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planes

Capt. Thomas, the co-pilot of Charcoal 01, the first B-52 shot down during Operation Linebacker II

by Till Daisd December 25, 2021

He was the father of Derrick Thomas, a linebacker and defensive end for the Kansas City Chiefs who was elected to the NFL Hall of Fame in 2009. Capt Thomas never got to see his son play football

An American flag serves as a backdrop to an image of Capt. Robert J. Thomas and a B-52G Stratofortress. During Operation Linebacker II over North Vietnam in 1972, Thomas was the co-pilot of Charcoal 01, the first B-52 shot down. After being declared missing in action for almost 6 years, the captain’s remains were finally recognized in 1978 and given back to his family by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. John Q. Public claims that on January 27, 1997, when the captain’s son, linebacker Derrick Thomas of the Kansas City Chiefs, visited Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, the picture was a part of a display given to him.

He was the father of Derrick Thomas, a linebacker and defensive end for the Kansas City Chiefs who was elected to the NFL Hall of Fame in 2009. Capt Thomas never got to see his son play football.

Seventy-five Airmen died supporting the operation, 33 of whom died in the 15 downed B-52 Stratofortress bombers—the primary bombers flown during Operation Linebacker II. More than 700 sorties were flown out of Andersen AFB and U-Tapao Royal Thai Airbase, Thailand, during the operation, which is also known as the 11-Day War or 11 Days of Christmas. Fifteen thousand tons of munitions were dropped mainly on military targets in North Vietnam by the completion of the operation.

Photo by U.S. Air Force

December 25, 2021 0 comment

History

An Operation Bolo hero honored with a new bridge over Pensacola Bay

by Till Daisd December 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

In Southeast Asia,
Gen. Chappie James served as deputy commander for operations and later vice wing commander of the 8th TFW. Along with Robin Olds, James formed a strong leadership and combat team, inevitably dubbed “Black Man and Robin.”

The Gen. Daniel Chappie James Memorial Bridge is the name of the new Pensacola Bay bridge, according to the Pensacola News Journal.

The campaign to rename the bridge in honor of the illustrious U.S. Air Force (USAF) general was led by former congressional candidate Cris Dosev, who presented the idea to the Escambia County legislative delegation in December 2019 at a local public hearing ahead of the legislative session.

The idea was well received by local legislators, and Sen. Doug Broxson proposed that Dosev schedule a meeting with his office.

James was the first African American four-star general in the U.S. Air Force. James was appointed as the Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) on September 1, 1975, a position he held until his retirement on February 1, 1978. In 24 days, he passed away.

James, a veteran of World War II, the Korean War, and the Southeast Asia War, described his feelings on his experience as an American serviceman as follows: “I’ve fought in three wars and three more wouldn’t be too many to defend my country. I love America and as she has weaknesses or ills, I’ll hold her hand.”

His son, Claude James, stated that the family was in favor of renaming the bridge in the general’s honor.

“It’s a perfect acknowledgment of one America’s greatest leaders and defenders who never forgot where he came from,” the son said. “And throughout his history-making career, he gave credit to his mother’s little school on Alcaniz Street that prepared him to succeed in and love and defend his country.”

Dosev, a former pilot with the United States Marine Corps, claimed that he had always admired James.

“Everyone is talking about the fact that we no longer have heroes to emulate,” Dosev said. “Well, we do. We do, and that hero is Gen. Chappie James. And I think that the community in a large part has forgotten who this man was, and what he did, and that’s sad.”

New Pensacola Bay bridge could be named after Operation Bolo Hero Gen. Daniel Chappie James — *General Daniel “Chappie” James, Jr. in front of his McDonnell-Douglas F-4C Phantom in Thailand during the Vietnam War.*

“A statue of James will be erected in the new park near the bridge landing on the Pensacola side,” Dosev added, in addition to renaming the bridge in the general’s honor. Dosev intended to place a static display of an F-4 Phantom II fighter jet behind the statue.

During Operation Bolo in the Vietnam War, James piloted an F-4.

He served in Southeast Asia as the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing’s vice wing commander and deputy commander for operations when he met Robin Olds, an ace pilot, and wing commander, whom he had already known during his time at the Pentagon. The two guys inevitably earned the nickname “Black Man and Robin” for their effective leadership and combat abilities.

Perhaps the pinnacle of their professional collaboration was Operation Bolo. It was an aerial trap designed by Olds for adversary MiGs that had been hitting heavily laden F-105 fighter bombers flying to their targets while dodging US fighter escorts.

Beginning the operation in January 1967 was a force of F-4 fighters posing as an F-105 flight. The F-4s made use of F-105 refueling altitudes, approach routes, airspeeds, radio call signs, and more distinctive indicators. According to Aces and Aerial Victories, the official history of the USAF in Southeast Asia, the F-4s were also given ECM pods for the first time to deceive the enemy’s missile and flak tracking and acquisition radars.

This deception force had four F-4C aircraft per flight. At 3:00 p.m. local time, Olds piloted the first flight and arrived right on target over Phuc Yen, northwest of Hanoi. No MiGs.

Unbeknownst to Olds, enemy ground control had forced a 15-minute delay in MiG takeoffs owing to cloudy conditions.

Then James led Ford Flight, the second group of F-4s. It emerged from the clouds five minutes after Olds, on schedule. The MiGs emerged at that same moment. The subsequent melee may have been the biggest fighter engagement of the Vietnam War.

Three MiGs attacked James’ flight right away. One came from the 6 o’clock low and two from the 10 o’clock high. James unexpectedly found himself flying very next to his opponent as he transitioned from a steep right break to a left bank, in what he subsequently described as a “strange encounter.”

“For a split second, [he] was canopy-to-canopy with me. I could clearly see the pilot and the bright red star markings,” James said in an after-action report. James barrel-rolled to gain separation for attack and fired one Sidewinder. It missed as the MiG broke hard left. But the North Vietnamese pilot had evaded James only to put himself in the flight path of Ford Flight’s No. 2 aircraft, flown by Capt. Everett T. Raspberry Jr. A few more maneuvers, and Raspberry put a Sidewinder up the MiG’s tailpipe.

By the time it ended, 12 F-4s had engaged 14 MiGs, winning seven confirmed battles without losing any.

One of the Vision Pensacola organizers, Pensacola urban planner Alan Gray, supported the idea and created renderings of what the memorial at the base of the Bay Bridge would look like. Alan Gray also submitted the winning design for the new bridge.

The bridge already had a name under Florida law, the Philip D. Beall Sr. Memorial Bridge, thus, it presented one of the remaining obstacles to designating it after James.

After being chosen as the Senate’s president in 1943, Pensacola state senator Beall passed away while still in office. Kirke Beall, his grandson, has fought to maintain the name on the bridge.

Beall did not object, nevertheless, to the bridge sharing a name.

