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The ongoing maintenance backlog in the East Coast’s aircraft carrier fleet leaves the Navy with no ready aircraft carrier available to sub in for USS Harry S. Truman, if needed.

On Sep. 12, 2019 surface escorts from the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (CSG) left their homeports to kick off an overseas deployment.

The aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) did not.

After the carrier was sidelined at the end of August with a malfunction in the ship’s electrical distribution system, engineers continue to assess the problem. “The aircraft carrier’s repairs are progressing, and all efforts are being made to deploy the carrier and air wing as soon as possible,” according to a Navy statement to USNI News.

In the meantime, the surface ships in the strike group are forming their own surface action group (SAG) and deploying with neither the carrier nor the air wing.

Norfolk-based USS Forrest Sherman (DDG-98) and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG-60) will join ArleighnBurke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Lassen (DDG-82) and USS Farragut (DDG-99) which departed Mayport, Fla.

The SAG will be led by the DestroyernSquadron (DESRON) 28 and her staff, along with elements of the carrier strike group staff. To make up for capabilities typically found on the carrier particularlynin the areas of maintenance and technical support, the SAG staff brought innabout 15 additional personnel, 2nd Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis toldnUSNI News.

The SAG will also take with it a detachment of MH-60R helicopters from Helicopter Maritime Squadron (HSM) 72 out of Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville, Fla.

“This group is going to deploy more than likely to multiple regions, and they are going with a much higher-end capability, with helicopter detachments with significant anti-submarine warfare capability, significant air defense capability, as well as strike warfare capability,” Lewis said. “So really a full-up group, minus the carrier and the air wing. But full-up, very capable group is going off to do the nation’s bidding in this great power competition.”

According to Lewis, this is the first time anSAG has deployed from the East Coast since 2006. He added that it was an unusual and unfortunate situation to send a SAG in lieu of a full carrier strike group.

“The situation with Truman frankly is unfortunate; obviously we’re working really hard to fix it and we will fix it, but it’s unfortunate – nobody wanted that to happen certainly. But we’re going to make this into what it really is, which is, we’ve still got a massive capability that’s going forward on time, and that will be even more amplified when Truman comes out.”

Having a carrier strike group deploy without an aircraft carrier is a largely unprecedented move by the service. There are several past instances where a carrier was stuck in maintenance or otherwise unable to deploy on time, and another carrier in the fleet was able to swap in and take its place.  For instance, when USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) didn’t leave the yard on time for its 2015 deployment, Truman went in its place.

However, the ongoing maintenance backlog in the East Coast’s aircraft carrier fleet leaves the Navy with no ready aircraft carrier available to sub in for Truman, if needed.

The one example of a CSG sending its escorts out ahead of the carrier occurred with the Nimitz CSG in 2013. USS Nimitz (CVN-68) had an emergent maintenance issue arise in November 2012, so its destroyers deployed in January 2013 and the carrier was in maintenance until March, rejoining the DDGs that were operating as a SAG in the Pacific.

Lewis said the carrier brings the deterrent effect, but the cruiser and destroyers bring the most in-demand naval capabilities.

“If you look at the missions that are in demand by naval forces, by high-end naval forces, much of them can be classified in the maritime security operations, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare.

“There’s no question that not having the aircraft carrier, does detract from the symbolism and the deterrent effect, no question. The aircraft carrier is a behemoth beast with an amazing capability that, shows up off your shores, and if you’re not our friend you become our friend quickly if you know what’s good for you. There’s no question that that effect is lost with smaller ships, but these ships are really really capable,” he continued.

As for the fate of the carrier, Lewis said engineers are beginning repairs and continuing to assess the full damage to the electrical system.

“They’re in the process of repairs and identifying all the root causes that they can at this point,” he said. “We fully intend to deploy the aircraft carrier at a later time. We obviously can’t talk about that timeframe right now and what it’s going to be right now, but we’re pressing forward with that and it will deploy and rejoin the group at some point. So it goes to the dynamic capability of maritime forces.”

Asked for a ballpark of how much longer the repair would take, Lewis, said, “I can’t say because I don’t know.”

Even without the carrier and air wing, “we have an important mission ahead,” Capt. Jennifer Couture, the commodore of Destroyer Squadron 28, said. “SAG operations allow the Commander tremendous flexibility and responsiveness in the types of missions that can be conducted, and geographic reach into varied and diverse areas. The SAG ships are ready and able to support a variety of exercises and missions with our partners and allies in support of maritime stability and security around the globe.”

Photo by U.S. Navy

“Everybody was lucky. We didn’t sink, no one got burned. We even managed to kick out the ‘enemy’ for a long time,” Vladimir Evseenko, K-314 Captain.

In March 1984 USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), with more than 80 aircraft and eight escort ships, entered the Sea of Japan to take part in a joint U.S.-Korean exercise codenamed Team Spirit-84.

Such a powerful CSG not far from the Soviet Far East could not go unnoticed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet the Victor-Class nuclear submarine K-314 was ordered to follow the aircraft carrier.

