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The incredible photos in this post show an F-14 Tomcat (actually the F-14D BuNo. 164341) flying without canopy

Advancements during the Cold War in Soviet long range patrol and bomber aircraft dictated a requirement for a fleet defense fighter that could engage high-altitude bombers from well beyond visual range. The iconic F-14 Tomcat was Grumman’s answer. Equipped with long range AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, F-14s could engage multiple hostiles over 90 miles away. Needing an interceptor’s high speed while carrying this heavy ordnance, Grumman produced the highly effective variable sweep wing of the F-14, enabling it to operate at a wide range of airspeeds.

Following Grumman’s tradition of naming its aircraft after cats, the new “Tomcat” made its first flight in December 1970. After a number of changes following flight testing, the first F-14As were delivered to the US Navy in June 1972, with Fighter Squadron (VF) 124 designated to provide crew training. On the West Coast, VF-1 and VF-2 were the first operational squadrons to receive the new aircraft, while on the East Coast VF-14 and VF-32 became the first Atlantic fleet Tomcat squadrons.

The F-14 saw its first combat in August 1981, downing two Libyan Su-22 fighters over the Gulf of Sidra. It saw considerable duty in the Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan. The last F-14 retired from active service in 2006.

Here’s something you don’t see everyday: the incredible photos in this post in fact show an F-14 Tomcat (actually the F-14D BuNo. 164341) flying without canopy.

The incredible photos in this post in fact show an F-14 Tomcat (actually the F-14D BuNo. 164341) flying without canopy.

The U.S. Naval Aviator driving this Tomcat was then Lt. Geoff Vickers from Fighter Squadron 213 (VF-213) Black Lions and the story of how he was able to successfully land in this “unusual configuration” is quite interesting.

In 2002 Vickers and its squadron were detached to Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada, for strike training when he was tasked with giving the battle-group-air-warfare commander an orientation flight in the F-14D. As skipper of the cruiser in charge of the battle group’s air defenses he had the chance to experience several E-2C and EA-6B flights, and he remarked the fact that the Prowler guys hadn’t been able to make him sick.

As explained by Vickers himself to VFP62.com, his task for that flight was “to demonstrate the Tomcat’s performance and tactical capabilities. Though this flight was my first without a qualified radar-intercept officer (RIO) in the back seat, I had flown with a number of aviators who had very little Tomcat experience.”

The battle-group-air-warfare commander arrived at the squadron a half-hour before the brief to receive his cockpit-orientation lecture and ejection-seat checkout. Once in the ready room, Vickers and his wingman briefed the flight.

Vickers recalls: “I told the Captain that after the G-awareness maneuver, we would do a quick inverted check to verify cockpit security. Looking back, I should have recognized his anxiety when he mocked me and said, ‘Just a quick inverted check?’ then laughed. I didn’t realize hanging upside down with nothing but glass and 11,000 feet of air separating you from the desert floor might not be the most comfortable situation in the world for a surface-warfare officer.”

Vickers told the battle-group-air-warfare commander that during the flight they should have done an F-14D performance demo, followed by a couple of intercepts and by an air-to-air refueling from an S-3 Viking. “I was determined to avoid the temptation to intentionally make him sick and uncomfortable” says Vickers.

After the take off, Vickers checked the airspeed and since it confirmed he was above the 300 knots recommended to do the check, he rolled the aircraft inverted. “I decided not to really put on a lot of negative G and unloaded to about .3 to .5 negative G’s-just enough to make anything float that wasn’t stowed properly. If he was uncomfortable in such a benign maneuver, it would be better to find out then, rather than when we were racing toward the earth during a radar-missile defense.” As Vickers started to push on the stick, he heard a loud pop, followed by a roar. The cockpit filled with smoke, and they suddenly lost cabin pressure. “I first thought a catastrophic environmental-control system (ECS) had failed. I said to myself, ‘This is new. I’ve never even heard of something like this happening.’ Time compression turned the next few seconds into an eternity. I knew the first thing I had to do was to roll the jet upright and assess the situation. About three seconds after the first indication of a problem, I had the jet upright and knew exactly what had happened. I transmitted, ‘Lion 52. Emergency, my RIO just ejected.’ “

