.

As you can see by looking at the photos in this post, the weird kill markings appeared on both F-15C 86-0169 and F-15C 84-014.

84-014 was Rico’s assigned jet. However, he was flying 86-0169 when he scored the kill as Rico himself confirmed to #AW#: ‘0169, or as I called her, the LOVE MACHINE was the jet I flew on night one and scored the first kill of OAF.’ 

But what about the weird kill markings?

‘Rico’s assigned jet carried a kill flag… Representing no known country… For a while, after the Serbs packed it in,’ Scott Brown, who made the decals of the OAF F-15C MiG Killers and runs Bullseye Model Aviation and Wall Pilot Facebook pages, explained to #AW#. ‘This represents “Boomer” McMurry’s denied kill. Both he and Hwang shot at the same aircraft. McMurry was initially awarded the kill, so 014’s crew chief applied what he thought was a Serb flag. Remember, at the time, Google wasn’t really a thing, so it was hard to just look up what a Serb flag looked like. Eventually, it was determined that Hwang killed both MiGs and McMurry’s Slammer went through the debris and fire where the Fulcrum used to be…’

Brown concludes:

‘The crew names were removed after [F-117] Vega 31 was shot down, but on the night of the MiG kills, Rodriguez’s name was on it. The Iraqi flag represents John Doneski’s kill off a Fitter with the 53rd TFS during Desert Storm. Rico chose it as his assigned jet because the tail number was close to his double kill jet from Desert Storm 85-0114.’

During OAF, NATO faced a Yugoslav air force that included 16 MiG-29 and 80 MiG-21 fighters, plus 28 J-22 and 70 G-4M attack airplanes. Serbian air defenses included more than 800 man-portable SA-7, SA14, and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles and 130 other low-altitude anti-aircraft missiles. Other larger and longer-range missiles included four SA-2s, 16 SA-3s, and more than 80 SA-6s.

Besides the four MiG-29 kills scored by USAF F-15Cs, another Fulcrum was shot down by a Dutch F-16 pilot (who actually scored the third MiG kill of the war) on March 24. NATO had shot down five of the best Yugoslavian fighters in the first three days of the conflict, with no friendly aircraft losses.

Photo by Scott Brown, Unknown and U.S. Air Force

Combat aircraft aren’t some kind of medieval knights in a jousting tournament. They’re not even ‘Spitfires vs Bf.109s’ anymore. On the contrary, modern aerial warfare is one of the most complex disciplines in the history of humankind.

Again and again, I’m getting the same question, usually in the style of ‘who would win a 1-v-1, F-16, or MiG-29‘?

Please, people, get it into your heads, finally: that’s not how modern warfare works. Combat aircraft aren’t some kind of medieval knights in a jousting tournament. They’re not even ‘Spitfires vs Bf.109s’ anymore. On the contrary, modern aerial warfare is one of the most complex disciplines in the history of humankind.

Nowadays, nobody—repeat for emphasis: nobody—is as stupid as to operate single-combat aircraft entirely on their own. Even smaller air forces are going to support their F-16s or MiG-29s with at least ground-based early warning/surveillance radars, COMINT/SIGINT (i.e. ELINT) assets, probably also with the help of electronic support measures (ESM, like electronic countermeasures: ECM). Combat aircraft—and their pilots—are much too expensive, much too vulnerable, much too much a matter of national prestige—but to get blown up just because somebody there was too lazy, incompetent, or simply incapable of providing them the support they need to ‘work’ (i.e. function as designed and intended).

Moreover, the essence of modern aerial warfare is something called ‘situational awareness (SA). SA consists of finding out where is the enemy, what are enemy’s intentions and capabilities, and then killing that enemy—and denying all the same to the enemy. The situation in regards to the SA is such that in every air war since around 1968, one side usually has it and the other does not. The side in possession of the SA (or at least ‘superior SA’) wins, something like 1934% of the time. The side without the SA is losing, every time.

Thus, when you ask me, ‘who would win a 1-v-1, F-16, or MiG-29’, the first thing that comes to my mind is to ask you back such stuff as, What kind of support platforms are around? …and only then: what version of F-16? What version of MiG-29? What armament? In what position, vis-à-vis each other, are they? What’s the local terrain and weather…? …and that’s just the start.

Check what happened the last week over NW Syria.