“As long as it’s a good person and they are deserving of it, I am glad to have my grandfather’s name next to it,” Beall said.

“My motivation is to promote Gen. Chappie James,” Dosev said. That’s my motivation… I don’t want the memory of Chappie James to be forgotten.”

Photo by Pensacola News Journal and U.S. Air Force

December 24, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

F-4 Vs F-8: the first “All-Weather Interceptor” vs the “Last of the Gunfighters”

by Till Daisd December 24, 2021

written by Till Daisd

*“The F-4s got off to a horrid start when running into F-8s. Their reputation was dog-s**t,” Jerry B. “Devil” Houston, former F-8 driver*

One of the most versatile fighters ever constructed was the McDonnell two-place, twinjet, all-weather F-4 Phantom II, which could reach high speeds of over twice the speed of sound. It served in the first line of more Western air forces than any other jet. The F-4 became the fastest, highest-flying, and longest-range fighter in the U.S. Navy only 31 months after its maiden flight. It first flew on May 27, 1958, and entered service in 1961.

In contrast to the F-4’s “all-weather interceptor” role, many of the Phantom’s early cruises were as paired squadrons with F-8 units, which were considered “day fighter” (or, in the F-8 pilots’ opinion, “fighter”) units, as explained by Peter E. Davies in his book Gray Ghosts, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps F-4 Phantoms. When the F-4 started to outnumber the Crusader and F-8 drivers began switching to the Phantom, the antagonism between the two communities grew more intense. Before making the switch, Jerry B. “Devil” Houston, who flew Crusaders with VF-11, summed up the situation as follows:

“The F-8 stole your heart from the get-go with its beauty and, for its time, power (God, an afterburner!), but it quickly earned an ensign-killer reputation, rightly or wrongly. In the long run, that reputation contributed greatly to fighter pilot development in the Navy: only the top ten percent of pilot graduates were even considered for the F-8 pipeline—the créme de la créme. And as luck would have it a damn solid base of mid-level stick-and-throttle talent groomed the hungry youngsters into frothing-at-the-mouth tacticians. Without experiencing it, anyone would be hard-pressed to understand the aura that surrounded that early F-8 Crusader community. An ensign in F-8s took no crap from a Lieutenant Commander who flew anything else. Period.

“Among that small, but growing privileged group, anyone in the first few squadrons knew damn near exactly where they stood in the overall tactics ladder. Killing, capability meant everything: King of the Mountain, in spades. Gunnery, tactics, gunnery, tactics, just enough intercept training to get you into the sky with another victim. F-8s didn’t bomb then—hell, the plane didn’t even have hardpoints on the wings. In other words, everything funneled the best pilots and the best airplanes through a narrow training spout, and out popped the world’s best fighter pilots. They all ate, breathed, thought, and dreamed about fighting airplanes. All the time.

“The F-4, on the other hand, was an ugly, two-seated, gas-hog monster that hit the Fleet with a bunch of F3H Demon interceptor pilots. Consequently, the F-4s got off to a horrid start when running into F-8s. Their reputation was dog-s**t, and the ex-Demon drivers didn’t have a clue about changing it. So they practiced intercepts, avoided tactics, and groomed follow-on clods in their own image. All the while that lovely top ten percent advantage kept aircrew infusing the Crusader community with superior talent, which rapidly molded into long-clawed killers. The rich got richer—and even richer. Better people, better training, frightful competition. Crusader pilots didn’t have to brag; they owned the sky. So it remained, until finally, an F-8 jock got into an F-4, screaming and dragging his heels all the way. The rest is history.”

F-4 Vs F-8: the rivalry between the first

F-8 pilots and tactics, which were initially transferred from their squadrons to the Phantom, undoubtedly sped up the development of F-4 ACM training. In 1971, Jerry Houston referred to his VF-51 as a “double-barreled Crusader squadron with an extra set of eyeballs in each plane” as the unit transitioned from the F-8J to the F-4B. However, the need for ACM was recognized far earlier than then, and it certainly predated the late 1960s initiatives that gave rise to the Top Gun ACM training project.

Photo by U.S. Navy

December 24, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

The Egyptian MiG-15 pilot that perfectly ditched his stricken aircraft in Lake Bardawil

by Till Daisd December 20, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Abd el-Rahman Muharram, the pilot of the stricken MiG-15, flew exceptionally well and his subsequent ditching in the shallow waters of Lake Bardawil was a remarkable piece of airmanship

These intriguing pictures from 1956’s Suez War feature the first Egyptian Air Force (EAF) MiG-15 lost in combat. On October 31, 1956, an Israel Air Force (IAF) Mystére piloted by Capt. Yakov Nevo damaged its right wing, which was being flown by pilot Abd El-Rahman Muharram. Muharram was compelled to ditch his aircraft at Lake Bardawil, where the Israelis discovered it.

Nevo recalls: ‘A short burst from 600 yards missed, a second one from 400 yards missed, the third burst lasted until I got as close as 200 yards.’

The Story of the Egyptian MiG-15 Pilot that Perfectly Ditched his Stricken Aircraft in Lake Bardawil

The Egyptian fighter was hit in its starboard wing. As told by Tom Cooper and David Nicolle in their book Arab MiGs, Volume 1, the official Israeli account adds no further detail about the combat, unlike an extravagant later version that spoke of the Mystére pilot “flying alongside his helpless victim, so close that he could see the Egyptian’s head”.

Some unofficial versions suggest that the Israelis attacked the Egyptians “out of the sun”, while others maintain that, having been joined by two Israeli aircraft, which were out of ammunition, it was the Israelis who were bounced by Muharram and another MiG. All at least agree that the pilot of the stricken MiG-15 flew exceptionally well and that his subsequent ditching in the shallow waters of Lake Bardawil was a remarkable piece of airmanship.

The EAF pilot in question was Abd El-Rahman Muharram. Having graduated in 1955, he was among the youngest pilots in his squadron. He was close friends with Pl Off Fuad Kamal, who told Muharram’s story:

‘Abd al-Rahman Muharram escaped from the Israelis after being hit in the wing by going down to extremely low altitude, flying at “zero feet,” and making abrupt maneuvers. Before ditching in Lake Bardawil, there were no enemy aircraft close to him and the story that an Israeli flew alongside and could see the MiG pilot’s face is nonsense.’

After safely ditching in the lake and then escaping back across the Suez Canal, Abd al-Rahman Muharram remained in the EAF and rose to high rank. Much later the Israelis found the ditched MiG, salvaged the aircraft, and brought it to Israel for testing. Its photographs appear in most accounts of the 1956 War. The plane eventually ended up as a trophy in front of Hatzor AB.