On Mar. 14, Kitty Hawk was located by K-314. The Soviet submarine began the chase of the US Navy aircraft carrier which soon discovered that it was followed by K-314 and did what it could to break away from the Soviet submarine.

According to Russia Beyond, this cat-and-mouse game continued for a week, until something unexpected happened.

On Mar. 20, K-314 rose to a depth of just 10 meters after having lost track of USS Kitty Hawk due to bad weather.

Captain VladimirnEvseenko discovered that the entire USS Kitty Hawk CSG was only 4 to 5nkilometers away through the periscope. More alarmingly still, the Americans and K-314 were heading towards each other at full throttle.

Evseenko gave an immediate order to submerge, but it was too late. K-314 and USS Kitty Hawk collided.

“The first thought was that the conning tower had been destroyed and the submarine’s body was cut to pieces,” Evseenkonrecalled. “We checked the periscope and antennas – they were in order. No leaks were reported, and the mechanisms were ok. Then suddenly another strike! On the starboard side! We checked again – everything was in order…. We were trying to figure out what happened. It became clear that an aircraft carrier had rammed us. The second strike hit the propeller. The first one, most likely, bent the stabilator…”

The only option for K-314 was to surface and show themselves to the Americans. As its sailors were waiting for emergency tow ships, the Soviet submarine immediately received a visit from several U.S. Navy aircraft which inspected K-314 from above.

“We immediately launched two helicopters to see if we could render any assistance to them but the Soviet sub appeared to have suffered no extensive damage,” said Kitty Hawk’s commander, Captain David N. Rogers.

K-314’s propeller was heavily damaged as a result of the collision. Kitty Hawk instead had a huge hole in its bow, causing several thousand tons of jet fuel to leak into the sea; by sheer miracle, it did not explode.

Luckily, nor did the nuclear weapons on board the Soviet and American vessels detonate.

Close escorted by a US Navy frigate for part of the route, the Soviet Submarine was towed to the nearest Soviet naval base.

For USS Kitty Hawk, exercise Team Spirit was over: the aircraft carrier made its way to the port of Subic Bay for repair.

The Americans blamed the Soviet submarine captain for the incident, and the Soviet Naval command concurred. VladimirnEvseenko was suspended from the post of captain and continued his service on land.

Evseenko could not agree with such a verdict, since the incident had caused no loss of life or the submarine itself: “Everybody was lucky. We didn’t sink, no one got burned.”

“We even managed to kick out the ‘enemy’ for a long time,” he pointed out.

Photo by U.S. Navy

The latest Aircraft Recovery Bulletin by the U.S. Navy enables propeller aircraft: C-2A Greyhound, E-2C Hawkeye, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and jet aircraft: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler to perform flight operations aboard USS Gerald R. Ford.

The latest Aircraft Recovery Bulletin (ARB) by the U.S. Navy has cleared the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system to recover all existing fixed-wing aircraft operating aboard its aircraft carriers.

The ARBs enable propeller aircraft: C-2A Greyhound, E-2C Hawkeye, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and jet aircraft: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler to perform flight operations aboard USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).

“The entire team did a tremendous job accelerating the schedule and working through challenges,” said Capt. Ken Sterbenz, program manager for the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment program office (PMA-251). “This achievement is another significant step toward ensuring the system can support the ship’s full airwing.”

ARBs are official Navy instructional documents identifying the weights and engaging speeds authorized for shipboard arrestments of specific aircraft, along with other pertinent information.

“Release of the ARBs signifies ‘Naval Air Systems Command’s stamp of approval’ for the AAG system to safely recover these type/model/series aircraft aboard the Navy’s newest class of aircraft carriers,” said Jeff Mclean, deputy program manager for AAG System Design and Development.

The team, in collaboration with prime contractor General Atomics, continues to execute the requisite SystemnDevelopment and Demonstration testing at the land-based test sites located atnJoint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.

Mclean added, that comprehensive testing of new systems like AAG is critical, and not only ensures the technology meets Navy requirements but also ensures it is operationally safe for use in the fleet.

Prior to Props and Jets ARB generation, the team conducted more than 2,500 dead-load arrestments at the Jet Car Track Site (JCTS) and 1,420 manned aircraft arrestments at the Runway Arrested Landing Site.

“The pace of system testing was consistently demanding and required numerous team members to perform their duties in difficult conditions and in all types of weather in order to meet critical program milestones leading up to these ARB releases,” said Mclean.

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) is the lead ship in the Ford-class of an aircraft carrier, the Navy’s first new class of aircraft carriers in more than 40 years. The AAG system is designed to arrest a greater range of aircraft, reduce the fatigue impact load to the aircraft, and provide higher safety margins while reducing manpower and maintenance. AAG is one of more than 20 new systems incorporated into the Gerald R. Ford-class design, giving it the warfighting capability essential for air dominance in the 21st century, including the flexibility and resilience to rapidly adapt to emerging threats, and the cost-effectiveness to support overall Navy shipbuilding priorities.