– Turkish F-16C Block 40/50s, supported by E-7 AWACS and a host of advanced ground-based radars, Koral ECM-systems, armed with AIM-120C-7s, etc…

– Syrian MiG-29SEs, supported by obsolete ground-based radars, minimum ECM systems (if any), and armed with R-77.

The outcome? 2 Syrian Su-24MK2s, 1 L-39, and perhaps also a Mi-25 splashed, all by AIM-120-C-7 shots taken with the help of E-7s, launched from within the Turkish airspace. The Syrians never got as far as to at least get any of their MiG-29s near the combat zone, and they’re unlikely to risk doing anything of that kind: You can bet your annual income; they know why.

Check out Helion & Company’s website for books featuring interesting stories written by Tom Cooper.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

‘At about two miles, I looked once again, but I was no longer thinking about taking a pre-merge shot. Instead, I planned to merge with the bogey just 50 feet off of its left wing. As I crossed its wing line, I saw that the jet was in fact a brown/green-camouflaged Iraqi MiG-29,’ said Capt. Cesar ‘Rico’ Rodriguez, a former F-15 driver.

The interesting video in this post tells the story of one of the most exciting engagements of the entire Operation Desert Storm.

On Jan. 19, 1991, Capt. Cesar ‘Rico’ Rodriguez and his wingman, Capt. Craig ‘Mole’ Underhill, both F-15C Eagle pilots with the 58th TFS/33rd TFW, were conducting a fighter sweep ahead of a strike force of F-16s and F/A-18s when they were vectored by an AWACS controller towards a single pop-up threat.

As explained by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat, within minutes Rodriguez had been locked up on the radar by the approaching MiG-29, forcing him to turn away from the enemy jet in order to spoil its targeting solution. Underhill supported his flight lead by firing an AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar-homing air-to-air missile (and not a heat-seeking missile as claimed in the video), which guided squarely into the Iraqi jet.

Turning back towards the burning MiG after the AWACS controller had spotted a second pop-up threat, Rodriguez detected this second contact of the mission:

‘We received another call from the western AWACS, at which point we executed an in-place check turn to the north. I looked up and saw a smoke trail — not a missile trail, but engine smoke — and “Mole” and I simultaneously locked him up. We started going through our ID matrix, and the target displayed a friendly electronic return to both of us. I now directed a VID pass, looking out at about four miles and spotting a silhouette that looked a lot like an F-15 or a F/A-18, so I didn’t declare it hostile. At about two miles I looked once again, but I was no longer thinking about taking a pre-merge shot. Instead, I planned to merge with the bogey just 50 ft off of its left wing. As I crossed its wing line, I saw that the jet was in fact a brown/green-camouflaged Iraqi MiG-29.’

In the scrap that ensued, Rodriguez successfully positioned himself behind the ‘Fulcrum’, chasing the jet down to the desert floor, where the MiG impacted the ground and cartwheeled for several miles.

F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

Flown by LCDR Mark “MRT” Fox and LT Nick “Mongo” Mongillo on Jan. 17, 1991, each of these F/A-18C Hornets shot down an Iraqi MiG-21 Fishbed.

On Monday, June 17, 2019, the National Naval Aviation Museum welcomed two new aircraft into the collection. As we have previously explained, both were involved in a historic mission over Iraq during Operation Desert Storm (ODS).

Flown by LCDR Mark “MRT” Fox and LT Nick “Mongo” Mongillo on Jan. 17, 1991, each of these F/A-18C Hornets shot down an Iraqi MiG-21 Fishbed. “With the retirement of the legacy Hornets from Naval Aviation squadrons after decades of service, these historic aircraft were at the top of our wish list for acquisition,” said museum director CAPT SterlingnGilliam, USN (Ret.).

“They represent links to an important chapter in Naval Aviation history,” he added.

Actually, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 34 hosted a sundown ceremony and fly-over for the F/A-18C Legacy Hornet aircraft at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana in Virginia Beach, Va., on Feb. 1, 2019.

“Born more than 40 years ago, then Horne entered operational service for the U.S. Navy in 1984, and for the next 35 years, she proudly served the nation from the flight deck of aircraft carriers on all the seas across the globe,” said Cmdr. William Mathis, commanding officer of VFA-34.

The Blue Blasters of VFA-34 were the last squadron in the Navy flying the Hornet, most recently joining USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to conduct Freedom of Navigation patrols in the South China Sea in 2018.