Photo by Israeli Air Force

December 20, 2021 0 comment

History

Mike Adams, the only Pilot who died during the X-15 Flight-Test Program

by Till Daisd December 20, 2021

written by Till Daisd

At a height of around 62,000 feet and a speed of roughly 3,800 feet per second, the X-15-3 aircraft broke up because the weights on it increased above their structural limits

A well-known and important figure in aviation history is the X-15. Its goal was to fly quickly and high, testing the aircraft and putting the pilots through challenges that might later face astronauts. In addition to being the first piloted aircraft in the world to reach hypersonic speeds, or more than five times the speed of sound, it made the first manned flights to the farthest reaches of space. In the 1960s, the X-15 was a crucial tool in the development of spaceflight, and X-15 pilots who flew at altitudes greater than 50 miles were awarded astronaut wings.

In total, 199 flights were made by the three X-15 aircraft between 1959 and 1968. It was a collaborative project between the US Air Force, US Navy, and US NASA.

Almost every X-15 flight experienced some sort of technical issue or malfunction; occasionally, there were many issues on a single flight. It is remarkable that during the 199 flights of the whole X-15 program, just one pilot, Mike Adams, perished.

Mike Adams was the twelfth (and last) pilot in the X-15 program, according to John Anderson and Richard Passman’s book X-15 The World’s Fastest Rocket Plane and the Pilots who Ushered in the Space Age.

The Story of Mike Adams, the only Pilot to lose his life during the X-15 Flight-Test Program

Michael Adams, a veteran pilot with six prior X-15 flights, boarded the machine on November 15, 1967, for a mission intended to test a guidance display and carry out several experiments. He had practiced the specifics of this flight in the simulator for more than 21 hours. He descended to 45,000 feet at about 10 a.m. as usual and then climbed to 266,000 feet. After takeoff, an electrical disturbance caused the MH-96 dampers to trip out as the plane rose to a higher altitude.

The dampers were reset by Adams. To more precisely manage the experiments, he then changed the sideslip indicator’s mode to a vernier attitude control mode. In order to see his sideslip during the approach to landing, he intended to reset this back to indicate the yaw angle when returning to base. However, he was unable to see the airplane yawing at a crucial point in the flight as a result of this equipment shift.

After burnout, he experimented with wing-rocking while soaring, and as he neared his max altitude of 266,000 feet, the rocking became extreme. His instrument was accidentally adjusted to show pitch attitude rather than yaw, thus he was unaware that his yaw had drifted to 15 degrees. The aircraft began to yaw violently around 15 seconds later, and Adams informed Pete Knight that “the airplane seems squirrelly.”

He soon after claimed that he was spinning and experiencing strong accelerations. The ground crew was unable to provide assistance since they were mostly unaware of the airplane’s hypersonic spin characteristics. When Adams recovered, he was yawed 90 degrees, flying upside down, and descending at supersonic speed, according to the ground data that was later correlated with the flight data.

The Minneapolis-Honeywell adaptive flight control system (MH-96), which is on and locked in, causes the aircraft to oscillate between its limits, up and down, preventing Adams from correcting his attitude and flying his way home. Adams pulled out of the spin, and he probably would have had a successful landing, but for the fact that the MH-96 was on and locked in. The X-15-3 aircraft broke up at a height of around 62,000 feet and a speed of roughly 3,800 feet per second because the weights on the aircraft increased above their structural limits. In close proximity to Johannesburg, California, it struck the desert floor. There was talk about Adams having slight vertigo; this may have prevented him from seeing the yaw buildup or from resetting the yaw indicator to the yaw setting.

Adams’s death shows the dangers of flight testing a new aircraft in previously untested regions of flight, and of flying experiments in which certain research-data measuring instruments may have caused an electrical disturbance that affected the MH-96 from operating at its top quality and in conditions it was not designed for. All of these factors could have had an impact on the disaster.

Because his flight was above 50 miles high, Adams was posthumously awarded an astronaut rating. Despite being the only accident in 199 flights, the tragedy was a setback for the X-15 program. The disaster had a significant role in the decision to end the X-15 program because the goals for the aircraft had been met. Only seven more flights were scheduled after that.

Photo by NASA

December 20, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

SR-71 crew’s encounter with Soviet MiG-31 over Barents Sea

by Till Daisd December 15, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“I assumed the Soviet MiG-31 fighter pilot would like nothing better than an opportunity to fire his missiles at an SR-71 Blackbird. Certainly, the SR-71 Blackbird would be a prized target,” Ed Yeilding, former SR-71 pilot

Major Mikhail Myagkiy, a retired Soviet MiG-31 pilot, participated in several attempts to intercept SR-71 Blackbirds during Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Operations Program (PAROP) missions to the Barents Sea area.

According to his logbook, Myagkiy has conducted 14 successful SR-71 intercepts:

21 August 1984

14 March 1985

18 March 1985

15 April 1985

17 July 1985

19 December 1985

20 January 1986

31 January 1986

21 February 1986

28 February 1986

1 April 1986

6 October 1986

23 December 1986

8 January 1987

SR-71 Aircrew remembers a Memorable Encounter with a Soviet MiG-31 Interceptor over the Barents Sea

Two of these intercepts were carried out by Ed Yeilding aboard an SR-71. Yeilding discusses the intercept from October 6, 1986, in Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions (Revised Edition), written by Paul F. Crickmore.

As Yeilding recalls one of his “Barents missions was especially memorable because we had an encounter with a Soviet MiG-31. Because most details of Blackbird flights were classified at that time, I made no notes about the encounter, so I cannot verify the date of the encounter. I am certain that RSO Curt Osterheld was with me at the time. Curt and I had only two tours together at Mildenhall, so the encounter was between 25 Aug 1986 and 8 Oct 1986, or between 14 Apr 1987 and 7 May 1987. (I don’t remember why that second tour was only three weeks.) I think the encounter might have been the last flight of our first tour. My flight records show we had a 4.1-hour mission with Blackbird tail ‘980 on 6 Oct 1986.

“On that memorable MiG-31 encounter mission, I was glad to be flying with Curt, an outstanding RSO admired by all, and, by the way, one of the most popular Habus. There we were, 71,000ft, starting our Mach 3.0 reconnaissance track, heading east just outside the territorial waters of Russia’s Murmansk area coastline. I knew Curt was very busy in the rear cockpit with his many duties monitoring and managing cameras, sensors, and navigation. I kept a constant crosscheck of the many indicators and controls in the front cockpit, watching carefully for potential system failures, and maintaining stable airspeed and the most efficient altitude for our weight.

“After Curt and I completed our first pass flying south-east parallel to the Russian border, gathering imagery and electronic intelligence, our mission track turned us left about 90° and northwards, directly away from Russia over the Barents Sea. After the turn and perhaps another minute in that northerly direction, we turned 180°, and flew directly towards and perpendicular to the Russian coast.

