It was decided to leave the A-10A Thunderbolt II behind. The “Hog” was never renowned for having cutting-edge technology, and in its post-Operation Desert Storm design, it was only expected to operate until 2018. The Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement (LASTE) system was installed after the aircraft returned from Saudi Arabia in 1991, and it was intended to be the last significant improvement for the fighter. After then, the A-10 wasn’t going to receive any significant upgrades. The A-10 was not to be one of the main beneficiaries of those advancements as the USAF sought the additional technological advancements that had been displayed in Desert Storm.
According to Lt Col James Marks, before LASTE, an A-10’s ability to locate a target only hinged on the pilot’s competence; ‘When I flew the A-10A in Europe back in the 1980s, you were lucky if the old inertial navigation system [INS] fitted in the jet got you to within a couple of miles of the target due to its propensity for drifting. That was where you made your money as an A-10 pilot, employing effective clock-to-map-to-ground skills. You knew the terrain, which meant that the INS was just a reference point that might get you close to the target. It would get you to the ballpark but it wouldn’t get you to home plate. You had to become very adept at knowing the roads, hills, and valleys. INS gave you some corrections for weapons delivery but not a computed bombsight. LASTE gave us computed bombing, a radar altimeter, and autopilot. The A-10 became quite precise as the “death dot” in the HUD [head-up display] made things a lot easier.’
Even though LASTE had been a success, the A-10 would still require an update if it were to serve for another ten years. A modernization was first suggested in 1997, six years after Desert Storm, and Lockheed Martin was given a contract to serve as the prime contractor and systems integrator. Another contract for engineering and manufacturing development of the Precision Engagement (PE) upgrade program, which would eventually result in the A-10C, was given to the business in 2001.
The A-10 would undergo a number of changes as a result of the PE program. The infrared AGM-65D Maverick missile’s single television monitor in the cockpit would be replaced with two 5×5-inch color multifunction screens. New weapons like the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) could now be used by the jet thanks to the addition of a HOTAS (hand-on-throttle-and-stick), new computers, upgraded power systems, and a Mil-Std 1760 databus. Even if the USAF had never requested it, the post-PE A-10 would rank among the most technologically advanced aircraft in its arsenal with the addition of a current-generation targeting pod and a data link.
The 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) committee’s decision to shut down McClellan AFB and its Sacramento Air Logistics Center, however, almost put an end to the PE program. Since the jet’s first entry into service in 1976, the System Program Office (SPO) has called McClellan AFB home. Throughout the following 25 years, the engineering competence (mainly civilian) needed to work on modifications and maintain the jet operating has grown here. The A-10 SPO relocated to Hill AFB in Utah after McClellan’s closure in 2001, but the knowledge remained there. This instantly led to a knowledge gap when it comes to advancing the PE program.
The Air Force Reserve (AFRes) and Air National Guard (ANG) started working on the A-10A+ project, which would fill the gap between the A- and C-models, out of frustration with the circumstances at Hill AFB and the delayed development of the PE program. It thought that such an update would accommodate its requirements and budget range. To incorporate the A-10 in the preliminary planning for combat operations in Iraq, a proof of concept was started in 2002.
Making the jet work with a targeting pod was the main objective of this effort. Even with the aid of binoculars, the pilot would be able to hunt for targets beyond the range of his visual field. In order to integrate a targeting pod with their A-10As, two squadrons—the 118th Fighter Squadron (FS)/103rd Fighter Wing (FW) of the Connecticut ANG and the 131st FS/104th FW of the Massachusetts ANG—pushed the limits.
The A-10’s adaptable interface module was essential for integrating the targeting pod, in this case, the AN/AAQ-28 Litening II (AIM). Maj Thomas McNurlin, who would eventually run the A-10A+ program, described how it worked; ‘The ANG was in a hurry to get a pod on the A-10 as the immediate goal was to use the A-10 in western Iraq. By attaching a pod to the AIM, and after running a few cables, the jet thought it was still talking to a Maverick missile and the pod thought it was talking to a Block 30 F-16.’
The pod could detect its location in space thanks to the cables’ ability to transmit navigational solutions, which made it possible for it to produce coordinates.
‘At this point, Lockheed Martin was saying there was no way to install a pod without building the A-10C, but the Reserve Guard Test Center basically said, “Oh, really?” The latter entered into a relationship with Northrop Grumman, and engineers from both the test center and the company put it all together. When all of this started to prove worthwhile, Air Combat Command [ACC] decided to forgo the standard fielding process, put the capability on the jets, and deploy them with it. It was a temporary modification to the aeroplane that was ultimately unsustainable. Basically, it was a technology demonstrator that ended up going to war. What the ANG and AFRes needed was a long-term solution to securing a targeting pod capability outside of the AIM without having to wait for the A-10C.’
Requests for Lockheed Martin to help the A-10A+ program as the ANG and AFRes program advanced met with resistance. Under pressure from Lockheed Martin, an effort to collaborate with TRW Aeronautical Systems was also given up. The following candidate for the A+ program was Raytheon Indianapolis, and its engineers closely collaborated with ANG and AFRes staff to fully integrate the targeting pod with the A-10.
The Maverick television monitor was changed for a better display so that passengers could examine the photographs the pod had taken, and a moving map display was added to the cockpit. As many as four software upgrades per week may be made without interfering with the Operational Flight Program (OFP) of the A-10 thanks to the software for the system changes living outside of it.
From its initial flight to operational deployment, the A-10A+ took slightly over a year, with the majority of the flight testing taking place at the ANG/AFRes Command Test Center (AATC) in Tucson, Arizona. The 47th FS, a reserve unit stationed at Barksdale AFB, provided the A-10s that the AATC was testing.
Even though the majority of the testing was carried out by just two jets, there were occasionally three “Hogs” operating out of AATC. Because of the ongoing alterations made to the AATC A-10s, they were known as “Frankenhogs.”
The ANG and AFRes continued the push to enhance the combat capabilities of their jets as quickly as possible, despite the A-10C PE program running concurrently with the development of the A-10A+ and its scope shortly to be expanded to cover the entire “Hog” community;
‘The first units to get the A-10A+ would be the Idaho ANG at Boise, the Pennsylvania ANG at Willow Grove, and the AFRes A-10 units at Barksdale AFB. Half the A-10s in the Guard and Reserves were slated for the initial cadre of jets to be upgraded as part of the C-model conversion. The other half was at the very end of the modification line, so what we did was target those jets that would be last for the C-model upgrade and push them to the front of the line to become A-10A+s. That way, the Guard and Reserve had most of the important flying and fighting capabilities in their upgraded aeroplanes, although not the full mission integration of the C-model. However, all of their A-10s had improved baseline capabilities.
‘In the summer of 2007, the Pennsylvania and Idaho ANG units were sent to Iraq, which marked the first time either A+ or C-model jets had undertaken a combat deployment. The following year, three A-10A+ units combined to deploy to Afghanistan, including aircraft from Whiteman AFB that featured the final upgrades for this version of the jet. The latter included a mission software tape that gave the jet full HUD integration of the information collected by the new systems. By then the A-10A+ featured most of the upgrades installed in the C-model, although it lacked the digital store’s management system that allowed the A-10C to carry JDAM. That was a sacrifice we were willing to live with. When you’re working on the cheap you can’t afford to start adding weapons, as that is when things start to get very expensive very fast.
‘We added three computers and a ton of capability that produced a lot of situational awareness [SA] for the pilots. We put out three full mission software tapes and upgraded 102 A-10s for just $18 million. This figure included development, installation, and all of the contract logistics support.’
The book A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2008-14 is available to purchase here.