While Vickers was thinking he would have to make all the calls in the blind since he thought that all the noise of flying at 320 knots without the canopy would have never allowed the communications, he heard Desert Control contacting him: “Understand your wingman ejected?” “Negative, my RIO ejected. I’m still flying the plane.” “OK. Understand your RIO ejected. You’re flying the plane, and you’re OK?” Vickers replied he was ok but he didn’t tell he was flying a convertible F-14. “I was relieved to see a good parachute below me, and I passed this info to Desert Control. Very quickly after the emergency call, an F/A-18 pilot from the Naval Strike and Air-Warfare Center, who also was in the area, announced he would take over as the on-scene commander of the search-and-rescue (SAR) effort.” Vickers told his wingman to pass the location of the battle-group-air-warfare commander because “I could not change any of my displays. Once my wingman started to pass the location, I started dumping gas and put the needle on the nose back to NAS Fallon. One of our air-wing SH-60s was in the area and responded, along with the station’s UH-1N. The Captain was recovered almost immediately and transported to the local hospital for treatment and evaluation.”

After having raised his seat to have a better outside view during the landing, Vickers slowed the speed and decided to return to base “I did consider the controllability check, and I directed my wingman to check for damage to the vertical stabilizers-he found none. The faster I got on deck, the faster I would get warm. I slowed to approach speed in 10-knot increments at about 3,000 feet AGL (Above Ground Level) and had no problems handling the jet. As I approached the field, I was surprised at how quiet it got. The noise was only slightly louder than the normal ECS roar in the Tomcat. I’ll admit I felt silly saying the landing checklist over the ICS (the Intercom system, which allowed the F-14 pilot and RIO to communicate via the microphones built in to their oxygen masks and headphone speakers in their helmets) when no one else was in the cockpit, but I didn’t want to risk breaking my standard habit patterns.”

The landing was uneventful, and Vickers was surprised to find how many people had come out to see the spectacle. “The magnitude of the situation finally set in when my skipper gave me a hug after I got out of the jet.”

Vickers and the battle-group-air-warfare commander were very lucky since all of the ejection and aviation-life-support-systems (ALSS) equipment functioned well: actually the battle-group-air-warfare commander reported only two minor injuries to his face. But when Vickers talked to him he understood that even if he had briefed every single detail of the mission, he didn’t consider Captain’s fully perspective. “He said he didn’t know where to put his hands. Consequently, he just left them in loosely clenched fists on his lap, about two inches away from the ejection handle. It never occurred to me that someone would not know what to do with his hands. Obviously, I fly with the stick and throttle in my hands 95 percent of the flight, but I failed to consider his situation. The mishap board surmised that, during the inverted maneuver, he must have flinched when he slightly rose out of the seat and pulled the ejection handle. Now, before any brief, I try to place myself in the other person’s shoes (even if they are black shoes) and imagine what the flight will be like for him.”

Photo by Home of M.A.T.S. and U.S. Navy

‘I have actually done a fly by of the tower at over 400 knots…and I have photos to prove it,’ Dave “Bio” Baranek, former F-14 Tomcat RIO

Dave “Bio” Baranek was born and raised in Jacksonville, Florida, where he grew up drawing airplane pictures and putting together scale model airplane kits. In his early teens he set his sights on becoming a jet fighter pilot or radar intercept officer. He attended Georgia Tech and participated in the ROTC to qualify for officer training, then entered the Navy in 1979. Shortly after he joined his first squadron he received the callsign “Bio,” which many of his former squadronmates still call him.

He enjoyed a successful and satisfying 20-year career in the Navy, starting with assignments to F-14 Tomcat squadrons and the elite Topgun training program, and later assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US 7th Fleet. At one point, he commanded an F-14 Tomcat fighter squadron, responsible for nearly 300 people and 14 aircraft worth about $700 million. He completed his career with 2,499.7 F-14 Tomcat flight hours and 688 carrier landings. His logbook also records 461.8 flight hours in the F-5F Tiger II. While serving as a Topgun air-to-air combat instructor in 1985, he had the unusual experience of flying aerial sequences used in the film “Top Gun,” starring Tom Cruise and produced by Jerry Bruckheimer and Don Simpson. He also served as a dialogue advisor on the project, and took some of the few available photographs of the movie’s black F-5 fighters in flight.

He retired from the Navy in 1999.