Photo by U.S. Navy

As the F-4B’s own electrical systems took over, causing a power surge, there was a tremor beneath the left wing and a single Zuni flashed across the Forrestal deck and severed an ordnance man’s arm…

Fires on overcrowded aircraft carriers are every crew’s nightmare. Several of these accidents took place during the Vietnam War. The first to hit TF 77 was started in a magnesium flare locker aboard Oriskany (CV-34) in October 1966, killing 25 pilots and 19 sailors and taking the carrier out of the war for nine months. Of all the lethal ordnance aboard carriers, the Zuni rocket was involved in the most disastrous onboard fires. One of these occurred aboard Coral Sea (CV-43) on Oct. 18, 1967, when nine sailors were burned after a Zuni ignited during a test on deck. Crewmen near an F-8 Crusader onboard Hancock (CV-19) had also been badly burned when a Zuni misfired earlier that same year.

However, nothing compared with the fire onboard Forrestal (CV-59) that almost destroyed the ship on Jul. 29, 1967 — only its fifth day on the line in the Gulf of Tonkin. As explained by Peter E. Davies in his book US Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1964-68, VF-11 F-4B BuNo 153061 AA 110 was one of three loaded with six LAU-10/A Zuni pods on TERs rather than the 2.75-in rockets that the pilots had expected. The aircraft had flown an 0700 hrs mission earlier that day and returned with a hung Mk 82 bomb, so loading LAU-10/As was seen as a time-saver in order to meet the aeroplane’s 1100 hrs launch deadline.

Another shortcut unofficially employed by Forrestal’s deck crew was to attach the ‘pigtail’ electrical connection between the TER and the rocket launcher receptacle while aircraft were still ‘spotted’ in their pre-taxi positions on deck. The official instruction was that this last-minute connection should be plugged in ‘just before takeoff’, which most assumed to imply ‘on the catapult’ in order to prevent the possibility of inadvertent rocket launching at other aircraft on deck rather than out to sea. The system’s other safety backup was a ‘TER pin’ that was placed in a receptacle on the rocket-firing intervalometer mechanism, blocking the current from reaching the Zuni and firing it off. TERnpins were supposed to remain in place until seconds before launch, but to save further time in the frantic launch schedule of an Alpha package these pins were being removed earlier while the aircraft was still being pre-flighted. Sadly, deck crewmen were apparently unaware that both these safety measures, each one supervised by different personnel, were being overridden together. They also had little experience with a TER electrical system, which included a switch that was vulnerable to electrical surges.

Lt Cdr James E Bangert, a pilot of F-4B BuNo 153061 and squadron safety officer, was unaware of the two conflicting shortcuts, although he had been disquieted to learn that weapons were being armed early to hasten the launch sequences. As he pre-flighted his F-4B a crewman checked all the armament circuits and found no stray voltages, so he plugged in the Zunis’ pigtails. Bangert fired up his starboard J79 and signaled to crewmen to disconnect the yellow external power cart used to provide power for the start procedure in the absence of an internal battery. As the F-4B’s own electrical systems took over, causing a power surge, there was a tremor beneath the left wing and a single Zuni flashed across the deck and severed an ordnance man’s arm. It then impacted the external fuel tank of an A-4E Skyhawk (Lt Cdr Fred White’s AA 405 of VA-46) in the row opposite the line of F-4Bs. Although it did not explode, the rocket cut into the fuel tank, spraying fuel all over the flight deck. The A-4E, and those of Lt Cdr John McCain and Lt(jg) David Dollarhide, were instantly engulfed in flames as the fuel was ignited by jet engine exhausts.

There was a possibility that the burgeoning fire could have been contained by Forrestal’s vigilant fire crews, but far worse destruction was to follow as two 1000-lb M65 bombs fell from the wing pylons of the A-4Es. The shortage of new, low-drag Mk 83 bombs at the time had forced the ship’s commanding officer, Capt John Beling, to accept delivery of 16 World War 2-vintage M65s from Subic Bay, where they had been subjected to open-air storage in jungle conditions. His initial reaction had been to refuse the bombs, and many of the ship’s ordnance men also threatened to boycott the corroded weapons, some of which had been stored since 1953. They were known to be much more heat-sensitive than Mk-series ordnance and susceptible to shock detonation, while their explosive power was actually increased by chemical degeneration during storage.

The suspect bombs were uploaded for the day’s strike as early as possible, partly to get them off the ship. When the fire began they started to detonate within 1.5 minutes, rather than allowing a ten-minute window for the firefighters to tackle the blaze as the thicker-skinned Mk 83s would have done. Massive holes were blown through the carrier’s flight deck and blazing fuel cascaded into the lower decks. In all, nine bombs cooked off, and when the fire was eventually defeated after 12 hours 134 men had been killed and many more injured. Forrestal’s CVW-1 lost 21 airplanes, including seven F-4Bs, and a further 34 aircraft sustained serious damage. CVA-59 returned to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard for an extensive rebuild that cost more then $72m. It was replaced in TF 77 by fellow Atlantic Fleet carrier America.

US Navy F-4 Phantom II Units of the Vietnam War 1964-68 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Navy