The F/A-18C Hornet is being replaced by the F/A-18E Super Hornet, which is capable of executing the same missions as the Hornet but with significant advancements in mission systems that will dramatically enhance its effectiveness.

Photo by U.S. Navy

The 493rd FS would claim four Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Air Force MiG-29s destroyed during the brief campaign

Operation Allied Force (OAF) followed repeated NATO warnings in 1998 to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to remove his armed forces from Kosovo. Fifteen F-15Cs from the 493rd FS/48th FW, based at RAF Lakenheath, England, deployed to Aviano AB, Italy, in order to provide CAP support and OCA duties. NATO adopted a five-phase plan — initially, its military flights would act as a deterrent, only becoming more aggressive if NATO demands were not met.

Despite diplomatic gains made at the Rambouillet talks in France, additional NATO strike assets were still arriving in the theatre as late as February 1999, and newly arrived F-117 stealth fighters displaced Lakenheath’s Eagles from Aviano to Cervia AB. They were simultaneously reinforced to a total strength of 18 aircraft, as jets were sent directly to Italy from a seven-week Operation Northern Watch deployment in Turkey.

Operation Noble Anvil — the name given to the US portion of OAF— kicked off on the night of Mar. 24, 1999. As told by Steve Davies in his book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat, the 493rd FS would claim four Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Air Force (FRYAF) MiG-29s destroyed during the brief campaign.

The first MiG-29 kill that night fell to Lt Col Cesar Rodriguez, a double MiG-killing veteran of Desert Storm. Rodriguez (in F-15C 86-0169) claimed his third kill while flying OCA over the war-torn city of Pristina. He was No 3 in a four-ship F-15 OCA force — ‘Knife’ flight, mission 4125F — assigned to protect NATO’s first strike package of the war. The fighter bombers were targeting Montenegro airfield, ‘and were also going to take out the radars that were linking the adjoining Kosovo/Montenegro airspace. We were to open up a lane of attack to make the province of Kosovo accessible without contention’, recalled Rodriguez.

‘Knife’ flight would lead everyone into battle — even the stealthy B-2s were scheduled to follow behind it. The mission commander was the F-16 lead pilot, Lt Col Dave Goldfein, while ‘Knife’ would be led by Robert ‘Cricket’ Renner (the 493rd FS’s FWS graduate and weapons officer), with `K-Bob’ as No 2, Rodriguez No 3, and ‘Wild Bill’ Denim, recently winged Eagle ‘baby’, as No 4.

As the C-models took off at sunset, Rodriguez noted the eerie juxtaposition between the dark abyss — and war — to the east, and the sun setting to the West, bathing Italy in beautiful warm light as the nightlife started up and people ventured into restaurants and bars for meals and drinks.

Having taken on fuel and positioned some 40 to 50 miles ahead of the main strike force, Rodriguez remembered:

`We flew south along the Italian ADIZ (AirnDefence Identification Zone), all the way down to “the boot” at the southern tip of Italy. Then we turned east, coming up along the eastern edge of the Adriatic. We pushed it up and began cur climb to 35,000 ft, with the strike package behind us.’

Approaching the target area, Rodriguez’snflight began to observe a contact that quickly landed before they could engage it.

`That aeroplane executed an instrument approach into Montenegro airfield, and the pilot witnessed first-hand the destruction of the airfield. He may even have experienced a bomb or two himself, as he probably did not make it to his hardened facility.

`As we continued to head north, “WildnBill” and I were the easternmost element, and we were looking at the airspace between Belgrade and Kosovo. “Cricket” and “K-Bob” were looking at Montenegro. I detected a target flying out of Kosovo airfield which initially headed north and stayed at a low altitude for some 15 miles. It then popped up on a southwesterly vector, putting him on a direct intercept with the strikers heading towards Montenegro. As he turned to the southwest and climbed from a couple of hundred feet, we began our initial intercept and started working with NATO AWACS for validation of its identity. We also commenced our own EID matrix.’

The MiG had been detected and locked up at 1909 hrs, flying at 6000 ft, some 40 degrees and 62 miles off of Rodriguez’snnose. AWACS was unable to identify it as hostile at this stage, and two minutes later it beamed to a heading of 300 degrees, causing Rodriguez’s radar to drop the lock. At the same instant, Renner (`Knife’ 11) transmitted that he had an intermittent radar failure.