“Our altitude then was probably about 75,000ft. At that altitude, we could see the horizon 335 miles away and see the slight, but noticeable, curvature of the earth. The view was grand. Ahead were miles off the Barents Sea and snow-covered Russia beyond. In the distance far ahead, at perhaps 100 miles, I could see a long, bright white Russian contrail flying directly toward us, but at a much lower altitude. I knew it must be a Soviet fighter, probably a MiG-31, then the newest Soviet supersonic interceptor. I raised my periscope and saw that we too were leaving a long contrail. I knew the fighter could see our contrail as easily as I could see his. Since we were flying a routine reconnaissance track that the Soviets had seen many times, I knew the fighter knew exactly where we would start our 90° right turn to parallel the coast in a westerly direction.

“I imagined the Soviet fighter pilot was much like me, with a love of aviation and trying hard to be one of the very best. I also assumed he had orders to fire his missiles if I was late with my turn and slipped over Soviet territorial waters to within 12nm of Soviet land, and I assumed the pilot would like nothing better than an opportunity to fire his missiles at an SR-71 Blackbird. Just three years prior, on 1 September 1983, a Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Air Lines 747 that accidentally crossed into Russian airspace north of Japan, killing all 269 aboard. Certainly, the SR-71 Blackbird would be a prized target.

“I believed the Soviet fighter would not fire his missiles as long as we stayed on our usual track, but I also knew he or his ground controllers could mistake our position as being closer than we actually were. In the 1980s, we were not too concerned about missiles as long as we maintained our high altitude and high speed. From my previous years of flying intercepts in the F-4 fighter, I knew the newer MiG-31 would still have difficulty maneuvering to the required launch envelope even if he knew our exact flight path. Also, in the high altitude thin air, we believed that missile maneuverability, range, and proximity fuses were not adequate to bring down the Mach 3 Blackbird. For radar-guided missiles, our low radar reflectivity further decreased the missile ‘probability of kill’, and we had a jamming capability for further assurance. I knew our contrail could help him visually put his piper on us for a heat-seeking missile lock-on’. We had no defenses like flares against heat-seeking missiles, but again, we believed that the missile ‘probability of kill’ was very low due to our high speed and altitude. I was determined to fly the track as planned and get the pictures.

“Flying straight toward each other in our supersonic jets, I was reminded of two gallant medieval knights galloping full speed toward each other, only I did not have a weapon. For survival, Curt and I depended on accurate navigation to keep us just outside Soviet territorial waters to prevent a launch, and we depended on our superior speed and altitude in case missiles were launched.

“The fighter’s contrail was holding constant altitude and was heading straight toward us, but far below, perhaps altitude 40,000ft I guessed. I imagined he might be accelerating for a possible steep climb toward our altitude. I watched our distance indicator count down to our turn point, decreasing a mile every two seconds. As always, I was prepared, if necessary, to start the turn manually with the autopilot roll wheel or with the flight control stick, but at our turn point, the autopilot automatically initiated our 90° turn to the right.

“Our 90° turn toward the west was programmed for 32° of the bank. In the turn, I kept a close watch on my instrument panel as always, ready to handle any malfunction. During my instrument crosscheck, I turned my head frequently to watch the fighter’s contrail and saw that he was in a very steep climbing turn toward us. Perhaps a minute into my turn, while turning my pressure suit helmet with my hands so that I could see behind, I saw the grey metal of the fighter, low at my left 7:30 position, at the top of his steeply climbing contrail. We were still in our right 32° banked turn, but I could see him, barely larger than a dot. I could not discern any identifying features like twin tails or distinctive shapes. From my F-4 experience with intercepts and visual acuity, my best guess is that 8 miles were his closest approach. He appeared to run out of airspeed at the top of his contrail, at maybe 65,000ft or about 10,000ft below us. I saw his nose drop below the horizon and fall away. Curt and I stayed on course and got the pictures.

“During my three years of flying overseas reconnaissance missions, I frequently saw contrails far below of potentially hostile fighters, but that day, above the Arctic Circle over the Barents Sea, was the only time I saw a Soviet fighter get close enough that I could actually see metal, though barely larger than a dot and only because our routine track was predictable. Back at Mildenhall, during our debriefing, our intelligence officer told us, with near certainty, that the interceptor was a MiG-31, the premier Soviet supersonic interceptor at that time.”

In the back seat with Ed on Oct. 6, 1986, intercepted was Maj Curt Osterheld. He recalls:

Remembering Gil Bertelson, the SR-71 driver that saw three sunrises on one particular Blackbird mission

“Ed’s description of operations in the Barents Sea is perfect. We knew that the mission was strategically critical in keeping an eye on the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet. But we were also aware that if something went wrong with the airplane, the crew did not have many options. Given that we were operating under the rules of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Programme (PARPRO), our path was predictable, and the Soviets used us for ‘training’… both for the surface-to-air missiles and fighter intercepts. I do have a very clear memory of turning westbound away from Novaya Zemlya (a.k.a. Banana Island). Looking out the right window and with the help of the mirrors, I could see we were pulling a fat contrail at 75,000ft. Looking down I could see a pair of circular contrails, which, I assumed, were Soviet fighters setting up for a ‘practice’ intercept. We believed that the only chance an interceptor (MiG-31) would have at a decent shot was a ‘beak-to-beak’ pass. I believed like Ed, the velocity of closure and geometry of the required maneuver gave a very low PK (Probability of Kill) to this shot.”

Photo by U.S. Air Force and Dmitriy Pichugin via Wikimedia Commons

Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions (Revised Edition) is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 15, 2021 0 comment

History

Why the Intruder was the ideal CAS aircraft according to ex USMC A-6 pilot

by Till Daisd December 12, 2021

written by Till Daisd

“During Operation Desert Storm the B-52s heavily involved in CAS missions flew ten-hour missions from Diego Garcia. None had the external racks they used in Vietnam. They carried only 56 500-lb bombs. Two A-6s did more damage than a B-52” Capt Tom Uryga, former USMC A-6 pilot

During the Vietnam War, the Grumman A-6 Intruder served as the “Main Battery” of carrier aviation, and it was still in use by the US Navy and US Marine Corps (USMC) in 1996. The A-6 was still the most effective USMC strike aircraft during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991 because it was a true all-weather, day/night precision bomber.

Capt. Tom Uryga joined the VMA(AW)-224 “Bengals” in the early spring of 1990. He was an Eastern Washington University graduate. Uryga participated in the early ODS strikes as one of the USMC A-6 pilots;

`In the first part of the Gulf War, we started out with deep strikes on Basra, Shaibah, and Tallil. We’d use a mix [of ordnance], since the weather was shitty; 2000-lb LGBs and 2000-lb “steel nose cone”. We’d try to pickle the LGBs right in the middle of the basket. On the first night of the war we came back with better BDA [Bomb Damage Assessment] than the F-117s had.

`My first mission was with a guy named Rob McCarthy, an RAF Exchange officer, and Tornado navigator. He had absolutely no fear of death — he had flown in the airshow demo team for the Tornado where they do the 100-ft inverted near-supersonic pass. Nothing scared Rob.

