The Lockheed SR-71A strategic reconnaissance aircraft could only be intercepted by the MiG-25 until the MiG-31 entered service, making it of particular importance to the Soviet air defense
Lt. Viktor Belenko, a PVO unit pilot stationed at Chuguyevka Air Base north of Vladivostok (other sources indicate Sakharovka Air Base), disappeared after a sortie on September 6, 1976. If he had crashed into the Sea of Japan, his supervisors would not have been too displeased; nevertheless, the news that Belenko had landed at Hakodate International airport came as a huge shock.
It is unclear whether Belenko contacted American military intelligence on his own or was hired by them, as explained by Yefim Gordon in his book Mig-25 “Foxbat” Mig-31 “Foxhound”: Russia’s Defensive Front Line (there is even a theory that “V Belenko” was just a cover name for a trained agent tasked with stealing the newest Soviet military hardware, similar to Clint Eastwood in Firefox). Belenko was expected in Japan and had made preparations for the travel, according to the investigators, who concluded that the defection was not an impetuous move by a disgruntled officer. The moment he had a full fuel load, he made a beeline for Japan while carrying the secret technical manuals. (It was specifically prohibited to bring the manuals on a sortie.)
Nobody at the base had any suspicions about a possible defection. The mission profile called for low-level flying, during which the plane would be invisible to radar on the ground. Fighters weren’t sent up to attempt to find the crash site until Belenko failed to return at the scheduled time, at which point the C began calling him on the radio. Belenko was already entering Japanese airspace, with Air Self-Defence Force planes waiting to escort him, when border guards received word that an aircraft had crossed the state line and was heading for Japan.
If RSBN SHORAN beacons had not been accessible, the MiG-25P’s navigation equipment would not be able to direct the aircraft correctly during extended low-level flight (and of course, they were not). The radio compass might be useful, but once more the pilot would need to be aware of the marking beacon frequency at Hakodate, which nobody at Chuguyevka knew. Belenko overran his landing due to poor judgment because was so nervous, so much so that he damaged the landing gear and rendered the aircraft unflyable. Belenko spoke to the media and asked for political asylum in the United States. Japanese engineers assisted with some of the work while a sizable group of experts from the U.S. arrived to inspect the aircraft.
The Soviet Union put Japan under pressure by requesting the immediate delivery of the stolen “Foxbat.” The MiG-25 was returned in a disassembled and crated state since there were no legitimate legal justifications not to. In order to hide the “surgery” they and the American intelligence specialists had performed on the MiG, the Japanese deliberately did it.
Japanese officials resorted to delay tactics and bureaucratic snags when the Soviet delegation, commanded by General Dvornikov, landed in Japan. The Soviet officials insisted that the containers be opened for inspection to make sure nothing was missing when they were trucked to the port to be loaded onto a Soviet freighter. The Japanese gave them a short window of time on purpose in the hopes that the “Russians” wouldn’t have enough time to verify everything and repack the crates, but they were in for a surprise.
The Soviet experts were quick to find out just how much the West actually knew. It was discovered that the Americans had operated the engines, measured the aircraft’s infrared signature, and thoroughly analyzed the systems, avionics, including the radar, and structural elements before returning the MiG-25 to the USSR. The Americans had damaged some of the equipment since they didn’t know how to use it, so they had to make hurried repairs (foreign fuses and resistors were discovered in the radar set).
The incident sparked a flurry of MiG-25-related news in the international press. Aviation journalists mocked the design as “crude” and “engineering archaeology,” but they also acknowledged that the steel airframe was easy to build and repair without requiring highly skilled repair people and performed well at high temperatures. The radar’s components were judged outdated, but it impressed the West with its two wavebands, which almost removed jamming and were a feature that no U.S. radar had at the time. In fact, according to the U.S., “the MiG-25 is the sole aircraft terrifying the entire world.” According to U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger, the new Soviet interceptor is a powerful enough weapon to significantly alter Western weaponry and strategies.
It is impossible to adequately describe the shock that the Soviet leadership, the Ministry of Defense, and several other ministries felt. The most classified aircraft in the USSR has been stolen by the West! Worse, Belenko’s remarks that were reported in the international press revealed that Western intelligence services had early knowledge of the newest two-seater, the MiG-25MP (Izdelye83). The potential enemy now had the ability to quickly create countermeasures and effectively neutralize the MiG-25.
As a result, the Soviet government, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Aircraft Industry were compelled to take decisive action that was ultimately proven to be the right decision. The Soviet system’s tight and distinct lines of authority motivated the design bureaux and the defense industry to work hard, and barely two and a half years after the scandalous defection, a much-improved MiG-25PD reached production.
Until the MiG-31 entered service, the MiG-25 was the only aircraft capable of intercepting Lockheed SR-71A strategic reconnaissance aircraft that was prowling over the Barents Sea and, more specifically, the Baltic. This made the MiG-25 exceptionally crucial to the Soviet Union’s air defense (although in his autobiography Belenko claims that SR-71s flew off the coast of Russia, “taunting and toying with MiG-25s sent up to intercept them, scooting up to altitudes the Soviet planes could not reach, and circling leisurely above them, or dashing off at speeds the Russians could not match”).
Early in the 1980s, when Poland was experiencing upheaval, the West worried about a potential Soviet invasion. The Americans reportedly found the information provided by observation satellites on the Soviet forces stationed at the western frontiers to be insufficient, and the SR-71s started their missions over the Baltic Sea. The majority of the fighting against these snoopers was done by MiG-25PDs and ‘PDSs stationed nearby.
In addition to the long-term benefit already highlighted, Belenko’s elopement facilitated the transfer of new weapons. In 1979, the first MiG-25 export aircraft were delivered. Algeria, Bulgaria, India, Iraq, Libya, and Syria all purchased the export versions of the interceptor and reconnaissance/strike aircraft, which were slightly downgraded. It was an unusual strategy for breaking into international markets because the plane had to be stolen to start exports!
Photo by Dmitriy Pichugin and Leonid Faerberg (transport-photo.com) via Wikipedia and CIA