At 1912:25 hrs Rodriguez reacquired the target and gave ‘Knife 11’ a ‘Bulls Eye’ range/bearing reading, recommending that he focus his radar in that direction. At 1912:36 hrs he asked AWACS to declare his target but received a ‘bogey’ reply, indicating that AWACS was not yet sure. Less than a second later, ‘Knife 14’ transmitted that NCTRnindications in his cockpit indicated that the target was a MiG-29.

Still waiting to engage, and now down to 30nmiles separation from the target, Rodriguez ‘jettisoned the wing tanks so that we could go a little bit faster, climbed to about 33,000 ft, and accelerated tonMach 1.4’. At 1913:25 hrs he fired ‘a single AIM-120 against the single contact. The missile came off the rail, shot out in front of me, and then selected a lead pursuit curve commensurate to a positive intercept. We executed an F-pole (at 1913:27 hrs) to the southeast so that we avoided going into the Kosovo SAM belts, and tracked the missile towards closure.

`Still, 15 to 16 miles away, I came back to pure pursuit to assess the missile’s status, and everything was going well, so I stayed on the course (and waited for the timer to count down to zero). The MiG was obviously still full of gas because as the counter hit zero (at 1914:06nhrs), there was a phenomenal explosion. If you had put several football fields together and lit them up all at the same time then that’s what it looked like. The intercept happened over the western mountains of Kosovo, and they were still covered with snow — the reflection of the explosion off of the snow had the guys on the strikes well south of Montenegro wondering what the hell we had hit.’

At 2200 hrs local time on Mar. 24, 1999, the 493rd FS’s Capt Mike Shower became the second ‘Grim Reaper’ to score a kill when he fired an AIM-120 AMRAAM at a MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ as it lifted off from its airfield at Batajnica. The shower initially fired two AMRAAMs without success, but the third, fired at a closer range (six miles), found its target.

The final two kills for the 493rd came courtesy of Capt Jeff Hwang (in F-15C 86-0156) on Mar. 1999. Hwang was tasked as the Bosnia-Herzegovina DCA flight lead on Mar. 26 and was to provide cover for a vulnerability time of 1500 to 1900 hrs. He and his wingman were eastbound, approaching the Bosnia/Yugoslavia border, having established their orbit over Tuzla following initial refueling, when he picked up a radar contact 37 miles to the east at 6000 ft, beaming south at over 600 knots. The time was 1602 hrs.

Hwang called out the contact and ‘Boomer’ McMurray, his wingman, confirmed that he saw the same on his radar. Unable to immediately EID the contact, and with AWACS unable to see it, Hwang elected not to cross the border, but to enter a right-hand turn to run parallel with it on a southwest heading. He simultaneously called, ‘Push it up! Burner! Tapes on!’, to accelerate the flight from its leisurely 0.85 Mach at 28,000 ft to just below the Mach.

He continued his run for 60 seconds (ten nautical miles) before directing the formation to turn back ‘hot’, coming through south to the east in an attempt to get some cut-off on the contact. ‘Boomer’ McMurray was on the north (left) side of the formation, and both he and Hwang picked up the contacts at 070 degrees, 37 miles away. Flying at 23,000 ft, the jets were now heading west, straight at them.

Hwang was convinced that the contact was a FRYAF fighter because of its location, and the fact that there were no NATO OCAnmissions over the border at that time. He checked for friendly IFF signals but received no reply, so he called AWACS and asked for permission to engage. AWACS failed to respond, although it had just begun to detect the westbound contacts on its own radar. Accordingly, the ‘Dirk’ flight continued with its own EID matrixes the contact closed to within 30 miles. The F-15 pilots classified the target as a MiG-29.

As he secured the EID, Hwang called on ‘Boomer’nMcMurray to maintain the lock while he went back to search mode and began to sanitize the area around the contact for any trailers. The target check turned to the northwest and descended to the ‘high teens’, so ‘Dirk’ flight checked 30 degrees left to the northeast to maintain the cut-off. Having been momentarily placed behind McMurray in the left turn, Hwang repositioned himself in line abreast and then called for the jettisoning of the flight’s wing tanks.