`First night we flew, we’re heading into Iraq, and we’re heading into Shaibah airfield. This was the first time we had actually flown with the [navigation and formation] lights out and relied on the green formation lights instead – the lights on every jet were different. Some lights had burned out, which meant you couldn’t tell what was what. You thought you were rendezvousing on Battlestar Galactica because of all the different lights.

`Off to the left side, as we’re crossing the Gulf, you could see the SAM launches and AAA in Kuwait City – huge, holy shit, look at this stuff. Rob’s got his head in the boot, doing updates. We’re getting up there over the salt marshes, and little stuff – red tracers – was arcing below us, with bigger stuff, white tracers, reaching up higher to about 20,000 ft. Then you had some big AAA, big white bursts up at our altitude, but it was less frequent. I think the red stuff was ZSUs – it was disturbing enough, but you knew they weren’t all radar-guided because you didn’t have a lot of radar warning about everything.

`About this time Rob pulled his head out and said, in typical British fashion, “I say, Tom, it appears those blokes are shooting at us.” “No shit, Rob. Put your head back in the boot.”

After weeks of deep strikes and related operations, according to Rick Morgan’s description in his book A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96, on February 20 Marine units switched to Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) as their primary function in order to prepare for the ground assault. The employment of “Kill Boxes,” which were latitude and longitude grids where FACs, familiar with their assigned zone, would call in aircraft to target Iraqi army units as they were located, was crucial to the success of this mission. As the enemy forces realized they had little chance of escaping the Allied air force, the process proved lethally effective and contributed to their eventual mass capitulation.

Former USMC A-6 Pilot explains why the Intruder was the perfect CAS Aircraft — A U.S. Marine Corps Grumman A-6E Intruder from Marine all-weather attack squadron VMA(AW)-224 Fighting Bengals on the flight line at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina

During the last several days of Desert Storm, Capt. Uryga piloted a number of BAI sorties;

`The Air Force called the Kill Box missions CAS – what we Marines called CAS the Air Force called crazy!

`The B-52s [heavily involved in Kill Box operations] flew ten-hour missions from Diego Garcia. None had the external racks they used in Vietnam. They carried only 56 500-lb bombs. Two A-6s did more damage than a B-52. They just salvoed the entire load in one pass. Their BDA pictures showed mile-long strips of closely spaced craters, usually laterally displaced from their targets [largely due to 100-knot high-altitude winds]. Carpet-bombing made a lot of noise but didn’t hit much.

‘The typical Hornet load was four or six Mk 82s or Rockeyes. Without tankers, they had about ten minutes of time-on-station [TOS] in Kuwait. They made one pass, dropped two bombs, and then went feet wet to a tanker, gassed up, came in, and dropped the rest, before going home and getting credit for two combat missions on one flight. Pretty cheesy way to earn air medals. No [Marine] A-6 ever saw a tanker, yet we had more than 40 minutes TOS, even in northern Kuwait.’

The Intruder’s outstanding endurance made it a firm favorite amongst the Marines fighting the war on the ground. One FAC attached to the infantry was an EA-6B NFO, who stated post-war; `Our first three choices for CAS aircraft were, No 1, the Intruder, No 2, the Intruder, and No 3, the Intruder. It had plenty of bombs and enough gas to stick around. The Hornets had less of each, and as for the Harriers, if we didn’t have a target ready for them when they checked in they almost always went right back to the tanker.’

Photo by U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy

A-6 Intruder Units 1974-96 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 12, 2021 0 comment

History

Ex Egyptian MiG pilots offer a novel viewpoint on Israel’s “pre-emptive” attack on EAF airfields during the Six-Day War

by Till Daisd December 1, 2021

written by Till Daisd

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden under cover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks,’” EAF MiG pilot Tahir Zaki’s phone conversation with Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba

The Israeli attack on four Arab air groups on June 5, 1967, known as “Operation Moked” (“Focus”), has essentially already been covered in great detail. One of history’s most lauded and successful military missions was this one. Simply put: that fateful morning’s “pre-emptive” Israeli onslaught on Egyptian airfields in Sinai, on the Suez Canal, and elsewhere destroyed the UARAF’s fighting capacity (United Arab Republic Air Force, designation of Egyptian and Syrian air forces between 1958 and 1962, and of the Egyptian Air Force until 1969). The IDF/AF also defeated Egyptian resistance by maintaining multiple strike waves over important enemy airfields for most of the day.

According to Tom Cooper and David Nicolle in their book Arab MiGs, Volume 1, on June 5, 1967, six MiG-15s and MiG-17s were flying above Egypt early in the morning. At daybreak, two MiG-17s from No.18 Squadron conducted a CAP above Israel’s border. At least two MiG-15s departed for a training operation at 8:00 a.m. from one of the Suez Canal airfields that were unhindered by the early-morning fog.

El-Arish AB was the target of rocket and cannon fire from Israeli fighter planes at around 08:45 local time. The attack by the Ouragans was so unexpected that the majority of the MiG-17s of the No. 18 Squadron were destroyed before their crews could even understand what was happening. A MiG pilot for the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) could only draw the following conclusion:

`There was no warning at all. The aircraft at el-Arish were completely wiped out. In the evening of that day, pilots and ground crews were sent back to Cairo.’

Somewhat inaccurately, another EAF MiG pilot, Tahsin Zaki later complained: `It is important to point out that in June 1967, the Israelis attacked el-Arish air-field ten minutes before the rest of our airbases, and that the whole battle could have been different if the commander at el-Arish had contacted Meliz AB via the hotline.’

Former Egyptian MiG pilots provide an unprecedented perspective on Six-Day War

Other UARAF airfields were not attacked earlier than El-Arish. A formation of Mirage IIICJs hit Bir Thamada at the exact same moment. FM Fawzy (Maj-Gen, Egyptian Army Chief of Staff for Operations) did, however, later offer a potential explanation for why Israel was able to quickly neutralize No.18 Squadron and el-Arish AB. He claimed that the CO el-Arish AB worked for the Israelis for most of the 1960s and divulged all the specifics of his directives to them.

While Kabrit was the center of UARAF MiG-15 and MiG-17 missions at the same time as el-Arish and Bir Thamada, the IDF/AF did not classify Kabrit as a “major target.” However, SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron, under the command of Yakov Nevo, launched a sustained attack on it. EAF MiG pilot Mustafa Hafez found himself frantically looking for a functioning aircraft to take off and fight back as a result of this causing significant damage:

`I was not actually due to fly that morning. Around 08:20 hrs I was in the mess since I was due to fly later that day. No particular aircraft had been allocated to me since this was normal in our air force. We flew what was available. Suddenly I heard explosions and went outside the mess, and asked people what was going on. Someone said that it must be practiced somewhere. That was when I saw an Israeli aircraft attacking, very low from south to north, coming in towards the runway. It was a Super Mystére.