His three books, Topgun Days, Before Topgun Days and Tomcat RIO, tell many flying stories from his career, as well as presenting dozens of his photos.

#AW# asked its readers to submit questions about the F-14, the AIM-54 Phoenix and about how a Tomcat RIO could help his pilot during a dogfight. We chose the most interesting questions and we submitted them to Bio.

Here you find the first part of the Q&A with Bio.

This post instead features the final 14 answers.

1. Were there pilots you did not like to fly with? If so why and how do you handle them having your life in their hands?

Answering this could make me look picky, but since you asked…over my 2,500 F-14 hours there were a few pilots that I didn’t like flying with so much. Before I go any further, I’m sure there were a few pilots who didn’t like flying with me as much as other RIOs. I really enjoyed flying with the vast majority of pilots I flew with over the years, so this wasn’t a big problem anyway. And remember, we were flying to perform a mission, and that’s what we did, even if it wasn’t one of my “best buddies” that I was flying with.

As for putting my life in their hands, I didn’t fly with any pilot I considered incapable or dangerous, so that wasn’t an issue. Pilots and RIOs were continuously evaluated on their abilities, both informally and through formal tests and qualifications. The people who operated Tomcats ranged from very capable to truly amazing, so I really didn’t worry about putting my life in my pilot’s hands.

2. What is it like being a pilot/RIO in real life compared to simulators (especially the DCS Tomcat)?

Oh man, this is a good question. I’ll start with the little things, such as sitting on a hard ejection seat. The F-14 seat had a cushion and cooling air, but was still pretty uncomfortable after more than an hour (or less!). But that is the price you pay for sitting on an ejection seat in a fantastic jet fighter, so we didn’t complain. What kind of seat do you sit on for DCS? Probably pretty comfortable. Do you wear a torso harness and strap yourself in? Working while wearing the gear and strapped in would be cumbersome until you get used to it.

Then let’s talk about g forces. You feel g’s any time you turn; some people think it is when you go fast, but you don’t feel significant g’s if you fly in a straight line. If you’re not used to them, they can be very uncomfortable, and of course can make you black out. But once you’re used to them, as with the harness and strapped in, they are a part of the job and you deal with them basically subconsciously.

I agree that the visuals in DCS are phenomenal! Props to the developers who put in so much work to make it look realistic. But watching on a screen or even VR goggles just doesn’t compare to looking out of that huge canopy and seeing the world below you, or the clouds around you.

Now imagine that view after an oh-dark-thirty launch, when the world outside that huge canopy is pitch black, until the brilliant orange sunrise lights up the world and it means you’re going to get a day trap! Actually flying real aircraft is an immersive experience and you live it, day in and day out. The consequences of a mistake can be extreme. DCS is a task of choice and you can turn it on or off.

The squadron environment is also part of the experience that DCS just can’t provide. It was a varsity course in group dynamics. On the other hand, I don’t think DCS gives you paperwork!

3. When do you know you’ve reached the peak of the plane’s ability while flying?

There were several ways to know this in the F-14, at least when I flew it. Here’s a cool “seat of the pants” example: a dynamic cue called the edge of buffet, the aircraft shook as if it were going over a rough road. In very simple terms, this was when airflow was doing all it could do to make the aircraft maneuver, so if the pilot felt the edge of buffet he was getting the maximum turn. If he did not feel it, he wasn’t getting the maximum turn – but there could be a reason for that such as trying to increase speed. And if he pulled harder on the stick he could stall or depart the jet. (During straight and level flight or mild maneuvers, the F-14 was a smooth ride.)

Another way to know you’ve reached peak performance was to match the numbers developed by engineering calculations and test flying. This would be something like setting a particular climb angle at a certain airspeed, to know you were getting the best climb performance.

Yet another way to know would be to set control stick positions, such as pushing forward on the stick to achieve 0.5 to 0 g if you were trying to accelerate. This was called unloading and it reduced the induced drag normally generated by a wing, so you could accelerate faster.

4. Did RIOs have to wear glasses and/or contacts if they didn’t have 20/20 uncorrected vision?

Yes. Every RIO I knew wanted to have good vision, 20/20 or better, to perform at their best. They would wear glasses or contacts so they had this when flying. RIOs would compete with pilots for first tally-ho, so we wanted the best possible vision.