Now well above the Mach, Hwang positioned his radar elevation coverage to look from 5000 ft up to 21,000 ft in an effort to make one last sweep for trailers or other unseen contacts. AWACS simultaneously started calling out two contacts in a lead-trail formation — sure enough, he could see on his scope that his radar was just beginning to break out a second fighter in very close formation with the first. With the distance close to some 20 miles, and the contacts at 18,000 ft, McMurray called, ‘Fox 3’ as he unleashed an AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Hwang locked up the leader at about 17nnautical miles, immediately thumbed forward to his High Data TWS (HDTWS) mode, and then shot his own AIM-120 inside of 16 miles. He then stepped his acquisition cursors to the trailing ‘Fulcrum’ and held the pickle button down to command a second AIM-120 on its way. Hwang was about to score the F-15’s first-ever multi-bogey, double MiG kill.

Assuming that McMurray had locked the leader, Hwang kept the trailer as his primary designated target. He stayed in HDTWS as the slant range closed to less than ten miles. Both targets started check-turn to the southwest, and continued to descend into the ‘low teens’. ‘Dirknflight’ checked their RWRs to make sure that they were not being targeted, and then pointed their noses at the MiGs, assuming a pure pursuit curve. They rolled inverted from 30,000 ft and pointed their noses low and directly at the box in their HUDs.

Pulling the throttles to idle, Hwang saw a tiny dot in the TD box about seven to eight miles out against a broken cloud background. He called, ‘Dirk 1, Tally-Ho, Nose, seven miles, low!’ Realizing it was the trailer, he waited for McMurray to call that he had the leader in sight. Approaching five miles, and with no call from McMurray, he scanned without success in front of the trailer for the leader.

The trailer continued its left turn to the southwest, and Hwang thumbed aft to AIM-9 and tried twice to uncage a missile, only to discover that there was no missile tone. At that instant, between hisnHUD and canopy bow, he saw the leader explode spectacularly at his `one o’clock’ position. Turning his attention back to the trailer, it too exploded into a streaking ball of flame seconds later.

Hwang called for McMurray to assume an an080-degree heading and run his short-range radar. He thumbed aft to Auto Gunsnand plugged in full afterburner to accelerate to 460 knots and climb back to 20,000 ft. ‘Dirk 2′ then called, `Blind!’, but ‘Dirk 1’ quickly located him visually three miles north (left) and stacked high. Waiting a few moments to check one last time for more hostile fighters to the east, Hwang and McMurray turned to the west and departed the area.

Hwang had flown a well-executed intercept according to basic USAF doctrine — maneuver for displacement, check EID, shoot, F-pole, and displace again, or go pure pursuit if the target falls within ten miles, enter BFM if required. His decision to follow his AIM-120s to the target instead of F-poling was influenced by two factors. Firstly, he was winning the fight — at least he was not being fired upon — and secondly, he had closed to within ten miles of his foe, which was the F-15’s unwritten range after which it should no longer turn and run.

It was later determined that McMurray’s AIM-120 had failed to hit its target. Hwang’s near-simultaneous multi-bogey AIM-120 engagement had brought down both ‘Fulcrums’.

F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by Courtesy photo by Ioannis Lekkas/Released, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army

“This is the first time to my knowledge that an airplane scored a kill while carrying four 2,000-lb bombs, then continued to hit its target,” Lieutenant Commander Mark Fox, VFA-81 F/A-18 Hornet Pilot

On Jan. 17, 1991, Lieutenant Commander Mark Fox and Lieutenant Nick Mongillo launched with five other VFA-81 F/A-18 Hornets as part of a CVW-17 strike. Lieutenant Commander Fox was an airborne spare and was not scheduled to cross the beach. However, three of the scheduled strikers aborted for various reasons, and Lieutenant Commander Fox joined the three remaining aircraft as they headed inland.

CVW-17 on USS Saratoga (CV-60) flew the strike together with aircraft from CVW-3 on USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67). It was the first daylight strike of the Gulf War. The previous night had seen an intense first-strike effort by hundreds of allied aircraft against Iraqi facilities, especially around Baghdad and the major airfields in western Iraq codenamed H-2 and H-3.

Although the enemy defenses had everyone’s attention—there had been heavy concentrations of AAA and SAMs, and few Iraqi interceptors had taken off—the planners had scheduled an ongoing series of around-the-clock strikes. Planes had been lost during the first strikes, all to flak and SAMs. The MiGs and Mirages had been in the air, but none had been flown aggressively. The threat was there, however, and not to be taken lightly.