‘My first instinct was to run towards a ditch, but as soon as I got there I said to myself, “what am I doing here like an idiot?” So I ran to the squadron bus so I could get to the squadron headquarters. There I found the regimental CO. He had previously been my squadron leader at Abu Suweir. His name was Mamdouh Taliba, an excellent man. He was actually heading for his car so I went up to the passenger door. The CO drove to the nearest available aircraft, and I helped strap him in, though we weren’t absolutely sure that this aircraft was ready to go. Just as he was about to close the hood I noticed that the safety pin of the ejector seat was still in, so I pulled it out. I think he took off on a sub-runway as the main runway had already been hit.’

The Israelis were occupied engaging two I1-14s, the aircraft carrying FM Amer (Egyptian Minister of War) and his entourage, which were now flying directly in the middle of their attack, so Wing Commander Mamdouh Taliba and another pilot from No. 31 Squadron were able to launch their attack without being interrupted by SMB.2s. Before the Israeli formation was caught by two MiG-21s and lost two of its own aircraft, both means of transportation were declared as shot down.

Actually, the I1-14 carrying the Iraqi Defense Minister and Egyptian Minister Hussein el-Shafie arrived at Fayid safely before the location first came under attack (and their 11-14 destroyed on the ground). However, after Fayid AB was attacked as well, the aircraft carrying Amer was forced to abort the landing. It turned and crossed over Inchas. Amer gave the pilot the go-ahead to head toward Cairo West after spotting this base on fire. All the time, additional Israeli fighters were flashing by. In the most important phases of the war, the Egyptian military’s Supreme Commander was cut off from his headquarters.

After this initial attack, there was a short break, and Mustafa Hafez continued looking for a serviceable aircraft.

‘Then I tried to find another aircraft. They were all either damaged or being serviced or were not ready to go. Then I went to hangar….’

Around 08:50 hrs., a second attack on Bir Thamada occurred, and the pilots of No. 25 Squadron hurried to take off. A number of them took off as the base was attacked by Ouragans, who claimed to have destroyed six MiGs. The final UARAF jets that attempted to roll for takeoff were less fortunate; both MiG-17s blew up after taking numerous hits from Israeli cannon fire. Nothing comparable occurred at el-Sur; all of the MiG-15bis from the No. 24 Squadron that were still parked there, along with a few MiG-17s from the No. 18 Squadron, were destroyed on the ground.

Meliz AB also managed to scramble numerous MiG-17s despite being hit by Israeli Ouragans at roughly 08:55 hrs. in June 1967 and despite not being a typical MiG-17-base. However, their pilots were instructed to fly toward the direction of the West rather than fighting weaker opponents. With this, the forces of Air Group 2 and 12 consisting of MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircraft stationed in Sinai practically ceased to exist.

In the Canal Zone, the situation on the airfields was getting worse. Around 8:55 a.m., SMB.2s from No. 105 Squadron launched a second attack on Kabrit. The two MiG-17s piloted by Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba sighted the Israelis over the base as they were still climbing. The Egyptians tried to escape by turning on their afterburners, but the Israeli formation’s Number 2 first reported damage on a MiG-17’s engine and left wing before claiming that the aircraft had been shot down in a subsequent strike. While the available Egyptian sources dispute any such loss, the commander of the Israeli formation confirmed that this MiG crashed. Mustafa Hafez’s search for an operable aircraft ultimately succeeded as Israeli jets were once more occupied with defying orders and fighting in the air:

‘By this time mechanics started coming back after running away as the first bombs fell. That was when I took off in an available MiG-17F. I didn’t even check if it was armed but only asked if it had been refueled. I took off on a sub-runway. By that time, Mamdouh Taliba landed. I didn’t have any plans, only to try and defend the airfield. Once I was up in the air I could see the smoke from other airfields which had been attacked. I hadn’t even cleared my take-off with the control tower, I just took off. Nor did I have any idea what the rest of the squadron was doing. Then I saw something flying very low. It was a Mirage going west to east, so I half rolled in behind it. It was probably doing a reconnaissance as it was on its own and was not attacking targets on the ground. As I followed it I tried to load [cock] my guns three times, but my MiG- 17 was too slow to keep up and after a while, the Mirage just flew off. Of course, I was angry and frustrated because I was unable to shoot down that Mirage. There was a switch in the cockpit that changed the armament from rockets to guns. And I wasn’t the only pilot to make the same mistake. Hisham Said Abdu, who was another instructor, did the same thing.

‘Almost immediately after that, I saw something else very low with a long exhaust of smoke. It crashed into the Suez Canal. I thought it might have been one of my colleagues but in fact, it was probably a SAM. Then, I landed safely. Another of our pilots tried to take off using the main runway but hit some bomb damage which damaged his aircraft so that he had to eject while still on the ground. He survived but he was very lucky because the minimum height for ejecting was supposed to be 250 meters. His name was Muhammad al-Hadidi. This happened after I had landed.’

The attack on Cairo West, a significant UARAF MiG-17 base, was likely carried out using the Mirage Hafez that was trying to launch the attack. A formation from No. 101 Squadron IDF/AF attacked the airfield at precisely 9:00 a.m., claiming strikes on at least three MiG-17 aircraft. However, a few MiGs were still flying because Wg Cdr Zohair Shalabi scrambled with two wingmen right away. Helwan AB in order to scatter his aircraft after spending some time on a CAP. He arrived there at around 09:30 hrs.

The UARAF pilots at Bir Thamada thought they had been under attack continuously for 15 minutes since they had been hit three times in quick succession. Around 9:00 a.m., the final intact MiG-17 on the ground was destroyed by Mystéres of No. 109 Squadron, marking the end of the airfield’s use as a fighter base. Flight Lieutenant Hashim Mustafa Hassan of the No. 25 Squadron reported the peculiar circumstance that emerged only a short while later when another Israeli formation flew overhead:

`Some 30 seconds from the end of the attack, a second wave of planes arrived… We ran about the desert, looking for cover, but the planes didn’t shoot. They merely circled, their pilots surprised that the base was completely destroyed and that no targets remained. We were the only targets… weak humans scurrying in the desert with handguns as our only means of self-defense. It was a sad comedy… pilots of the newest and best-equipped jets fighting with handguns. Five minutes after the beginning of the attack, the planes disappeared and silence prevailed that encompassed the desert and the noise that destroyed our planes and the airbase, and the squadron. They completed their assignment in the best way possible, with a ratio of losses —100 percent for us, 0 percent for them.’