Some people don’t realize this, but Navy rules allowed a pilot to continue as a pilot if his vision deteriorated slightly after his initial training. As a result, some pilots wore glasses whenever they flew or when they were making a carrier approach, to see the ball better. Pilots usually called their glasses “cheaters.”

5. Did they ever launch a Phoenix in combat? If so, what happened?

I believe the US Navy has launched three Phoenix in combat situations, all during Operation Southern Watch.

• January 1999: Two F-14Ds from VF-213 each launched an AIM-54C at Iraqi MiG-25s; the rocket motors failed and the missiles fell to earth.
• September 1999: An F-14D from VF-2 launched one AIM-54C at an Iraqi MiG-23; the MiG turned away and the missile did not reach the target, which could be considered a mission kill.

Some sources have different details on these engagements.

I’ve said before that it is one of the disappointments of my life that American Tomcats have no combat Phoenix kills (even though I was not involved in any near-launch situations in operational flying). I’ve read with interest the stories of Iranian F-14 combat engagements and Phoenix kills.

The Phoenix was an impressive missile, and launching one was complex and exciting, even in a training environment. The first chapter in my book Tomcat RIO describes my missile exercise, shooting an AIM-54 at a jamming target.

6. Did you ever eject or fly with somebody that did?

Several people in training squadrons and in my first fleet squadron (VF-24) had ejected during their flying careers, and I found their stories fascinating: the idea of leaving a familiar and safe environment. (Yes, I considered the cockpit of a fighter a safe environment.)

Then on 19 December 1981 I myself had to eject during a carrier landing mishap. It was a split-second decision with absolutely no indication of approaching trouble. The reason was that one arresting cable was not set to the correct weight to stop an F-14, and that’s the one we caught. It slowed us down and then broke. When it broke we were going around 50 knots, which was too fast to stop on the flight deck and too slow to fly. My pilot evaluated the situation a bit faster than me and said, “Eject! Eject!” over the ICS, and I pulled the lower handle.

Our seats fired in the brief period when the jet was falling from the flight deck to the ocean surface, 60 feet below. My rocket ride was quite an experience, and then I had to deal with getting entangled in my parachute! But at least it was daytime and the water was warm, as we were near the middle of the Indian Ocean. I have to give credit to the maintenance technicians who maintained my ejection seat and survival equipment as well as the skilled helo crew from HS-8.

Here’s the video of our ejection.

7. As a RIO, how much of a role did you have from start up to shut down? Did the pilot and RIO perform preflight duties together or was everything done based on individual responsibilities? Was the workload more or less than the pilot? Did you have a chance to “enjoy” the flights?

I’m glad this question was submitted because it allows me to make a point about crew responsibilities. The Navy held F-14 pilots and RIOs to very similar levels of responsibility for the complete evolution: planning, preflight and start, flight, debrief. They took the exact same tests for safety and operational qualifications.

To cover some essentials: In the F-14 the pilot had the flight controls and was the aircraft commander. The RIO was the lead for navigation and communication. The mission commander could be a pilot or RIO, and this could apply to a single aircraft or multiple.

Within one aircraft, pilot and RIO responsibilities were integrated. The pilot literally signed for the aircraft (in the logbook), but pilot and RIO preflighted the entire aircraft, working separately and in opposite directions. In the F-14, the RIO had to participate in the start-up sequence to get the computers to do certain things for the plane to be fully operational, and the RIO had the IFF transponder controls.

While strapped in and flying, the RIO was expected to initiate checklists and ensure appropriate answers by the pilot. The RIO was to do everything possible to ensure effective and safe aircraft operation: visual lookout, switch positions, talking and listening to the radios, and so much more. They also had to coordinate closely for most of the flight.

I would say that during certain phases of flight the pilot’s workload was higher, and other phases the RIO’s would be higher. As for enjoying flights, on many flights there were definitely times when your brain could relax and you could enjoy the view, while on busier flights you had to enjoy it after landing!

8. What would you think it was like dogfighting with an Su-35 or Su-37 when you know it could do the Cobra and you will overshoot him reversing your role from hunter to hunted?

This is a classic situation for being aware of your opponent’s capabilities so you can avoid them. I would say if you’re in an F-14 fighting against an aircraft that can perform a cobra maneuver, you should avoid a high-overtake situation where he can do it. Also, maintain your energy, so if he does cobra, you can climb away. An aircraft that performs a cobra has his nose up briefly, but then has to lower it to regain some energy. This also makes him fairly predictable for a period of time.