The four Sunliner F/A-18Cs each carried four Mk 84 2,000-lb bombs, a hefty load for a single-seat aircraft. They approached their target, an H-3 airfield in western Iraq, in a ‘wall’, line abreast. The other two Hornet pilots were Commander Bill McKee, VFA-81’s Executive Officer, and Lieutenant Commander ‘Chuck’ Osborne.

High overhead, the ever-present AWACS and an E-2C from Saratoga’s VAW-125 monitored the strike. Although they were under visual ID (VID) Rules of Engagement, the Hornet pilots knew the E-2 could make a difference. The Hawkeye used various geographic reference points for its calls.

As he ran in on his target, Lieutenant Commander Fox was confident of himself, his aircraft, and the rest of his flight, as he explains in the book Gulf Air War Debrief.

“I didn’t leave thinking I wasn’t going to come back later. During the few hours before we entered Iraqi airspace, I thought about a lot of practical things. I made sure everything was set up, switches were in the right position, and I kept the other three planes in sight. There wasn’t time to think about anything but the mission.”

As they ran in from the south, the radio was alive with calls from other portions of the strike group. Kennedy’s package had run into a few MiG-29s that had tailed the strikers as they exited the target area after delivering their ordnance. The ‘Fulcrums’ stalked the CVW-3 planes as two F-15Cs from the USAF’s 33rd TFW, based at Eglin AFB, Florida, dropped from their CAP station. The F-14 escort watched as the F-15s streaked past and fired missiles at the MiGs. Two MiG-29s failed to return to their base.

When Lieutenant Commander Fox and his flight were about 30 miles from their target, their systems set up for the bomb delivery they would soon make, the E-2 called a bandit alert as MiGs seemed to head for the VFA-81 Hornets soon after the Kennedy group had left the area. The Hornets flew on.

Then, Lieutenant John Joyce, the E-2’s Air Control Officer (ACO)—one of the three Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) in the back of an E-2—made another call, this time with a real sense of urgency.

“Hornets, bandits on your nose, 15 miles!”

That was it. Lieutenant Commander Fox and Lieutenant Mongillo each thumbed the knurled knob on the control stick that selected the missiles and changed their systems to air-to-air mode. Their hands tightened on the stick-mounted trigger that fired their missiles.

As the flight flew on, Fox in F/A-18C AA 401 (BuNo 163508) and Mongillo in AA 410 (BuNo 163502) looked for the oncoming MiGs. Fox got a lock-on at 10 miles—two MiG-21s in a left echelon, a standard Soviet formation. Commander McKee and Lieutenant Commander Osborne had also locked up the lead MiG.

“It all happened very quickly. I switched back to air-to-air and got a lock on one of them. I had the MiG on the right, while the second Hornet in our formation, Lieutenant Mongillo, took the MiG on the left. The other two Hornets had also acquired radar locks.

“The MiGs approached us, nose on, supersonic at Mach 1.2. Our relative rate of closure Was more than 1,200 kt. They weren’t maneuvering.

“I shot a Sidewinder first. It was a smokeless missile and I thought, at first, that I had wasted it because I couldn’t see it tracking toward the MiG. I fired a Sparrow. The Sidewinder hit, though, followed by the Sparrow. The first missile actually did the job, and the Sparrow flew into the fireball. The whole event, from the E-2’s call to missile impact, took less than 40 seconds.”

Lieutenant Mongillo fired a single Sparrownwhich took out the second MiG-21.

“The Iraqi pilot knew what he was getting into when he climbed into that jet and took off after us.”

Following their two kills, the two new shooters rejoined their flight and continued with their bomb delivery. Throughout their engagement with the MiGs, they had kept their bombs, all 8,000 lb of them. As the four F/A-18s came off-target and headed south, they could see the two columns of black smoke rising up from the desert where the two MiGs had crashed—in the same relative formation as when they were shot down.

Talking about the strike-fighter concept that the F/A-18 represents, Fox has a definite opinion. “This is the first time to my knowledge that an airplane scored a kill while carrying four 2,000-lb bombs, then continued on to hit its target. If the MiGs had gotten behind us, we would have had no choice but to honor their threat. You can’t do that with 8,000 lb of bombs. We would have had to jettison ordnance to face them and would have served their purpose in stopping our strike. They failed; we succeeded.” These two kills were the only confirmed air-to-air Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft.

Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force