The third Israeli attack on Kabrit occurred around 9:10 a.m., and then another one occurred at 9:25 a.m. This time, up to 18 MiG-15s and MiG-17s were reportedly destroyed on the ground by Super Mystére B.2s of No. 105 Squadron and Mystére IVAs of No. 109 Squadron IDF/AF, increasing the total to 30 since the war started. However, Wg Cdr Mamdouh Taliba stated a completely different scenario when MiG pilot Tahir Zaki called him, sometimes after 9:00 a.m. local time, suggesting that their statements were probably certainly exaggerated:

‘I called him to ask what was happening. He answered, “It’s fantastic, they are attacking the dummy planes on the old runway! The real planes, which had been hidden undercover, weren’t attacked. None of these were hit during the first two attacks. But there were about eight or nine open pens and these had one aircraft in each of them. Some of these were attacked.” These were the only real planes that the Israelis attacked. We also had very big hangars at Kabrit, so we put four MiG-17s in each, one in each corner of the hangar where they were less likely to be hit. And they weren’t.’

The Israelis, on the other hand, only acknowledged being duped by Egypt’s dummy planes at Abu Suweir and Cairo West because they thought the majority of them were constructed of inflatable rubber rather than wood.

However, Mustafa Hafez was forced to flee under the most hazardous conditions a second time following the subsequent attack on Kabrit:

`Very soon afterward I took off again in a different aircraft. This was a MiG- 17PF [serial number 2803]. There had been no time for me to report or to be debriefed. I merely changed aircraft. As I started the engine the airfield came under attack again, perhaps it was the second or third attack. I was still inside the hanger, in the cockpit, when I heard the attack. I cleared the hanger doors at full throttle and afterburner. The aircraft was swerving and rocking from side to side as I turned, first to the left to clear another hanger which was facing my hanger, then to the right along a taxiway, then to the left again to cross a small railway line that ran between the hangers and the main sub-runway, then sharp right onto that sub-runway. I was afraid the wingtips would hit the ground. I took off without a pause and climbed as steep as I could, but the enemy had gone. Taliba had also taken off during the attack.’

Wg Cdr Taliba joined Hafez once they were in the air, and the two formed a CAP over Kabrit. They remained in the air until approximately the time of the sixth Israeli raid on Kabrit, which occurred at around 09:40 hrs.

‘He [Taliba] joined me and told me to accompany him as his Number Two (wingman). As I was joining him I saw a SAM coming towards us. We avoided it but Taliba ordered me to land as I only had 450 liters of fuel left. Taliba had landed and I was on my final approach at a height of about 15 to 20 meters when Taliba shouted over the radio, “Hafez! You have aircraft ahead of you!” So I retracted my undercarriage and flap, gave the aircraft full throttle and afterburner. The Israelis were about 100 meters ahead of me. I counted them, one, two, three, four; so I pulled up and tried to follow the last one. But this meant leaving the turn a bit late. I should have turned earlier. The Israelis were a bit lower than me. All five of us started circling, then one came at me head-on and opened fire. This made me so angry that I swore out loud. The Israeli turned to the right. I turned first to the left and then to the right to try and follow him. A head-on attack is very difficult.

‘That was when I was hit in the right wing. We were all flying at about 200 or 300 meters. My right aileron was damaged and I continued turning right, unable to straighten out, so I gained height. The Israeli couldn’t keep with me as a MiG-17 is better in a climb. My aircraft juddered several times and almost went into a spin. I thought it odd that it tried to spin under those conditions [this was perhaps when his aircraft was hit a second time, in the tail and rear fuselage]. While three of the Israeli aircraft attacked our airfield, the fourth one followed me. After the three have strafed the field, the fourth one did the same, then they all flew home.

Meanwhile, I was still turning to the right, unable to straighten up. As I lined up on a runway I used the aileron trim to straighten out. This wasn’t standard procedure. I don’t know if I invented it or maybe it just came by instinct, but it worked. I had no communication with the ground, but I landed OK. The MiG had been badly damaged. The right wing was damaged, the lower part of the rudder had mostly been shot away, the main control rod to the stabilizer was much damaged. The rear fuel tank had also been hit but fortunately, it had been almost empty, and although there had been a fire in the tank, and the alarm had been set off in my cockpit, I had used the fire extinguisher and this did the trick as there hadn’t been enough fuel to cause a big fire.’

Despite the fact that no Israelis witnessed Mustafa Hafez’s MiG-17 really crash, Major Asaf Ben-Nun of No. 105 Squadron claimed a kill. It’s interesting to note that the Israeli Air Force has never “verified” any other IDF/AF pilot’s claim to have shot down an Egyptian MiG-17 on the first day of the 1967 War. Given that the UARAF did not lose a single MiG-17 in an air battle on June 5, 1967, the precise reasoning behind this Israeli decision is still unknown.

The Israelis expanded their efforts to include the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi fronts after being encouraged by this accomplishment. They completely destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) in a matter of hours before inflicting such heavy losses on the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) that the latter thereafter played essentially no active role in the conflict. No operation in history compares to the IDF/AF attack on that day in terms of effectiveness and significance for the success of the entire conflict and the future of the Middle East.

Photo by Francesco Gasparetti from Senigallia, Italy and Oren Rozen via Wikipedia

December 1, 2021 0 comment

History

The Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui rocket-powered interceptor, the Japanese Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet

by Till Daisd December 1, 2021

written by Till Daisd

On July 7, 1945, the prototype J8M1 Shusui made its one and only powered flight at a high cost

Germany and Japan came to an arrangement in late 1943 wherein the latter would provide its Axis ally with a prototype, blueprints, and motors for the ground-breaking rocket-powered Me 163 Komet interceptor. Japan was also to receive further technical data pertaining to the aircraft’s production process. Both the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) and Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) expressed a strong interest in developing licensed versions of the Me 163 to aid in preventing anticipated B-29 Superfortress bombing raids of the Japanese home islands by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF).

Remembering the Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui rocket-powered interceptor, the Japanese Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet that never was

Japanese military attachés bought a license for a Walter HWK 109-509 rocket engine from the Germans for 20 million Reichsmarks after learning about the Komet and its potential. Despite these agreements, Japan encountered obstacles in getting a full Me 163. On March 30, 1944, the Japanese submarine RO-501 sailed from Kiel, Germany, bound for Kobe, Japan, with a disassembled model and its rocket engine. On May 13, 1944, U.S. Navy ASW aircraft flying out of the escort carrier Bogue sank RO-501 in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

Additionally, when the USS Sawfish (SS-276) sank the Japanese submarine I-29 off the Philippines on July 26, 1944, the Me 163 technical data, blueprints, and engines loaded into the I-Boat were also lost.

Due to these setbacks, as described by Mark Chambers in his book Wings of the Rising Sun, the Japanese were compelled to create their own Komet using a general Me 163 instruction manual that IJNAF engineer Cdr. Eichi Iwaya had acquired. The resulting aircraft, given the IJNAF’s J8M1 Shusui (“Sharp Sword”) and the IJAAF’s Ki-200 designation, was going to be made by Mitsubishi. The Yokosuka-based 1st Naval Air Technical Arsenal also produced the Walter HWK 109-509 engine in the Japanese nation.