The F-14 also had good ability to pitch up and generate high overtake, although I don’t think it was quite as dramatic as a cobra. After the pitch up maneuver, however, the F-14 would be slow and relatively vulnerable until it regained airspeed.

9. Is it difficult to learn the sign language used between pilot and deck crew ?

Not really, as most signs have a basis in familiar things. Electrical power, for example, was two fingers of one hand stuck into the palm of the other, like an electrical plug into an outlet. They are also the same signals used for land-based ops, so we practiced them all the time.

10. Did you have the chance to fly the Tomcat in the air-to-ground role?

Yes, I flew air-to-ground during my final squadron tour, 1996-98 with VF-211. All of my training and experience for the first ten years of my flying career was air-to-air, so it was new to me. I received training in the RAG when I went through for a refresher, but fortunately I found that VF-211 had an excellent training program and was full of conscientious aviators. That meant we had good flight briefs, disciplined execution, and thorough debriefs. We also used LANTIRN when we deployed, and I would say it was easy to become proficient with the controls and displays. LANTIRN made the F-14 a very effective precision bomber.

Mentioning the training program in VF-211, I have to acknowledge the Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics (SFWT) program implemented throughout Navy F-14 and F/A-18 squadrons. It raised the level of training and flight execution throughout the fleet.

11. Were there ever mock engagements with F-15 Eagles? And if so, who won more?

There were mock engagements, which we called by the general term ACM (air combat maneuvering). I really don’t know who won more, I don’t think anyone kept those kinds of records, especially over the long run.

There is a lot of “trash talk” about this, but I’ll give you some straight answers. The F-15 is a very capable aircraft and the USAF pilots I faced were well-trained. In a 1v1 the F-14 pilot would have to fly his jet very well … or break some rules such as lower the flaps. (There are videos and comments online by pilots who broke those rules, I’m not going to discuss them further.) In a multi-aircraft engagement the Eagle’s relative strengths were reduced. When I fought F-15s, which was not often enough, we did our best in the multi-aircraft environment. Out of my entire career I have a video of ONE engagement: a 2v2 against F-15s. Here’s a screen shot from about one minute after the merge, when my pilot got into position to launch an AIM-9 at an F-15. You can tell we’re in good position with Sidewinder (SW) selected. The image flickered a lot so the trigger-down cue has already gone.

12. In your expert opinion, do you think that the Iranian claims of over 100 kills by the F-14 during the Iran-Iraq War are true?

This is a sensitive topic due to the deep political divide between the United States and Iran, so I will only give a short answer. I do think Iranian Tomcat pilots and RIOs had good success with the F-14 in combat. The Tomcat is a versatile and capable aircraft, and their crews were initially trained by US Navy instructors.

13. What does it feel like when you do a 4G inverted dive along a MiG-28 somewhere over the Indian Ocean?

That’s classified. I could tell you, but then I’d have to kill you.

14. What’s it like to do a fly by of the tower at over 400 knots?

I have actually done a fly by of the tower at over 400 knots…and I have photos to prove it.

Navy aircraft regularly performed fly bys of the carrier when we were operating at sea, as a way to let the hard-working squadron members see their work in action: flying. Different ships and squadrons had different rules, but when the rules were announced they were usually followed or the crew risked being grounded.

Flying at low altitude, over land or water, is exciting because the sense of speed is greater. But doing a fly by is a good chance to remember some basics, such as planning and control. Plenty of aviators have been killed doing unplanned fly bys or “pushing it” too much. It didn’t always take a great deal of planning, but thinking ahead and deciding what you were going to do would help you complete the fly by and look good doing it.

Note: Once again, Bio would like to thank Jon “Hooter” Schreiber and Dave “Hey Joe” Parsons for their assistance

Photo by Dave “Bio” Baranek and digital image by Dorian Dogaru

While approaching for the second landing attempt, the Iraqi MiG-23 ran out of fuel, stalled and crashed only 200 metres short of the runway, killing its unlucky pilot

The primary point of disagreement between Iraq and the US, and its allies, during the 1990s was the UN Security Council’s resolutions under which Baghdad was obliged to permit inspections of its nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare facilities by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors. Initially, Iraq accepted UNSCOM inspections, and these dismantled all of its NBC installations and weaponry. However, when the US and allies insisted on additional inspections, Baghdad refused permit these. Therefore, on Dec. 16, 1998, the US and Great Britain launched Operation Desert Fox, aiming to further `degrade’ Iraq’s ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.