Three J8M gliders, known as the MXY8 Akigusa (“Autumn Grass”), were also built by the Arsenal to gather fundamental aerodynamic and handling data for the rocket-powered aircraft. On December 8, 1944, the MXY8 successfully conducted its first flight over the Hyakurigahara airport, with Lt. Cdr. Toyohiko Inuzuka serving as the test pilot. By that time, Japanese engineers had created the 3,307lb thrust Toko Ro.2, their own version of the Walter HWK 509A rocket engine. Last but not least, the J8M1 was to be equipped with two 400-rpm 30mm Ho-155 cannons.

On July 7, 1945, the prototype J8M1 made its pricey first and only powered flight. After a successful rocket-powered takeoff, Lt. Cdr. Inuzuka jettisoned the undercarriage dolly, and the aircraft rocketed upward at a 45° angle. However, the engine shut off as the plane ascended to a height of 1,300 feet, forcing the J8M1 to stall.

Just as Inuzuka was about to successfully glide the plane back to the airstrip, he collided with a small building close to the runway, causing the J8M1 to crash and catch fire. Inuzuka passed away from his wounds the next day. Until the Ro.2 engine could be changed and the issue fixed, all upcoming J8M1 flights were canceled. When the war ended on August 15, 1945, flight testing was supposed to resume along with the J8M2’s development. Seven J8M1/Ki-200s had been made altogether by that point.

Soon after VJ Day, American occupation forces in Nagoya recovered three J8M1s, which were then transferred to the United States in November 1945. One of them was scrapped at “Pax River,” where two of them were transported for a thorough evaluation. In October 1946, one was moved to the Naval Air Station (NAS) Glenview, Illinois, where it was displayed before being scrapped.

The third Shusui was sent to the USAAF, examined there, and then moved to Hollywood, California, where it was also on display for the public. In 1948, Ed Maloney purchased this airplane from a Los Angeles fairground and subsequently added it to his ground-breaking Air Museum in Claremont, California. Since then, after being restored, it has remained a part of this collection and is now on display at the Planes of Fame Museum in Chino.

In 1961, an unfinished J8M 1 was found in a cave near Yokosuka at Sugita. Two years later, it was presented to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. The aircraft, which had been abandoned for a long time, was refurbished by Mitsubishi between 1997 and 2001 and is now on exhibit in the company’s museum in Komaki Minami.

Photo by Alan Wilson from Stilton, Peterborough, Cambs, UK via Wikipedia

Wings of the Rising Sun is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

December 1, 2021 0 comment

Cold War

The U.S. Navy F-4B made an emergency landing aboard the USS Ranger after Vietnamese AAA destroyed its radome

by Till Daisd November 30, 2021

written by Till Daisd

Due to the damage, the F-4B was later broken up for spare parts at Subic Bay, Philippines

The main image of this article shows a U.S. Navy McDonnell F-4B Phantom II (BuNo 150643) of Fighter Squadron VF-142 Ghostriders. From May 5, 1964, to Feb. 1, 1965, VF-142 was part of Attack Carrier Air Wing 14 (CVW-14) on the USS Constellation (CVA-64).

CVW-14 flew the first strikes of the Vietnam War. During a photo reconnaissance mission to the Thanh Hoa Bridge, the F-4B 150643 of the fighter cover (call sign “Dakota 207”, piloted by Fred Ferrazzano) was struck by a 57 mm shell at an altitude of 150 m. This impact destroyed the nose cone, with some parts being ingested by both J-79 engines. Additionally, it was later discovered that the force of the impact had twisted the main spar.

The pilot was able to recover aboard the USS Ranger (CVA-61). Due to the damage, the plane was later broken up for spare parts at Subic Bay, Philippines. Note that the aircraft is carrying an AIM-9B Sidewinder missile.

Noteworthy, 26 years after this incident, another VF-142 aircraft, this time a Grumman F-14B Tomcat (BuNo 161433) aboard the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), had to make an emergency landing when the nose cone came off because of a latching mechanism failure at a height of 8,200 m over the Persian Gulf.

During the departure, the radome came in contact with the canopy, broke out the forward glass, and shattered the windscreen. The pilot suffered a broken right collarbone and glass in both eyes but managed to bring the jet back to the ship for a perfect two-wire landing.

With all the forward glass so badly damaged, the only way to see forward was through a three-inch hole in the left windscreen. The pilot was LCDR Joe Edwards, and the RIO was LCDR Scott Grundmeier. LCDR Edwards was medevac’d to Bahrain for eye surgery, then home to the US.

That time a VF-142 F-14 Tomcat with missing radome made an emergency landing aboard USS Eisenhower

For their remarkable achievement, both crew members received Distinguished Flying Crosses.

Photo by Commander Fred Ferrazzano / U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy via HOME OF M.A.T.S.

November 30, 2021 0 comment

Newer Posts

Older Posts

planes

He was the father of Derrick Thomas, a linebacker and defensive end for the Kansas City Chiefs who was elected to the NFL Hall of Fame in 2009. Capt Thomas never got to see his son play football

In Southeast Asia, Gen. Chappie James served as deputy commander for operations and later vice wing commander of the 8th TFW. Along with Robin Olds, James formed a strong leadership and combat team, inevitably dubbed “Black Man and Robin.”

“The F-4s got off to a horrid start when running into F-8s. Their reputation was dog-s**t,” Jerry B. “Devil” Houston, former F-8 driver

Abd el-Rahman Muharram, the pilot of the stricken MiG-15, flew exceptionally well and his subsequent ditching in the shallow waters of Lake Bardawil was a remarkable piece of airmanship

At a height of around 62,000 feet and a speed of roughly 3,800 feet per second, the X-15-3 aircraft broke up because the weights on it increased above their structural limits

“I assumed the Soviet MiG-31 fighter pilot would like nothing better than an opportunity to fire his missiles at an SR-71 Blackbird. Certainly, the SR-71 Blackbird would be a prized target,” Ed Yeilding, former SR-71 pilot

“During Operation Desert Storm the B-52s heavily involved in CAS missions flew ten-hour missions from Diego Garcia. None had the external racks they used in Vietnam. They carried only 56 500-lb bombs. Two A-6s did more damage than a B-52” Capt Tom Uryga, former USMC A-6 pilot

On July 7, 1945, the prototype J8M1 Shusui made its one and only powered flight at a high cost

Due to the damage, the F-4B was later broken up for spare parts at Subic Bay, Philippines

In Southeast Asia,
Gen. Chappie James served as deputy commander for operations and later vice wing commander of the 8th TFW. Along with Robin Olds, James formed a strong leadership and combat team, inevitably dubbed “Black Man and Robin.”

*“The F-4s got off to a horrid start when running into F-8s. Their reputation was dog-s**t,” Jerry B. “Devil” Houston, former F-8 driver*