As explained by Tom Cooper in his book In the Claws of the Tomcat: US Navy F-14 Tomcats in Air Combat against Iran and Iraq, 1987-2000, in addition to USAF aircraft operating from bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Oman, Operation Desert Fox involved the aircraft of CVW-3, now deployed aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65). Another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson (CVN-71), with aircraft of CVW-11 embarked, arrived a day after the fighting began. Eventually, 650 sorties against 275 targets were flown, of which 211 were hit by guided bombs: the Pentagon reported the destruction of 9 command facilities and damage to a further 11, 32 SAM sites, 13 industrial facilities and 18 factories.

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox, Baghdad announced that it would no longer respect both the Northern and Southern No Fly Zones (NFZs) and resumed its efforts to shoot down a Coalition aircraft. Correspondingly, the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) began deploying its SAM sites and the IrAF interceptors within both zones. This resulted in a series of short but sharp skirmishes. For example, on Dec. 1998, Iraqis deployed three SAM sites near Mosul and opened fire at a formation of USAF F-15Es: the Americans hit back with LGBs and reported the destruction of all of the Iraqi launchers. Three days later, the IrAF deployed a single SA-6 SAM site all the way to Ali Ibn Abu Talib AB, south of Nassiriyah, and nearly shot down a Tornado GR.Mk 1 of the RAF. This time the USAF reacted by deploying a sizeable formation of F-16s — escorted by Navy EA-6Bs — to destroy the site with LGBs.

Enraged, on Jan. 3, 1999 Saddam increased the pressure by ordering several MiG-23s, MiG-25s, and Mirages into the southern NFZ. Because the jets in question operated only whenever there were no E-2Cs or E-3Cs around, the Americans and allies failed to intercept them. It thus took the setting of a carefully prepared ‘trap’ for the Iraqis to enter the engagement envelope of US interceptors.

Early on the morning of Jan. 5, 1999, two AIM-54C-armed F-14Ds of VF-213 were sent over southern Iraq, together with a division of AIM-120 armed F/A-18Cs. The Tomcats were crewed by LCDR Vince `Bluto’ Sparito and LCDR Bob ‘Jumby’ Castleton (in BuNo 163903, Modex NH107) and LT Jonathan ‘Shoe’ Shoemaker and LT Mike `BuFi’ Bilzor (BuNo 159619, Modex NH106). The Iraqi interceptors had been active over the southern NFZ since dawn, and one of their formations had been engaged by a flight of F-15Cs of the USAF: the latter fired one AIM-7M Sparrow and three AIM-120 Slammers from long range, but all missiles missed. About 15 minutes later, another Iraqi formation appeared: two MiG-23MLs led by Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan al-Hashemawi from No. 93 Squadron scrambled from Suwaira airfield, both equipped with Remora ECM-pods. As soon as the Tomcats turned into them, the ground control advised both Iraqis to turn around head back to their base, attempting to entice their enemy to follow into an ambush. The AWACS detected all three Iraqi jets and cleared the Tomcat and Hornet pilots to fire. When the F-14s engaged, the Iraqis scrambled a MiG-25 that accelerated to Mach 1.5. The Tomcats, meanwhile underway at Mach 1.2, an altitude of 12,192m (40,000ft), and about 130km (70nm) in front and north-west of the Hornets, turned into the new threat and engaged: the lead F-14D fired one AIM-54C, followed by the wingman, who fired the second. However, because of being incorrectly armed before the two jets were launched from the deck of the USS Carl Vinson, both Phoenix missiles plunged to the ground, without ever activating their engines. The Foxbat kept coming for a while longer, but the Tomcat crews were advised not to go for a merge: instead, they disengaged towards the south.

In the meantime, two F/A-18s from VFA-22 and VFA-97 were vectored north in an attempt to cut off the two MiG-23MLs that were dashing away at supersonic speed in the direction of Baghdad. Although approaching to about 130km from their opponents, the Navy pilots concluded they could not run them down: both thus disengaged towards the south.

By this time, both MiG-23MLs were critically short on fuel and Hashemawi thus led them into an emergency landing at Rashid AB, which had not been an active air base since the mid-1980s. The leader landed safely, but his wingman, Major Fallah Mandi al-Azzawi overshot on his first attempt and was forced to fly a circle: while approaching for his second landing attempt, his aircraft ran out of fuel, stalled and crashed only 200 metres short of the runway, killing the unlucky pilot. Although never claimed as an official kill by the USN, the commander of the CVW-11, CAPT James T Knight, drew a logical conclusion: ‘Screw him — a kill is a kill.’

In the Claws of the Tomcat: US Navy F-14 Tomcats in Air Combat against Iran and Iraq, 1987-2000 is published by Helion & Company and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and Tom Cooper

Taken during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the following amazing photograph of a GBU-12 heading for its target was taken by a TARPS-equipped VF-32 F-14B Tomcat

Taken during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the following amazing photograph of a GBU-12 heading for its target was taken by a TARPS-equipped VF-32 F-14B Tomcat.

The aircraft’s RIO was Lt Cdr David Dorn, who recalled in Tony Holmes’ book US Navy F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom;

‘We were flying the TARPS jet when we were fragged to hit an SA-2 site with an LGB. Skipper Hitchcock was flying the jet which lased the target for our weapon. We got some great TARPS footage of the LGB coming off of our jet and leading down to impact the missile site. I got to replicate this mission several days later, when we again hit a target with an LGB while flying the TARPS jet. The jet could only carry LGBs when equipped with the TARPS as the JDAM was just too big. And when carrying the TARPS pod we could not employ the LTS, so we had to rely on our wingman to buddy lase for us.’

VF-32 flew very few TARPS missions in OIF, as squadron CO Cdr Marcus Hitchcock explained;

‘Although we were not tasked with flying TARPS missions in the early stages of the campaign, I made sure that our dedicated reconnaissance crews flew a couple of sorties in order to remain current with the system, and to allow VF-32 to offer this service to CVW-3 should it be required. We were eventually tasked to fly several missions later the war. My squadron operated the conventional and CD TARPS, and they effectively complemented each other. Because we were so pressed with servicing ground targets, we decided to load the TARPS jets with bombs too so that they could fly a dual mission.’

For many years, the F-14’s most important contribution to Operation Southern Watch (OSW) was as a photographic-reconnaissance platform thanks to its bolt-on TARPS (Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Pod System) pod. Secured to rear right Phoenix missile station five, the pod originally boasted two wet film (subsequently replaced by Digital Imaging) cameras and a single infra-red line scanner for low-light/night reconnaissance (removed pre-OIF). Although weighing in at 1760 lbs, the pod imposed few performance penalties on the F-14 other than restricting the carriage of missiles/bombs on the aft tunnel stations. TARPS jets were also LANTIRN Targeting System (LTS) prohibited because both systems shared common wiring and control panel locations in the Tomcat.

TARPS remained in use with the fleet until late 2004, and in its final years of service there were three main types of pod in use. They were the legacy ‘wet’ film pod, TARPS DI (digital imaging) pod, which used digital cameras that allowed the shots to be viewed in the cockpit and sent back to the carrier or other Link-16 capable aircraft over encrypted UHF, and TARPS CD (completely digital), fitted with digital cameras that auto-sent the imagery when within range of a receiving station.

OIF veteran It Cdr Mike Peterson explained how VF-2 selected the F-14 to be used in this role in 2002-03;

‘Not every aircraft in the squadron was TARPS capable, as the jet needed to have had its environmental control system (ECS) modified to allow it to pressurise the pod in flight. Our maintenance personnel were having to work flat out to keep at least six of our ten F-14s airworthy at any one time on cruise, leaving them with little time to perform the ECS mod on all of our jets. We tried not to switch the pods around too much, adhering to the principle “if it ain’t broke don’t mess with it”. We usually had a dedicated TARPS jet and two others identified as “good” TARPS aircraft. If we had to load a pod from scratch, and could secure a deck elevator run to get it from the TARPS shop up to the flightdeck (often the limiting factor), it would take us 1-2 hours -depending on jet location and availability – to fit it to the aircraft.’

US Navy F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Navy